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Abstract
Techniques derived from proof theory for logic alone have been insufficient
as a basis for efficient, elegant automatic theorem proving. They concentrate on
syntax, neglecting both strategy for particular domains and classes of problem,
and guidance from modelling human mathematicians.
A novel technique suggested by Bundy, developing ideas from Ernst &; Newell,
is to reason "middle-out". Often, the overall structure of a proof may be known,
but its details must be fleshed out according to the individual theorem. Con¬
ventional search might use heuristic guidance to backtrack over all possibilities.
Middle-out reasoning uses variables as place-holders for parameters still to be
chosen. These place-holders become instantiated by the requirements of the sub¬
sequent proof. Decisions which would multiply the search space are postponed
until more information is available.
This is an exciting development in search control, making extensive use of
strategic guidance and harnessing tools from human reasoning. This thesis re¬
ports research on its use for the synthesis of tail recursive functions from corre¬
sponding naive functions and for proofs requiring generalisation. It enables the
development of a unified framework for generalisation.
An existing proof planning and development system based on Martin-Lof
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This thesis reports research on middle-out reasoning (.M0£), an attempt to
replicate some of the mathematician's ability to speculate about the approximate
nature of a proof, and then flesh out the details as required by the particular
problem. Such speculation is difficult to harness, making considerable demands
on the mathematician's experience and understanding of proof structure.
I have studied MOZ in the context of two classes of problem:
• Synthesis of tail-recursive programs from naively recursive specifications.
• Generalisation of inductive theorems.
Each of these was rewarding in itself. Proof structures corresponding to tail-
recursive programs have only been characterised theoretically. I developed and
implemented an automatic system to create such proofs in a programs-as-proofs
context. Generalisation has been handled by a number of specialised techniques.
MOZ made it possible to discover, represent and prove these generalisations
within a unified framework. They all contributed to a common purpose, and
followed a similar pattern, which MOZ's flexibility could describe.
Developing automated MOZ solutions for these problem areas also enabled
me to form conclusions about MOZ: its contribution to search control, to the
problem areas I explored, and to a limited extent, what claim it has to psycho¬
logical validity.
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Some motivation for my choices of problem will be provided later in this
chapter. Before that, I will describe MOZ, expand a little on the subject of
speculation in mathematics and then give a very brief overview of the topic
of automated mathematical reasoning, to explain broadly how MOZ relates to
other work in the field as a whole. To end, I will give some implementation
decisions and outline the structure of the rest of the thesis.
1.1 Middle-Out Reasoning
In recent years, meta-level reasoning techniques have had considerable success
in a number of fields of automated reasoning. These techniques recognise a
difference between on the one hand, a problem and the language which describes
it [the object level), and on the other hand, the problem of reasoning about the
object-level problem and the language which describes that (the meta-level). This
explicit separation focuses attention on the control of reasoning, as opposed to
the manipulation of symbols at the object-level. The meta-level will normally use
representations of terms in the object level language in the course of reasoning.
The MOZ technique, as suggested by Bundy is a development of Ernst &:
Newell's version for GPS [Ernst &: Newell 69]. It extends meta-level reasoning,
by allowing the representations of the object level to contain meta-variables,
which represent object-level entities which may, if necessary, be higher-order.
The entities the meta-variables stand for must be legitimate within the object
level language. The significance of such meta-variables is that they can be used
for unknown terms or formulae, postponing decisions about their identity until
more information is available later, whereupon they become instantiated. This
should be contrasted with the usual approach of heuristic selection from amongst
known possible values at each stage.
There are a number of phases in MOZ.
1. deciding that speculation should be attempted;
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2. forming the speculation, using meta-variables;
3. exploring its consequences and finding values for the variables;
4. deciding whether it has succeeded, and possibly selecting from alternative
solutions.
It is convenient to think of the first two of these as the speculation, and of the
last two as resolving its identity. Unfortunately, the word "resolution" already
has another meaning in the field of automatic theorem proving, so I shall think
of steps 3 and 4 as discovery. Strong detailed models of proof structures must be
known which can guide the whole process, otherwise we risk unbridled specula¬
tion and wild goose chases. Such proof structures are determined by the problem
areas to which they relate. It is not yet feasible for computer systems to invent
such elaborate structures for themselves, they must be provided by humans.
Invention may not be too far away, recent work in learning [Desimone 89] has
developed techniques for learning non-sequential proof structures. With suitable
structures, all of steps 1-4 can be automated. Later chapters will show this in
the context of two problem areas.
MOZ has wide implications for search control. Effectively, a whole subtree
(corresponding to all the possible values of the meta-variable) of a search tree
can be explored at once. The identity of each meta-variable may be discovered
progressively, and commitment made to a particular branch only as contingent
decisions create constraints. Search control is concentrated on goal-directed,
structured reasoning, rather than data-directed reasoning.
Reasoning this way is middle-out in the sense that key decisions about values
are postponed to the middle of the process, once specific information is available,
directed by the relevant stage of the overall plan. This should be contrasted
with conventional approaches such as top-down, and bottom-up. A top-down
approach would start with a main plan and refine it into progressively smaller
components, but each refinement would be of a completely instantiated object to
a completely instantiated object. A bottom-up approach would pick instantiated
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bottom level components, and try to assemble them into a plan. A middle-
out approach will also start with a plan, but instead of refining components
which describe instantiated object-level stages, it will reason with uninstantiated
versions, until constraints determine the variables' identities. In principle, a
middle-out approach could be attempted in a bottom-up style, but it would be
more difficult to achieve enough structure to constrain variables sufficiently.
The technique of MOR is domain independent, although efficiency demands
that its management be tailored to the task in hand, as for other forms of search
control.
Greater flexibility brings the need for greater control. Search must be con¬
trolled to pay attention to instantiated items, which provide more information
than variable ones. The use of meta-variables for higher-order object-level enti¬
ties requires special attention, as will be described in later chapters.
In our domain of automatic theorem proving, proof sketches and propositions
containing meta-variables can be expressed by stretching representation beyond
what is allowed by the grammars of the languages of formal logic, which do not
admit meta-variables. Despite this apparent departure from rigour, correctness
can be ensured either by restrictions on the use of the variables, or by running
the instantiated proof through an object level proof system checking afterwards.
Most automated mathematical reasoning techniques are conventional top-
down or bottom-up systems. Dominated by the form of the current expression,
they concentrate on choosing amongst the visible subsequent steps. Recent work
has tried to make more use of strategic knowledge - understanding of proof struc¬
tures and planning. MOR builds on those ideas and moves closer to incorpo¬
rating some of the more psychologically-based advice of such experts as Polya
[Polya 45]. I shall return to this below.
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1.2 Patterns and Speculation
Structured speculation is a core mathematical activity. Mathematicians rely
on their ability to perceive patterns and then select related ones from their
experience and adapt them as required. Adaptations are typically formed by
abstracting a general pattern and using it to provide a structure within which
speculation can take place and to develop a new version of the pattern, tailored
for the current problem. Existing knowledge feeds the speculation. Known
theorems and their proofs suggest connections, patterns and components for
new proofs.
Experienced mathematicians will analyse proofs in order to abstract patterns
from them and use these to suggest more general results and generate new con¬
cepts. Lenat's controversial thesis [Lenat 82] was an attempt to capture and use
their strategies for discovery of new object-level concepts.
Proof structure is vital to guiding the kind of speculation which is likely to be
fruitful. Individual proof components may have their own local proof structures.
A simple example is that a constructive proof of a conjunction always splits into
two subproofs, one for each conjunct.
Knowledge about purpose can supply more structure. For example, decidabil¬
ity proofs are likely to draw on arguments about termination. Indeed structure
may be imposed on a proof precisely in order to make it fit some intention. A
proof of the order of complexity of an algorithm will involve introducing objects
with which comparison can be made. When we generalise a theorem, the knowl¬
edge of whether or not we intend to produce, for example, the special conditions
which ensure tail-recursion will influence the structure we use.
All these means can be used to suggest and constrain speculation. One can
then embark on a "sketch" proof, knowing how to start and approximately how
to proceed, but expecting to sort out the details on the way, as the requirements
become clearer. The clarification, informally, may be something like "I can't
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produce a 2 unless I use X" or (after some inference) "I could try A now,
let's see if that leads to B", or perhaps "Suppose I knew K ...". At the level
of knowledge about the proof process, one may even conjecture that if P were
provable, steps S would be sufficient.
Much of Polya's advice to mathematicians [Polya 45] tries to spark insights
into structure and inspire speculation. Although commonly too high-level to be
used in current automated mathematical reasoning systems, it has been invalu¬
able to many human mathematicians. Typical suggestions are
Can you restate the problem?
Can you think of a similar problem?
In [Polya 45] he writes:
"Heuristic reasoning is reasoning not regarded as final and strict but
as provisional and plausible only, whose purpose is to discover the
solution of the present problem. ... We need heuristic reasoning when
we construct a strict proof as we need scaffolding when we erect a
building."
Pertinent to this experiment with MO P. is his dictum "Examine your guess".
Of this he says:
"Guesses of a certain kind deserve to be examined and taken seri¬
ously: those which occur to us after we have attentively considered
and really understood a problem in which we are genuinely inter¬
ested. Such guesses usually contain at least a fragment of the truth
although, of course, they very seldom show the whole truth. Yet
there is a chance to extract the whole truth if we examine such a
guess appropriately."
In his book "The Computer Modelling of Mathematical Reasoning"
[Bundy 83], Bundy points out the potential contributions of psychology to au¬
tomating reasoning, as yet comparatively unexploited in comparison to those of
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logic. MOR is a limited, but interesting attempt to emulate some of mathe¬
maticians' proof sketches, assuming their structure is known, but details are still
to be ascertained. I will not attempt a detailed argument on the psychological
validity of this technique. It is still too early to make such significant claims, but
to show that this could contribute to such developments, my concluding chapter
will draw on literature from the psychology of mathematics.
Although automating speculation is desirable, it is difficult. The languages
used to describe mathematics are not the same as the language used to describe
the activity of doing mathematics. The various object-level languages of for¬
mal mathematics, including logic, are strict and precise. Their power has been
one reason for the comparative success of automating some mathematical pro¬
cesses, so giving them up is risky. But escaping a little, while still allowing the
mathematical language to make suggestions, is attractive. That is the choice of
MOR.
This kind of problem is common in Artificial Intelligence research. The ques¬
tion is, "What sort of meta-language should be used to describe the activity,
and how should it relate to the object language?". The solution explored in this
thesis spans issues both of language and of search control.
1.3 A Brief History of Automated Mathemati¬
cal Reasoning
Philosophically, there are differing opinions on what mathematics is, and how it
relates to mathematicians and the rest of the world. Platonists regard mathe¬
matical objects as existing, immaterially, in their own terms, independently of
humans. Intuitionists view it as the product of our design, inextricable from the
world. Although this affects their beliefs about the meaning of mathematics, and
the operations it is valid to use within it, in many contexts it has comparatively
little effect on the style of that operation. Whatever standpoint is taken, formal
mathematical proofs still function in terms of their own symbols.
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For classical logic, Herbrand's theorem shows that the provability of a
quantifier-free formula of predicate calculus is consequent only on the language
of the formula. Proof is thereby separated from external notions of truth. The
possible number of proofs which might need to be considered is much reduced.
This crucial result has made it possible to concentrate on the symbols and
the rules for manipulating them. Once computers became available, the initial
temptation was to use their considerable powers of symbol-crunching to try
out all the possibilities. Even using standard procedures such as normalisation
[Gilmore 60], [Davis & Putnam 60], it rapidly became clear that this was neither
adequate, efficient nor elegant.
Improvements were sought by refining the standard procedures for managing
logical expressions. The resolution rule [Robinson 79] arose from this approach,
and was further refined in the multitude of work on uniform proof procedures.
Uniform, that is, with respect to the nature of the proposition to be proved
and its associated theory. Such refinements exploit purely structural logical
properties, such as whether all sentences correspond to Horn clauses. They are
not tailored to theories or to proof patterns, unlike automated reasoning systems
developed later.
Such uniform procedures are highly data-driven, operating in single steps
determined by the current state of the expression being worked on. The search
inherent in such tasks can still be huge, and so attention focussed increasingly
on what strategic guidance could be given.
A solution to these search problems was attempted in systems like PRESS
[Bundy &; Welham 81] and the Boyer-Moore theorem prover NQTHM,
[Boyer &; Moore 79], [Boyer &: Moore 88], which were developed after careful ex¬
amination of the structure of solutions to, respectively, solving algebraic equa¬
tions and proving theorems involving induction. The resulting implementations
were designed around domain-specific structural guidance.
ClAM [Bundy et al 88],[Bundy et al 90a] consolidates and extends the lessons
of using strategies designed from domain knowledge. It is a shell for develop-
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ing custom-built and general purpose strategies. The Mathematical Reasoning
Group at Edinburgh has successfully used ClAM for inductive theorem proving.
The group has pioneered the use of proof plans to achieve desired proof struc¬
tures. These plans, built around methods which perform regular components of
proof, implement strategic knowledge about proof structures. Chapter 5 contains
a detailed account.
In contrast, the guidance we might expect from studying the psychology of
mathematicians' processes has been little used, as has already been stated, since
it is so high level and allusive.
MOR. tries to incorporate some of these more speculative, allusive pieces of
guidance, supported by our existing powerful domain-guided strategies.
1.4 Tail-Recursive Optimisation
There are a number of well-known types of optimisation, of which tail-recursive
optimisation is one. It permits compilers to avoid the building of a stack of calls
when a procedure is defined in terms of itself. This is possible if the result of
each call completes the execution of the function which called it. The number
of recursions is unchanged, but there is a saving in space. Indirectly, of course,
that results in a time saving, since less time is spent managing a smaller stack.
The development of general techniques for optimisation, as opposed to in¬
dividually honing each program procedure, has been a valuable development in
computing. Optimisation of code is desirable for efficiency, but potentially diffi¬
cult, as the translations required may be tricky and the result unintuitive. This
brings with it the possibility of a number of types of error:
• attempting an optimisation when it is inappropriate;
• attempting the wrong optimisation;
• making mistakes during the optimisation conversion;
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• making mistakes when the more opaque optimised code is subsequently
modified.
It is desirable that programmers write clear maintainable code, while relying
on machines to take on the overhead of transparent conversions for efficiency.
Machines can only achieve this through applying general procedures.
Tail-recursive optimisation is an interesting task for experimentingwith MO R,
as, in the problems I attempt, it involves reasoning about meta-variables repre¬
senting higher-order object level entities, and is essentially a program synthesis
problem. The programs-as-proofs principle means that program synthesis can
be realised by theorem proving in constructive type theory, as will be described
in chapter 3. In such systems as Oyster and NuPRL (see chapters 2 and 3), an
executable program can be produced corresponding to a synthesis theorem.
The key features of this work were the use of a characterisation of proof
structure corresponding to tail recursion, and the implementation of a system to
find proofs with this structure automatically using MO R.
Using the programs-as-proofs principle, and given a standard recursive spec¬
ification, a new program is synthesised using a general plan of a proof structure
which will yield a tail-recursive program. Realising this plan involves specu¬
lation about a function to build the computation so far onto an accumulator.
The meta-variable representing this speculation forms part of the definition of
the new program, and represents something which is higher-order at the object
level. This approach is unlike transformational optimisations, where the existing
steps are re-grouped and re-ordered.
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1.5 Generalisation
Generalisation lies at the heart of mathematical discovery. It is a powerful tool
with a variety of roles - amongst others, it may be used to:
• define new concepts (in the limited sense of extending or recombining ex¬
isting ones),
• turn proofs developed around specific examples into ones valid for ranges
of examples,
• produce more readily provable versions of true, but less readily provable
formulae.
These activities require the vision and grasp of structure that comes with ex¬
perience, otherwise they are liable to lead to pointless or impossible notions.
Nonetheless, with such versatility, it is not surprising that generalisation is a
common device.
Generalisation's suitability as a candidate for experiments with MO R is clear,
particularly for the second and third of the roles described above. These are spec¬
ulative mathematical activities, still with an obligation to provide a constraining
structure.
We see generalisation's outcomes in terms ofmore powerful results, but rarely
the process which leads to the formulation of these new theorems. Van der
Waerden's account of a lunchtime brainstorming proof of Baudet's conjecture
[der Waerden 71] is an unusual example of this. His description brings out one
surprising feature of generalised theorems - in the context of induction proofs
they may be easier to prove than their "simpler" originals. The reason for this
is that induction gives us an extra hypothesis very similar to the goal to be
proved. If we strengthen the goal by generalising it, we strengthen the induction
hypothesis too. This was part of the insight which led to my choice of problem
class.
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To cover the diversity of all possible generalisations would be unmanage¬
able, not least because there are so many alternative generalisations of any one
theorem. Tail-recursive optimisation is, in fact, a type of generalisation. The
success of the representation technique used there suggested that it might be
more widely applicable.
Initially, I studied those classes of problems which are standard generalisation
problems in inductive theorem-proving. In all of them, it is clear that generali¬
sation has a particular role, that of enabling the use of the induction hypothesis
to complete a section of the proof. Eventually I saw how it was possible to make
this enablement of induction the guide, by using At 02 as a speculative device
to explore the generalisation of segments of the theorem obstructing a successful
inductive proof. This is in contrast to taking the usual approach of noticing
repeated terms in the original theorem.
Taking induction-enabling as a motivator turned out to be a unifying and
fruitful approach to controlling the instigation and identification of successful
generalisations. By doing this, a number of apparently separate classes of gener¬
alisation could be dealt with within a single approach. This approach subsumed
existing generalisation techniques, and could also deal with problems outwith
their domain of relevance. The change of motivation provided an analysis of
inductive proofs requiring generalisation. Chapter 9 describes this.
1.6 Implementation Decisions
The key components of my experiments with MO2 were plans for known proof
structures and the use of higher-order unification for MO2. It was necessary to
decide whether to implement a proof-planning system on top of a higher-order
logic-programming system, such as AProlog, or make higher-order unification
available within the existing ClAM proof-planning system (described in chap¬
ter 5) and its underlying constructive logic proof development system, Oyster
(described in chapter 3). The latter had some clear advantages:
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• The essence of the technique is in describing strategies to achieve proof
structures. This is exactly what ClAM is for. The meta-variables are a
device to enhance this.
• The power of higher-order unifiability was only needed for a restricted num¬
ber of specific cases, whereas most of the processing was regular program¬
ming which could take place in ordinary Prolog. Also, the proof-planning
system would run extremely slowly if it had to run entirely in AProlog.
• By virtue of its basis in a constructive type theory, Oyster is capable of
supplying executable programs for the tail-recursive synthesis proofs.
Consequently, C1AM/Oyster was chosen as the primary vehicle, and higher-
order unification was made available through augmenting ClAM's repertoire of
available predicates.
1.7 Outline of Thesis
Although the MOR representation used is similar in both my work on tail-
recursion optimisation and that on generalisation, the nature of control infor¬
mation used differs. The bodies of work comparable to each of them have little
in common with each other. Where appropriate, I shall deal with the two topics
separately.
In chapter 2 I give a broad review of related work. Chapters 3 and 4 present
relevant theoretical work on logic and type theory, and on higher order unifi¬
cation. The basic ClAM proof-planning system is described in chapter 5. The
account of my own work starts after that, beginning with the implementation
of MOR, in chapter 6, and followed by its use for tail-recursive synthesis and
generalisation in chapters 7 and 9. Chapters 8 and 10 compare this research to
other work addressing similar problems. Lastly, I draw conclusions and discuss
further work which could be pursued in chapter 11.
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Chapter 2
Context and Review of Related Work
The purpose of this chapter is to give some background about related work.
Detailed comparison with the work described in this thesis will be addressed in
chapter 8. As well as introducing some basic notions, this chapter will provide
context for my work. Relevant work is in a number of areas:
• the general area of theorem proving applied to similar types of problem.
Since my work is intimately bound up with the control of the proof pro¬
cess, it is important to describe this control for comparable systems, albeit
briefly;
• algorithm and program synthesis;
• generalisation;
• unification;
• meta-variables, where the term meta-variable is intended to mean specif¬
ically, the use of a variable at the meta-level to represent an object level
entity.
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2.1 Control of Automatic Theorem Proving
Automatic theorem proving has made great progress over the last decades. The
approaches are diverse and the extent of the automation varies. Some, such as
Otter [McCune 89], are based on refinements of resolution techniques. NuPRL
[Constable et al 86] and Boyer &; Moore's system, NQTHM [Boyer & Moore 79,
Boyer &; Moore 88], are intended to form interactive systems, with macros of in¬
ferences controlled by program code (tactics) completing sub-proofs of arbitrary
complexity. Such tactics may be more or less automatic, depending on their
prior guidance from the user. The domain over which the proofs are to be com¬
pleted is used varyingly to supply heuristics. Gelernter's system [Gelernter 63]
supplied a model, which was used to prune the search space.
Although most automatic theorem proving has been based on first-order
predicate calculus, some higher-order systems exist, such as Gordon's HOL
[Gordon 88]. Paulson's Isabelle [Paulson 86] is also higher-order, and can han¬
dle a variety of object-level logics. More recently the Logical Frameworks
[Harper et al 87] was designed to host work on a variety of logics. LCF
[Gordon et al 79] and NuPRL each use special purpose logics designed for their
links to computable functions. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt a
general account of theorem proving, and I will concentrate on those aspects and
systems most relevant to the work reported here.
Without intending to define a clear division, it is worth distinguishing be¬
tween automatic theorem proving and a computerised logical system with some
automated components. Many theories have decidable portions. It is valuable
to identify these and build decision procedures for them, for use as adjuncts to
the proof process. There still remains the decision as to when to use them. Most
interesting areas are undecidable, so for them we must use heuristic processes to
attempt automatic proof, including the use of any available decision algorithms.
In the context of interactive systems, however sophisticated the heuristic and
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non-heuristic systems are, there is the possibility of expecting user control to
invoke a lower level module.
Consequently, theorem proving can be seen to be working at different lev¬
els to complete proof segments - decision procedures, controlled by automated
heuristics, which may in turn be controlled or assisted by a human, in an interac¬
tive system. If the reasoning about proof is kept explicit, a heuristic meta-level
may make decisions about when and how to use decision procedures. In a wholly
automatic system, the heuristic level must take full responsibility for control, as
it is the highest level.
The ClAM system, which provides the vehicle for my work, is totally auto¬
mated. It is described in detail in chapter 5, but I will summarise it here for
the perspective that this gives on other work. ClAM is a proof-planning system,
applying heuristic guidance at a meta-level. Plans are formed by combining
components called methods. These are freestanding objects which perform stan¬
dard operations in the domain under consideration. They may also be explicitly
combined to form larger methods embodying strategic knowledge. Methods are
represented as frames. Each one contains
• preconditions, which the planner can use to assess its applicability at any
point,
• postconditions, which compute the subgoals resulting from its use on the
current input, and
• an object level tactic to carry out the effect of the method.
Certain methods generate no subgoals, and are treated specially, since they cause
termination of proof branches. The planner has a few search strategies, from
which the human user chooses. Starting from an initial problem state, strategies
guide the planner in constructing a combination of methods which give a solution,
i.e. there are no outstanding subgoals. Methods' tactics can be combined in
the same pattern as the methods were, to form an entire object level solution.
By working at a meta-level ClAM is able to describe proofs structurally and
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use explicit strategies and planning to attempt proofs completely automatically.
Details of the object level, such as time-consuming well-formedness goals, are
avoided until the major decisions have been made.
Although ClAM's main collection of methods is tailored largely for proofs of
first-order formulae involving induction in the Oyster system, there is no inherent
reason why it should not be extended to other types of theorem and logic. Indeed
others have adapted it in this way [Wiggins 90].
As my work extends this system for particular types of theorem, as opposed to
underlying logics, it is appropriate to relate it to other systems with comparable
applications, i.e. the automated components of other induction theorem provers
addressing similar problems.
2.1.1 Boyer & Moore's Theorem Prover
Part of the original inspiration for the ClAM system was to rationally reconstruct
the Boyer &; Moore theorem prover, NQTHM an essentially object level system,
described in [Boyer &: Moore 79] and [Boyer &z Moore 88]. NQTHM is capable
of proving a large and varied collection of theorems requiring induction in such
domains as number theory and the LISP language itself. It operates on a first-
order logical system and is capable of expressing the basic datatypes of LISP,
such as numbers and lists, along with definitions of their construction, from
which it defines well-founded induction schemes.
NQTHM is a cumulative system, which proves theorems which are then added
to the body of rules available for rewriting, user-labelled according to the purpose
for which they may be used. It is constructed around a list of what they call
"methods" but in ClAM's terminology are tactics. These are attempted on the
current proof goal in a "waterfall". In this the methods are tried sequentially
until one applies, whereupon the whole process starts again on the resulting
goal(s). No other explicit organisation to form strategies is available.
Strategic knowledge is implicit, in that symbolic evaluation is the first in the
list, along with other simplifying techniques, but induction and generalisation,
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complicating techniques, are among the last. A great deal of effort goes into the
use of these expensive techniques to apply them wisely. A complex algorithm
determines which variable induction should be performed on, and what induction
scheme should be used. Generalisation is much hedged about with conditions,
as I will explain later.
The lack of explicit strategy makes it difficult to detect whether any progress
is being made. The system may be getting into a loop of generalisation and
induction, or even generalising to a non-theorem.
NQTHM is a very powerful theorem prover capable of proving thousands of
theorems without human interaction, although it has an interactive mode. It
can automatically prove some complicated verification theorems. However, it
does not address synthesis, as all variables are assumed universally quantified,
and there is no mechanism for existential quantification, which is required for
synthesis.
2.1.2 LCF and Related Work
LCF stands for Logic for Computable Functions [Gordon et al 79]. It is an
interactive system for proof development, based on classical, not constructive
logic. Consequently it does not embody the propositions-as-types and proofs-
as-programs principles. Its style differs from NQTHM, being primarily intended
as an interactive system, but one for which tactics (macros of inference rule
applications applied as directed by an ML program) will be available. These can
be used as shorthand to handle some subgoals automatically.
It is designed especially for theories about programming languages and re¬
cursive functions. It consists of two parts:
• a logic PPLAMBDA (polymorphic predicate lambda calculus) in which
properties of programs can be stated, and specific theories described in the
usual way;
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• the ML programming language which enables tactics to be programmed.
These can be combined by tacticals - combinators which permit the con¬
struction of sequences, repetitions and branching trees of tactic combina¬
tions.
Avra Cohn used it for her automation of proofs about tail-recursive function
schemata [Cohn 79] following Huet and Lang's work (section 2.2.3).
From the same stable comes the Logical Frameworks project [Harper et al 87].
This is an attempt to provide a grand framework capable of describing a number
of logics and permitting proof development in any or across a number. Its main
implementation, LEGO [Zhaohui et al 90], is another interactive proof develop¬
ment system, in a natural deduction style. It offers proof development facilities
in some related type systems, which are various Calculi of Constructions.
2.1.3 NuPRL
NuPRL was built for implementing mathematics in a system of constructive
logic. Like LCF, it is an interactive system for proof development, but being
based on constructive rather than classical logic, it embodies the proposttions-as-
types and proofs-as-programs principles. It incorporates Martin-Lof type theory,
like the Oyster system which is a Prolog-based version of it. So NuPRL, like
Oyster, uses the Curry-Howard isomorphism between proofs and programs, to
let proofs of theorems synthesise and verify corresponding functional programs.
In NuPRL, like LCF tactics of inferences can be built. There is a library mech¬
anism so that theorems which have already been completed may be kept available
as lemmas for later use. The thrust of the work is more towards demonstrat¬
ing that a variety of tasks can be specified in logic and that a provably correct
program to perform them derived.
Constable et al. [Constable et al 86] say "... although the system provides
a nontrivial level of deductive support, none of our methods can presently be
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described as theorem provers". The emphasis of their work has been to demon¬
strate the power of the system to express complex ideas in a variety of domains.
This type of control does not compare with ClAM's meta-level planning and
explicit exploration of the proof tree. It operates on nodes, and tactics either
succeed or fail. All arguments to inference rules must be completely instantiated
before the rules are applied.
2.2 Algorithm and Program Synthesis
In this review section I shall only attempt to survey the most directly relevant
work from this major subject area, i.e. that pertaining to the generation of
tail-recursive equivalents of recursively described algorithms. In addition, as the
work reported in this thesis is on synthesis I will not dwell on the host ofmaterial
on transformation, beyond describing that which is highly relevant to the work
described here. Research which is analysed in detail in chapter 8 will only be
described briefly here.
There are some well understood techniques for turning recursively defined
programs into iterative ones. This may involve a number of stages, converting a
convoluted recursive algorithm into a simpler one, and then that into an iterative
version. Some of these techniques stem from work on optimising compilers, but
not all of this work is automated, by any means.
Many authors comment on the difficulty of this process where clarity may
be sacrificed for efficiency. When informed user involvement is required to assist
the process, such loss of clarity may be crucial, and even prejudice the success
of the final outcome. Depending on the overall aims these are critical issues,
especially if the eventual program is to be easily modifiable.
The common approach taken is to demonstrate that if an algorithm or pro¬
gram has some distinct form, usually described by a template or schema, then
some given transformation will produce a tail-recursive equivalent. There are a
number of component processes to be considered:
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• selection of schema;
• identification of instantiations for a particular schema - involving higher-
order matching and potentially choices between non-unique matches;
• proof that the schema, as instantiated, achieves the desired efficiency gain;
• justification that the synthesised program is genuinely equivalent to the
original.
2.2.1 Darlington and Burstall
John Darlington and Rod Burstall are responsible for some of the seminal work
in this area. Through the 70's they published descriptions of work on different
approaches to program synthesis and transformation.
Darlington's Thesis
Darlington's thesis (for which Burstall was supervisor) "A Semantic Approach
to Automatic Program Improvement" [Darlington 72] is about his system of re¬
finement by stages from a high level description involving recursions of arbitrary
complexity to a lower level target language. Improvement is achieved by the
compilation processes which generate subsequent levels.
Only the first level is relevant to this work, that which takes a set of recursion
equations over set primitives, and yields an equivalent description in an itera¬
tive language. As he points out, other researchers had described techniques for
achieving these gains in efficiency by relying on schemas, but only for certain
classes of algorithm, e.g. those which are linear recursive, i.e. whose recursive
definition calls on the function being defined at most once, though the name
of the function may appear more than once if each appearance is in separate
branches of a conditional.
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To embrace a more extensive array of types of problem, his system uses
both the structural form of the input and knowledge about the properties of the
specific functions involved to attempt two kinds of improvement:
• re-arrangement of the computation sequence to reduce stack utilisation
and function entry and exit calls;
• re-arrangement of the code to avoid repeating identical calls at separate
points in the calculation.
The goal is to get sound improvements rather than a complete set.
The former of these forms of improvement is relevant here, called "struc¬
ture recognising". This uses schemas expressing particular recursive forms, and
matches the input expression against them until a match is found.
The matching used is F-matching. I will describe this briefly before returning
to my account of the system it serves. It uses an algorithm similar to first-order
unification, to compare terms considered as tree structures. That is, it traverses
the term trees looking for matches at comparable points, and instantiating vari¬
ables where necessary. It differs from first order unification in that variables may
be used to label non-leaf nodes, and it can cope with permutations of arguments.
So, taking upper-case letters to denote variables, and lower-case letters to denote
constants, F(a, b) can F-match with g(b, a). However, it will not find other more
complex matches which a general second-order matcher could, such as F(a,b)
matching with 6, where F may be XuXv.v or XuXv.b. Nor will F-matching find
other matches which span multiple nodes of the term tree, such as F(0) with
s(s(0)).
The matching is further qualified by conditions on the actual functions in¬
volved in the match. Each of the five schema patterns given is accompanied by
up to three translation conditional sets. Conditions are such things as whether
the function in a particular role is associative or has an inverse. They perform
checks that the recursion is not being made more complex through inadvertent
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choice of match for functions. The system does not have to prove all the con¬
ditions or create the witnesses for their truth. For some, such as finding the
inverse of a given function, it uses a device called an "oracle" - it asks the user!
Having satisfied the conditions, the translation supplies the code template to be
used.
This system described in his thesis is highly automated, but there is no need
for an elaborate control structure. Backtracking over the different schemas when
matching or conditions fail is sufficient.
Folding and Unfolding
Later work from Burstall and Darlington [Burstall & Darlington 77] develops
some of the ideas from Darlington's thesis. Manna and Waldinger came up with
some similar ideas around the same time [Manna & Waldinger 74].
Techniques are described which re-arrange the order in which operations are
performed in a program so that it becomes more efficient. Separate computations
are collapsed into single ones. Control over this is achieved by categorising
transformation operations, such as expanding a function application using the
function's definition, (unfolding), the inverse of this (folding), and abstraction -
introducing a "where" clause to derive a new piece of definition from an existing
one. These categories are then used to build a combination of transformations
which has the effect of improving on the original program. Different kinds of
improvement are possible within a unified system. The system is automated to
a considerable extent, but receives some clues from the way its task is initially
set up.
Naive to tail-recursive transformation is described, and a method to incor¬
porate it into the automated system discussed.
Darlington pursued these ideas further still in [Darlington 81]. The goal
of this research is the development of program transformation methodologies,
which influences the nature of its automation and user-interaction. Although
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automated components are sought, the context is one of experimentation, so
that the automation can be developed.
Topics explored in this work are:
• Optimising computation of the fibonacci function by building in an auxil¬
iary tupling function to store intermediate results and avoid recalculation;
• Naive to tail-recursive transformation;
• Top down to bottom up recursion - an alternative way of evading the re¬
cursive problem - instead of starting at the top and needing the next value,
start at the bottom, and feed the current value into the next calculation;
• synthesis of programs from definitions written in logic;
• definition of new subfunctions;
The notion of forced folding, a user-controlled device, is used to drive the overall
combination of transformations towards the goal of folding the program back
into a recursive program with improved properties.
2.2.2 Feather
Martin Feather, another of Burstall's students, followed up Darlington's work,
and developed another system, ZAP, for user-controlled recursion conversion
[Feather 79]. Although not using the schema approach, it is worthy of note here
because of its utilisation of second-order variables and matching. He wanted a
system which could help a user cope with larger, more complex examples, and
which could operate at a higher level. This was especially important in order to
utilise user interaction to best effect.
In pursuance of this higher level operation, he identified "tactics" (not to
be confused with C1AM tactics which will be described in Chapter 5) which
performed different kinds of improvement. These tactics were:
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• Combining. This took cases of embedded functions which traversed some
intermediate data structure twice (as output and then input) and converted
it into a function with a single pass, but with a more complex function
applied each time.
• Tupling. This took separate function calls which used the same argument
values, and therefore risked recomputing the repeated values. It generated
a new function which only called on the arguments once, and produced an
output tuple consisting of each of the individual functions' outputs.
ZAP took a context including details of function names to be improved, and
proceeded to transform them both automatically and with interactive control
using unfolds, folds and lemma-justified rewrites. The context consisted of def¬
initions of functions, lemmas about them, names of functions to be unfolded,
names of functions to be permitted to remain in the improved definition and
outlines for functions to be improved. These outlines might specify a particular
case structure or recursive structure to use, the appropriate arguments for them
and perhaps even the approximate nature of the answer. Along with a knowledge
of the constructors in the theory, the context enabled ZAP to decide whether
or not the user's requirements for improvement had been met. The context and
record of interaction provided documentation of the transformation process.
When ZAP could not automatically achieve a new definition with the de¬
sired improvements, the user could supply the details. If the user's definition was
wholly specified, ZAP had only to check its equivalence to the original. How¬
ever, just as in the statement of context, the user had the option of indicating
approximately the form the solution was to have, and leaving ZAP to sort out
the details. Approximation could take two forms:
• The use of a special function variable symbol "$$" which would be permit¬
ted to match tuple and "where" constructions, constructors and constants.
It could also match certain declared functions. The symbol could be used
more than once in different positions in a term and have the different oc¬
currences bound to different values.
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As an example of its use Feather gives the following goal, which expresses
the notion of the function sumsquares (defined below) being rewritable
into a recursive definition:




sum(N :: L) == N + sum(L)
squares{nil) == nil
squares{N :: L) == N * N :: squares(L)
taking nil to represent the empty list, list construction, and == to
denote definition. The goal unfolds to:
N * N + sum(squares(L)) <= $$(iV, sum(squares(L)))
and matching binds $$ to XxXy.x * x + y.
This corresponds to the "Combining" tactic above.
• The use of other function variable symbols to abbreviate some intermedi¬
ate function composition, provided this did not involve any functions not
permitted to appear in the eventual definition. These variables were given
a unique name preceded by two ampersands to allow the definition of the
new function.
This allowed more efficient alternative recursive structures than the stan¬
dard ones to be employed. An instance would be recursion down a list of
characters a word at a time instead of a character at a time. The naively
defined algorithm would find the first word, and then remove that word by
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traversing the beginning of the list again. A more efficient version could
be built by collapsing these functions to one whose output was a pair con¬
sisting of the first word and the list of characters following it.
As in the other type of optimisation, ZAP was able to identify such inter¬
mediate functions by maximal unfolding, normalisation and matching.
This corresponds to the "Tupling" tactic above.
Like Darlington, Feather needed second-order matching for these tasks,
and describes his implementation as a version of Huet and Lang's matcher
[Huet & Lang 78] with restrictions and extensions.
The restrictions were to inhibit function variables from certain matches in¬
volving function symbols which ZAP was trying to eliminate or only use in ways
guaranteed to achieve desired recursive structures. The main extension was to
build in associativity and commutativity.
With the move to larger scale problems, choices arose over which tactic to
apply, and which expression to work on first, since the ordering of the translation
process affect what improvement was reached. Feather's strategy was to work
from the innermost subterms upwards. He claimed no advantage for this other
than that it worked and was systematic.
His system was able to operate on large problems, as he had intended: a
simple compiler and a text formatter.
2.2.3 Huet and Lang
Gerard Huet and Bernard Lang's paper "Proving and Applying Program Trans¬
formation Expressed with Second-Order Patterns", [Huet & Lang 78] builds on
Darlington and Burstall's work. Taking the latter's identification of schematic
rewriting systems (with constraints to ensure validity) which achieve optimi¬
sations, Huet and Lang recast this as a task in second-order unification and
explored the consequences. Their work described theoretical results, but with¬
out any implementation. Indeed they indicate that this is not a major goal, in
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the paper being described at least, perhaps because of the interactive role they
anticipate in conjunction with their technique.
In their introduction, the authors note the
"huge gap between practical software certification techniques and the
theoretical tools defined for formal proofs of programs"
They suggest that
"One way to close this gap is to write interactive systems that will
help the programmer to design, debug, run and ultimately validate
his system.
A desirable feature of such a system is the ability to manipulate
programs into various forms, while preserving their meaning.
As a systematic approach to high-level optimization for programs, it
is the natural complement to structured programming development
techniques ..."
Huet and Lang extend Darlington's repertoire of schemas, by supplementing
it, generalising and also by omitting schemas which are effectively subsumed by
others when using their technique. They characterise the schematic rewritings
in terms of transformation templates, which are triples consisting of
• a schematic description E, of a functional program /, e.g.
f(x) <= if a(x) then b else h(x, f(e(x)))
where a, b, e and h are all variables, typed appropriately.
• a schematic description E' of the corresponding optimised functional pro¬




g'(x, y) -<= if a(x) then y else g'(e(x), h'(y, x))
These descriptions are also available unabbreviated in an ALGOL-like no¬
tation.
• any constraints < /ci,...,/c„ > which must apply to the entities used in
describing the schemas continuing this example:
Vx h(x, b) = h'(b, x)
VxVj/Vz h(x, h'(y, z)) = h'(h(x, y), z)
Vx h(x, b) = b
where b is the base element of the type of object required for /i's second
argument position.
The example used is just one of several templates they supply.
They are mainly concerned with the validation of such templates, and the
organisation of libraries of templates so that subsumed templates can be omit¬
ted. To a lesser extent they are interested in recognising whether a particular
template is applicable to a given program, and choices involved in this process
are neglected, probably because the intention is that the whole process will take
place within an interactive system.
Applicability of a template is tested by using second-order matching of the
template's first element against the program fragment. Second-order is sufficient
because no variable in any of their schemas is of higher order than a function.
So for a program fragment P, they require a substitution o such that P — <rE
and that each constraint is valid under the substitution, i.e. each er/ct- is valid.
Then P can be replaced by crE'.
Their method is as follows:
1. Apply the matching algorithm to E and P, to get a finite set of possible
substitution sets. These assign the variables in E but not those in E' or
< KU...,Kn >.
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2. Although they do not say how the choice is made between candidate sub¬
stitutions, a substitution a is "completed" to cover these other variables.
This seems to mean they are given a token entry in the substitution, the
details of which are supplied by the next stage:
3. The constraints (with known substitution applied) are proved. This process
instantiates the remaining unknown variables.
4. P is replaced by ctE'
The various choices involved here are complicated if automation is required. The
initial matching may supply more than one substitution. Not only must the sys¬
tem decide between these substitutions, but it must identify the variables which
occur in the 'output' and not in the 'input', by using proofs of the constraints.
Some constraints will easily identify variables, others won't, so the choice of con¬
straint to prove first is significant. In the presence of unidentified meta-variables
representing higher-order entities, a poor choice could be disastrous. I will give
a more detailed account of this and a comparison with my own work in Chapter
8.
2.2.4 CIP Project
Helmut Partsch's book "Specification and Transformation of Programs"
[Partsch 90] is a general text on methodologies of program development. From
his background working with Bauer and Wossner and with the Munich CIP
project, he draws on this and related sources to describe a variety of transfor¬
mational techniques, some of which are for tail-recursive optimisation.
At the beginning of the book, he outlines the CIP view of the role of such
techniques as within a software development framework leading to: "... a sep¬
aration of concerns in program development between man and machine, man
being responsible for creative aspects, and machine for mechanical tasks".
He lists typical mechanical tasks as:
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• support for validating the specification,
• performing program transformations,
• support for verifying applicability conditions of transformation rules,
• keeping track of the development process,
and typical creative aspects as:
• formalisation of the problem,
• selection of suitable development strategies,
• selection of transformation rules and indication of respective point of ap¬
plication,
• derivation of new rules (if necessary), including the respective proofs of
their correctness.
The CIP philosophy is comparable to Huet and Lang's. Templates are given
for some transformations which will turn certain recursive program fragments
into tail-recursive equivalents. Some examples of effective transformations are
given without templates for more complex operations. The expectation is that
a human will select the relevant transformation, and a computer will apply and
check it, perhaps with some human guidance. Automation is not dealt with.
Partsch's book follows a more thorough technical treatment by Bauer &;
Wossner. In [Bauer &: Wossner 82], they describe a number of transformations
similar to Huet &: Lang's, which, if applied, achieve tail-recursive optimisation.
These transformations involve the usual conditions of certain of the functions
involved being associative, and there is no discussion of automation. Algo¬
rithms are also given for transforming any linearly recursive function into a
tail-recursive, but highly inefficient equivalent. These are credited to Pater-
son and Hewitt [Paterson Hewitt 70], and involve performing the entire com¬
putation at each recursion. They compute all the values that would be stored in
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an accumulator at successive steps, starting from scratch each time. Bauer and
Wossner point out a variant on this which is to store the successive values using
a stack, but that would seem to defeat the purpose of tail-recursion in the first
place.
2.2.5 Harrison and Khoshnevisan
Harrison and Khoshnevisan's work [Harris &: Khoshnevisan 88] also follows on
from Darlington's, and to some extent from the CIP project. They dissect func¬
tion descriptions in terms of their functional components and by using arguments
about functional structures which ensure certain properties, are able to specify
new equivalent functions with the desired properties, in some cases. The ap¬
proach is closer to templates than the fold-unfold style.
They have developed existing analyses of linear functions to provide the au¬
tomatic transformation of such functions into tail-recursive equivalents building
bottom-up. Further, they can also transform such functions into tail-recursive
equivalents growing top-down, as attempted in this thesis, conditional on ex¬
plicit constraint equations (such as associativity) on some of the component
functions. This second transformation is very similar to some of Huet &; Lang's
templates, and suffers from the same problem of inventing suitable accumulator
initialisation values and accumulating functions which satisfy the constraints.
The constraint equations given define the possibilities systematically. This is a
good, thorough approach, but essentially static, without the opportunity to use
other available information to create new, but currently unknown functions. The
major advantage of this approach is that it makes explicit just how the function
components operate to fulfil their roles.
2.2.6 Miller
Miller's work on A—Prolog, a higher-order extension of Prolog, has been applied
to program transformation. In [Miller & Nadathur 87], he and Nadathur de¬
scribe a structure which can recognise tail-recursive programs, using template
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structures, and from them produce iterative programs in A—Prolog. They also
note the drawbacks of using templates to cover many different patterns of pro¬
gram. They point out that the following program to calculate the sum of two
numbers:
sum(x, y) == if x = 0 then y
else sum(p(x), s(y))
where p is the predecessor function, is tail-recursive, following this schema:
Fun(x,y) == if C(x,y) then H(x,v)
else Fun(Fi(x,y), F2(y))
However, the following function to calculate the greatest common divisor of
two numbers is tail-recursive too:
gcd(x,y) == if x = s(0) then s(0)
else if x = y then x
else if x < y then gcd(y, x)
else acdlx - y, y)
but it doesn't fit the schema. They state that "there is no (second-order) term
whose instances represent only tail-recursive programs and also [the gcd] term
and the term representing the sum program". This is only part of a wider
problem, as the conditional structure could be even more complex.
They finesse this problem by returning to the definition of tail-recursion. A
program F is tail-recursive if it is of the form:
• H[x,y) - there is no recursive call, or
• F(H(x,y),G(x,y)) - purely a recursive call with modified arguments, or
• if_ C(x,y) then Hi(F,x,y) else H2{F, x, y) where Hx and H2 represent
tail-recursive programs.
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Using this formulation, they can combine the three possibilities using
A—terms. Not only does this provide a recognition mechanism, but also a trans¬
formation to an iterative form. This is achieved by guessing cases. The first
case above corresponds to terminating the recursion; the second, to resetting
the variables of the iteration; and the third, not surprisingly, to a conditional.
Higher-order unification is involved in matching the input to this transfor¬
mation.
In [Hannan &; Miller 88], Hannan and Miller describe a further implemen¬
tation of some other higher-order program transformers for general operations
such as unfolding and permuting arguments. It is not applied to specific tasks
such as program optimisation.
2.3 Generalisation
I shall use the term generalisation in its mathematical sense, not in any broader
sense used in Artificial Intelligence.
Generalisation is a step which allows us to postulate a new theorem as a
substitute for the one we are currently trying to prove, and then use it to justify
the original. This can be done to achieve a more powerful theorem, or because it
easier than the current proof. This may seem perverse, but for theorems proved
inductively, it makes sense. The induction conclusion will become stronger, but
so will the induction hypothesis.
One of the dangers of generalisation is that of generalising to a new statement
which is not a theorem. This is all too easily done when following syntactic
generalisation rules, and hard to guard against.
I will analyse generalisation in chapters 9. In chapter 10, I will look at some
of the methods presented here in more detail, and compare them to my own
work.
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In this section I will survey some methods of generalisation which are partic¬
ularly relevant to induction proofs, i.e. those relating to universally quantified
variables.
2.3.1 Generalising Terms to Variables
Boyer &; Moore generalise terms which occur multiple times to variables
[Boyer &: Moore 79]. Their motivation is to make inductions work, and they
regard this step as tidying up after an induction to clear the way for subsequent
inductions. Their view is that an induction may leave extraneous term structure
around, and generalisation fixes this.
Given a goal of the form Vx.P[/(x)], Boyer &; Moore prove Vy.P[y] where y
is some new variable (square brackets here, as elsewhere, indicate that P may
be a compound expression). There are various conditions on this:
• f(x) must occur at least twice,
• some occurrences of /(x) must be on either side of an equality or in separate
literals,
• /(x) must not be a variable - since they don't distinguish between different
occurrences of a variable, to generalise a variable would be pointless, it
would just rename all x's to y's, for example;
• f(x) must not be an explicit value template - terms composed entirely of
constructor symbols and variables. They say that experience shows that
explicit value templates like s(s(0)) contain too much information, which
would be lost;
• /(x) must not have = as functor;
• /(x) must not have a destructor as its functor. To achieve a little normal¬
isation and reduce the number of rewrite rules, a "destructor elimination"
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routine converts formulae involving known destructor symbols into equiv¬
alents without them. This gets rid of division by multiplying throughout
by the divisor, for example. It has high priority in their system, so they
expect that it will already have decided whether a destructor should be
changed.
• f(x) must not be something which contains as a subterm anything in the
list of candidates being amassed. The reasoning given for this is the wish to
capture information from generalisation lemmas for each component which
might be lost if a containing subterm was generalised first.
As an example, they would generalise1
VxVyVz. rev(x) <> (y <> z) — (rev[x) <> y) <> z (2-1)
where <> denotes the append function, to
ViuVyVz. w <> (y <> z) = (tu <> y) <> z (2-2)
This is now an easy theorem to prove.
The generalisation process is as follows:
1. For each term, t, in this list of candidates to be generalised, look through all
known generalisation lemmas (only three are listed in [Boyer & Moore 79]).
This is a rather ad hoc feature, which gives them an extra hypothesis, useful
for the subsequent proof.
2. The set of datatypes of the term, t, is obtained, and if it consists of only
one datatype, that information giving the datatype of the object is added
as a hypothesis too. This protects against the generalisation of len(l) in
V7. len(len(l)) == len(l)
1Although NQTHM does not use explicit quantification, variables are implicitly uni¬
versally quantified at the outside of the formula. I have chosen to make this explicit for
clarity and consistency.
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where it would add a new hypothesis that the variable replacing the re¬
peated term len(l) must be a number, i.e. a list of »t7's, in their system.
This theorem is true in NQTHM just because numbers are represented as
lists of niVs. On generalising it to
Vv. len[y) = v
it is still true if v is a list of ni7's, a number. Since this is the type of len(l),
this generalisation heuristic enforces that condition.
3. Each subterm being generalised is replaced in the formula by an unused
variable name.
2.3.2 Generalising Variables Apart
Aubin [Aubin 76] concentrated on two types of generalisation, of which the first
extended Boyer & Moore's work to permit the generalisation apart of variables.
Aubin used primary recursion path analysis. Primary recursion paths were
paths through the terms to the leaves only through the arguments which were
in the recursion positions. By recursion position, I mean the argument position
on which a function is recursively defined.
To prove
Vx. x + (x + x) — (x + x) + x (2-3)
he proves the more general
VxVy. x + (y + y) = (x + y) + y (2.4)
The task, here, is to take some theorem with the same variable appearing
multiple times, and find a generalisation by careful differentiation of the vari¬
ables, if such is available. Any multiply occurring variable with occurrences on
both sides of an = or —> would be considered as distinguishable. Here, that
would suggest the first and fourth occurrences of x in (2.3). These were good
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candidates to be the induction variable, and so worth differentiating from the
other occurrences.
If that failed, as it would in
Vx. x * (x + x) = (x * x) + (x * x) (2.5)
where it would again suggest the first and fourth x's, the analysis could consider
adding other occurrences to the set to be distinguished. Possible candidates
would be those occurring in recursive argument positions, but not primary re¬
cursive positions, such as the second and sixth x in (2.5). This could be awkward
since the number of combinations grows fairly quickly, and to help out there was
a routine to try out some values, so that false generalisations could be discarded,
by use of counterexamples. To some extent, any base case is just such a simple
check.
Jacqueline Castaing also attempts this kind of generalisation [Castaing 85].
She uses mismatches of induction conclusion against induction hypothesis to
guide induction choices and distinguish variables apart.
Given an induction which had failed to result in the induction conclusion be¬
ing an instance of the induction hypothesis after all available symbolic evaluation
had been performed, she would attempt a generalisation. She would identify all
the mismatches in term structure between the induction hypothesis and induc¬
tion conclusion, and create distinct new universally quantified variables for all
the mismatch positions in the hypothesis.
This plethora of new variables would then be reduced by identifying any
which were replacing identical terms and were primary recursion variables in
Aubin's terms. It would further be reduced by separately identifying all the
rest. This is a minor variation on Aubin's approach.
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2.3.3 Generalising Terms with Initialised Accumulators
Aubin also describes [Aubin 76] a technique for generalising terms with a con¬
stant in an accumulator position. An accumulator is an argument used to accu¬
mulate a function application's value progressively internally as its computation






rev {nil) == nil
rev[h :: t) == rev{t) <> (h :: nil)
an induction proof results in an attempt to prove
rev2(t,nil) — rev{t) D rev2{h :: t,nil) = rev{h :: t)
which unfolds to
rev2(t,nil) = rev{t) D rev2[t,h :: nil) = rev(t) <> (h :: nil) (2.6)
and there is no match on the left-hand side of the conclusion. On the right, we
can use the hypothesis to substitute for rev{t), giving:
rev2{t,nil) = rev(t) Z> rev2{t,h :: nil) = rev2(t,nil) <> (h :: nil)
but then the proof is stuck, and we would have to try a further induction, which
would continue to be blocked on both sides in just the way this one is on the
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left2. The preferable approach is to generalise the constant nil to a universally
quantified variable a, say, and turn (2.6) into:
Va.rev2(t, a) — rev(t) <> a D Va.rev2(t, h :: a) = (rev(t) <> (h :: nil)) <> a
Aubin's approach would decide to generalise nil because it was a non-variable
accumulator which was an argument of an induction application. Induction ap¬
plications are those function applications which contain in the argument position
on which they recurse either the induction variable, something whose outermost
function is a constructor, or another induction application. Essentially this la¬
bels those arguments which are siblings in the expression tree to places which
are part of the primary recursion path, and will therefore be involved with the
symbolic evaluation about to happen. ClAM also makes use of this information,
and it will be interesting to remember this technique when considering the ClAM
account in Chapter 5.
In this example, just generalising nil to a results in
Va.rev2(x,a) = rev(x) (2-7)
which is a non-theorem without further generalisation to install a appropriately
on the right-hand side of the equality too. Aubin handles this by continuing to
2There is a nice parallel here with Boyer and Moore's "Productive Use of Failure"
[Bundy 83, Boyer & Moore 79] to identify the need to perform induction. On attempting
to symbolically evaluate a term, if the result would be a new term containing a strict
superterm of the original, symbolic evaluation is abandoned in favour of induction. Here,
the symbolic evaluation resulting from induction on t in
rev2(t,h :: nil) — rev2(t, nil) <> (h :: nil)
would produce:
rev2{t',h' :: h :: nil) = rev2(t',h' :: nil) <> (h :: nil)
The second of these is not a conventional superterm of the first, because the rule being
used is transverse, not longitudinal. It is the transverse analog of a superterm. If there
were a strict superterm test for transverse analogs, it would suggest that this is doomed
to failure and an alternative should be sought.
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expect generalisation to be "balanced" on both sides of an equality. He argues
that the nil which is being generalised on one side of the equality should be
partnered by another on the other side.
Additionally, in this case his counterexample checker can establish that (2.7)
is not a theorem. If he can turn rtv[x) into rev(x) <> nil, he has a nil to
generalise on both sides of the equality, but he needs a way of selecting this.
He looks at the mismatches between corresponding induction hypothesis
and conclusion expressions. The left-hand sides of (2.6) are already being ac¬
counted for by the generalisation. What about the right-hand sides: rev(t) and
rev[t) <> (h :: nil)? The induction variable occurring within the mismatch sug¬
gests a problem. Can the mismatch at least be made more "local" and avoid the
induction variable? Yes, by a process he calls expansion, putting the hypothesis'
rev(t) inside the same term structure as it occupies in the conclusion, in the
same position: rev[t) <> (_) and choosing a value for the hole which preserves
the value of the term. This is done by trial and error over the members of the
appropriate type. He also has a number of specialist heuristics for dealing with
special cases involving constructor symbols.
Having localised his mismatch on the right-hand side, he can now check
the real relationship between the sources of mismatch, before leaping to the
conclusion that they are identical. Labelling the two niVs as b and c, he can
take the base value of the induction variable and consider:
rev2(nil,b) — rev(nil) <> c
which easily evaluates to show that b = c. Although this seems trivially obvious
in this case, it is not always so in more elaborate examples such as those involving
nested functions using accumulators.
2.3.4 Hummel's Survey of Generalisation
For the sake of completeness I should mention that Birgit Hummel has writ¬
ten a comprehensive survey of generalisation techniques [Hummel 87] including
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most of those described here. Using a broad definition of generalisation which
includes use of any proposition including the induction hypothesis, she distin¬
guishes different types of generalisation according to whether the generalisation
is performed before or after induction, and whether it is applied to the original
formula or the induction steps.
Hummel's PhD thesis [Hummel 90] on "Generation of Induction Axioms and
Generalisation" is not available to me at the time of writing.
2.4 Higher-Order Unification
Unification is central to almost any computational logic, but as soon as we stray
beyond the straightforward most general unifiers of first-order unification with¬
out built in theories, it becomes much less nicely behaved. Just incorporating
one law about the associativity of a function over an infinite domain will cause
infinite numbers of most general unifiers. Building theories into the unification
algorithm was not required for this thesis, and I shall not expand upon it here.
For a broad account of unification - kinds, algorithms, theoretical results, and
applications, Kevin Knight has written an excellent survey [Knight 89].
My requirements were for higher-order unification over a domain which in¬
cluded sorts. I shall reserve the term unification to describe the case when
variables may be instantiated in both of the given expressions, and use matching
when variables may be instantiated in one only. Unifiability, of course, refers to
the decision as to whether or not unifiers exist, without necessarily producing
any or all of them.
Although I have used Huet's higher-order unifiability algorithm, when it is
called on in a purely second-order setting, it provides the same answers as Huet's
second-order unifier described in [Huet &; Lang 78] would.
It is known that even second-order unification is undecidable in general. Al¬
gorithms are known for second-order problems which will find unifiers if there
are any, but may not terminate if the two expressions are not unifiable. Even if
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unifiers exist, there may be infinitely many, and the nice notion of "most general"
no longer applies. Second-order matching is decidable, and as we shall see in
chapter 4, it is advantageous to reduce problems to matching wherever possible.
I shall adopt the Prolog convention of using capital letters for variables and
lower case ones for constants in the rest of this section.
2.4.1 F-matching
Darlington's work e.g. [Darlington 72] relies on F-matching, a restricted version
of second-order unification. In this function variables may be used, but the
substitution for them may only be another function symbol. So on unifying
Z(a, b) and /(a, b)
F-matching would suggest the unifier: {//Z}. Full second-order matching
would additionally propose such unifiers as {XuXv.f(a, b)/Z}.
2.4.2 Second- and a>Order Unification
Pietrzykowski gave an algorithm for second-order unification which was pub¬
lished in 1973. This was extended by work with Jensen to handle w-order unifi¬
cation [Jensen & Pietrzykowski 76]. These algorithms are very complex, requir¬
ing five different operations to be performed at each point of comparison. Unlike
Huet's unifiability algorithm [Huet 75], they are capable of enumerating all the
unifiers if there are any, although they share with his algorithm the unavoidable
lack of guarantee of termination if there are none. Enumerating all the unifiers
has the necessary but unfortunate consequence that where there are an infinity
of unifiers, the algorithm will also not terminate.
Huet's unifiability algorithm over terms of the w-order simply-typed A-calculus
is more straightforward, has a further simplification when 77-reduction is permis¬
sible, and produces either unifiers when there are finitely many, or stops with
a pre-unifier when there are infinitely many. This algorithm specifies the set
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but does not enumerate it if it is infinitely large. This makes it more usable
than Jensen and Pietrzykowski's, and it forms the basis of most subsequent
work, e.g A-Prolog [Miller &: Nadathur88]. Pre-unification is required in cir¬
cumstances corresponding to variable-variable unification in first-order cases. In
higher-order systems, when comparing two terms with variable functions, which
are not A-variables, at their heads, e.g.: Au.F(u, c) and Av.F'(c, u) Huet simply
noted that such cases would always be unifiable, though the enumeration of all
the unifiers would branch infinitely. It is of course open to anyone using such an
algorithm to choose a particular unifier that fits. His algorithm is described in
detail in Chapter 4.
Wayne Snyder and Jean Gallier [Snyder Sz Gallier 89] returned to earlier
work on first-order unification by Herbrand, and later pursued by Martelli and
Montanari. This was based on transformations of systems of terms which cleanly
separates logical issues from procedural ones. This transformation approach is
close in spirit to methods of solving simultaneous linear equations by progres¬
sively assigning variables. Their solutions are not, in general, most general uni¬
fiers. They argue that this is an elegant way of analyzing invariant properties of
unification and extending it to higher-order systems. New completeness proofs
are presented. Their descriptions are close to Huet's and their conclusions, al¬
though shifted to a somewhat more abstract level, confirm the value of Huet's
algorithm.
In A—Prolog [Miller 90], Miller uses a restricted form of higher-order unifi¬
cation. He describes it as "an extension to first-order unification that respects
bound variable names and scopes". The algorithm is designed for his logic pro¬
gramming language, and has the properties of being decidable, and providing
most general unifiers where any exist. His is an untyped system, and it gains its
power by only permitting P0—reduction, not full /?—reduction. This means that
a A—abstracted function, Ax.t, may only be applied to tokens which are not free
in Ax.t, such as (Ax.t)(x). The consequence of this is that he avoids the explosive
parts of the unification search space, but cannot achieve some of the unifications
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we would need for speculating about generalisation. It would be adequate for the
existing work on tail-recursive synthesis, as it is an improvement on F-matching.
2.4.3 Typed Unification
In his thesis on search and logic programming for the All calculus [Pym 90],
David Pym describes a development of Huet's unifiability algorithm to deal
with unifications involving variable types as well as variable terms. Instead
of requiring all types to be known in advance of using the unifying algorithm,
they may contain variable entities too, instantiated along with the term. His
extension is limited to the types of entities that are required for the An calculus,
which would not cover all those used in Oyster. For example E-types, used for
existential quantification, are not included. His system is not implemented.
2.5 Meta-Variables
By using variables at the meta-level not just as placeholders with which to reason,
but as parameters which only become instantiated by the demands of the proof,
we can postpone decisions until enough information becomes available to make
them. This usage constitutes what we call middle-out reasoning. This technique
has proved fruitful in many aspects of controlling theorem proving. The notion
of meta-variables is integral and merits a short account.
As I said at the beginning of this chapter, for this purpose, the term meta¬
variable is not intended to include any variable used within a meta-level inference
system. It is used here purely to denote a meta-level variable which represents an
entity at the object level. The meta-variable may refer to first-order or higher-
order entities in the object level theory. This means that we can take advantage
of the naming relationship between meta-level and object-level, and apply more
flexible versions of inference rules at the meta-level, for example, than would be
possible at the object level. There are no theoretical problems with this, as long
as the eventual result is valid within the rigorous object-level system.
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Many AI systems use meta-level inference in one way or another, for planning,
expert systems etc. A comprehensive account is provided in van Harmelen's
thesis [van Harmelen 89] which contains a detailed analysis. He categorises meta-
level systems along a number of dimensions of which the only one relevant to
this discussion is the linguistic relationship between the meta-level and object
level.
Van Harmelen classifies the ClAM system as bilingual, since the meta-level
language (a planner and methods written in Prolog) is kept syntactically distinct
from the underlying object language. His classification is based on the levels'
languages being kept conceptually separate, even if they happen to use the same
language. In this case, the two languages are different, since the object language
is Martin-Lof Type Theory, and the meta-level language is Prolog.
Bilingualism is a common and desirable feature of meta-level systems, as van
Harmelen asserts, since it offers
1. Suitability: the object level and the meta-level deal with separate do¬
mains, and so have good reason to be distinct;
2. Distinguishability: by keeping the levels separate they can be changed
independently;
3. Explanation: control knowledge is kept distinct for explanatory purposes;
4. Formal correctness: work on the theoretical foundations of meta-
programming by Hill and Lloyd [Hill & Lloyd 88] attempted monolingual-
ism, but preferred bilingualism as the only way of achieving a satisfactory
theoretical account.




Great advances are being made in all the fields I have described here. There is
plenty of scope for finding ways of tying them together, seeing their interrela¬




The work for this thesis has been done in the Oyster system [Horn 88] in a logic
based on constructive type theory. As well as being a proof refinement system
for constructive logic, the Proofs — Programs correspondence means that
Oyster proofs can be used for program synthesis, verification and transforma¬
tion. Since different proofs of the same theorem can correspond to different
program algorithms, desired algorithmic properties can be obtained by ensuring
a particular proof structure.
In this chapter I will describe:
• The Curry-Howard isomorphism and the Proofs as Programs principle.
• Relevant details of the Martin-Lof Type Theory and the Oyster implemen¬
tation.
• Synthesis, verification and transformation of programs via proofs.
i
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3.1 The Proofs as Programs Principle
The concept of computation in computer science is closely related to that of
inference in constructive logic. Programs and constructive proofs require us to
construct actual objects such as sets, functions or numbers as evidence. We may
not show that "for any given natural number there is always a greater one" by
assuming the converse and proving a contradiction, we must produce a program
that can compute a greater number than a given one. The deep similarity of
constructive inference and computation is accounted for by the Curry-Howard
isomorphism.
The Curry-Howard isomorphism is between proofs and terms of the simply
typed A-calculus. Details are given in the next section. This immediately brings
us close to programming because the A-calculus can be viewed as a functional
programming language. Computation corresponds to term reduction. Initially
this isomorphism was perceived syntactically [Curry Feys 58, Howard 80] as
a correspondence between proofs in the intuitionistic logic of implication and
terms of a simply typed A-calculus. Logical operators such as A,D (conjunction
and implication) correspond to type operations: x,—*■ (cartesian product and
function space). Proofs then correspond to terms of the appropriate type. By
using the concept of Propositions as Types, propositions are identified with
the type of their proofs. Since each proof corresponds to a A-calculus term,
the proposition it proves may also be viewed as the type of the term. Further¬
more, when we view these A-calculus terms as programs, the proposition may be
regarded as the type of the program, in the sense of specifying its task.
This proof/type construction process will be explained in more detail later
in this chapter, in the context of describing the process of proof and the ex¬
traction of programs. Martin-Lof's Type Theory comprises a constructive type
theory with an associated constructive logic interpretation and extended A-
calculus/functional programming constructs.
Consequently, we can see the statement t £ T in different ways:
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• t is an element of a type, T
• t is a proof of T
• t is a program for the task specified by T
Oyster is an implementation of a logic close to Martin-Lof's type theory. It is
a Prolog version based on NuPRL [Constable et al 86]. It provides a sequent cal¬
culus proof refinement system, building the corresponding A-calculus fragment
(called the extract term) at each proof node, as well as developing the proof tree.
At any proof tree node labelled by some proposition, for which the proof below
has been completed, the extract terms assembled from the proof below form a
lambda calculus term. This constructed term is evidence that the proposition's
type is inhabited (by the term), which is equivalent to it being proved. I will
use the word "proof" for a sequent calculus proof, "extract term" for the corre¬
sponding A-calculus term, and "witness" (sometimes "proofwitness") for a piece
of evidence, possibly assumed if it labels a hypothesis.
For a complete proof of a goal which is a specification of a program, these
program fragments will amount to a runnable program. If the problem has
been suitably formulated, Oyster can execute this program. As some proofs
correspond to verification rather than synthesis, the corresponding A-calculus
term may not always be executable.
Constructive logics may be defined as natural deduction systems, but a se¬
quent calculus, as is used in Oyster and NuPRL, has the advantage of being
modular - any node has all the information relevant to its proof present ex¬
plicitly. There are no links to indefinitely distant assumptions which must be
discharged later. The hypothesis list contains any assumptions, labelled with
their associated proof objects.
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3.2 Constructive Logic
In any logic, proofs can build on other proofs. In a constructive logic, though, a
guarantee of the ability to construct proof witnesses is integral to the notion of
what constitutes a proof, in contrast to classical logics using Tarski semantics.
Working in a constructive logic, proof requires evidence. The evidence may
be a construction based on other proofs, an actual witness or a recipe for the
construction of any objects whose existence is asserted. As an example of an
"actual witness", if we wished to prove that there were some natural numbers,
s(0) would be an "actual witness".
For example, to prove a conjunction, it is necessary to prove each conjunct.
The evidence for the conjunction is the pair consisting of the evidences for each
conjunct. The inference rules are designed so that the process of proof can con¬
struct the necessary evidence at each stage, and assemble the proof components
from each node into the evidence for the whole proof.
This need for evidence means that we may not prove a proposition by as¬
suming its negation and then deriving a contradiction, or by assuming in general
that either a proposition or its negation must be true. If we wish to make such
an assumption, we must provide evidence for it.
As in classical logic, there may be many proofs of a proposition. As already
stated, a proposition A can be taken to represent the type of its proofs. The
proof we construct will be one element of this type. A false proposition has no
proofs, so it corresponds to the appropriate empty type, void.
The Oyster versions of inference rules are called refinement rules because as
the proof is constructed backwards from the initial statement, it is refined into
(usually simpler) components. Each rule has a corresponding construction func¬
tion associated with it, for building its evidence from the evidences associated
with its supporting proofs. Each use of an inference/refinement rule extends the
fringe of the proof tree and fleshes out the extract term a little more, leaving
holes for the rest of the subproofs to fill. The holes will be filled by their evidence
constructions. The leaves are one of the following:
• Axiomatic equalities such as I- 0 =pnat 0- As I shall explain in more detail
later, equality is defined with respect to the type of the expressions being
compared. For Peano natural numbers (pnat in Oyster), 0 =pnat 0 is
axiomatically true. The extract term for this is just axiom.
• Well-formedness goals such as h 0 in pnat, again the extract term for this
is just axiom
• Sequents which are immediately true because the conclusion is already
directly a hypothesis, and its proof construction is available, e.g. A b A.
The extract term for this is the proof construction witness.
3.2.1 Refinement of Conclusions
It is interesting to look at the Curry-Howard isomorphism in detail for a variety
of common inference rules, to see how the proof construction takes place which
doubles as a functional programming language. I will use Pa and Pb to represent
proof witnesses of propositions represented as A and B. The proof witnesses
correspond to the extract terms for A and B. For each inference rule, I will
describe what constitutes proof, what the witness construction term is in Oyster,
and what the type of such terms is. Table 3-1 summarises these rules. The final
column is the Oyster refinement rule which would be used. For most of the
rules the context makes their operation unambiguous, but some of them must
be parameterised, as described next. I have not shown all the subgoals from each
inference in table 3-1, as the well-formedness subgoals would make it cluttered.
• To prove A A B we must prove A and we must prove B. A proof of the
proposition A A B consists of a pair Pa&Pb (written (PA, Pb) in usual
notation). The cartesian product A#B is then the type of all such proofs.
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• To prove A V B we must prove A or B and state which one, hence the
parameterisation in table 3-1. A proof of A V B consists of an indicator
(in/ or mr) of which disjunct has a proof, along with the proof (PA or Pb)-
The proof evidence construction is inl(PA) or inr(PB). The set of all of
these corresponds to the disjoint union1 of A and B viewed as types, A\B.
Sequent Construction Type Subgoals Refinement Rule
h A/\B PA^PB A#S b A and b B intro
b AV B inl(PA) A\B b A intro(left)
1- A V£ inr(PB) A\B b B intro(right)
b A D B A(x e A).Pb{x) A^B a E A b B intro
b -A A(x E A) .P'void. A —> void a E Ah void intro
b 3x E T.A(x) (/> PA(t)) t-.T#A b A(t) intro(t)
bViG T.A{x) M-PA(t) t:T A t E T h A(t) intro
PAe A b A Pa A none intro
Table 3—1: Introduction Refinement Rules
• To prove A D B we must show how a proof of B can be constructed given
a proof of A. An arbitrary new symbol a is created, corresponding to the
witness for A which will be assumed to exist. A proof of A D B consists
of a function which applied to a proof of A produces a proof of B; that is,
a function Ax.b(x) which may be applied to PA. The type of all of these is
the type of functions from type A to type B, A —* B. It is a special case of
the class of dependent functions, which correspond to proofs of universally
quantified formulae.
• Proving -iA means that we want to show there can be no proofs of A, i.e.
that it is the empty type, void. -iA is identified with A —» void, the type of
1Set union without collapsing common elements
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functions which, given a proof of A, returns a proof of some absurdity, such
as membership of the empty type. This makes it similar to the previous
case.
• A proof of 3x E T.A(x) requires that we demonstrate the construction
of an object t of type T, and a proof of A(t). The proof construction
is a pair {t,PA(t)), where PA(t) is a proof of A{t). The type of proofs is
the disjoint union of the A(t) types, indexed by t's: t : T#A. This is a
dependent product, because the type of the second element of any pair in
it is dependent on the first element.
• A proof of Vt E T.A(t) requires us to demonstrate that for any member t
of r, we can produce a proof of A(t), thus a function which takes an object
t of type T, and constructs a proof PA{t) of -<4(0 > i.e. At.PA(ty The type
of proofs is the type of functions from T to A, indexed by i's: t : T —► A.
This is a space of dependent functions, because the range type may depend
on a domain element.
Here is an example proof, of A A B D A V B as an illustration of some of
these rules. Since everything must be typed, A and B are declared to be in u(l),
the type of basic types. This will be explained in more detail in section 3.4. To
simplify the presentation, I have left out the well-formedness goals which would
arise and be resolved trivially. The proof will be completed in the next section.
i: This top sequent is refined by a V introduction. This can be viewed as
either the hypothesis of some new free variable over which to continue
proof, or as part of the construction of a witness. The partial construction
is AA._, where the underscore will be filled in by the next refinement.
A E u(l)
A E u(l),_B E u(l)
h VA E u(l) E u(l) A A B D AV B
h WB E u(l) A /\ B D A V B






ii: This is similar to the last refinement. The assembled construction is
\A.\B._.
iii: To prove an implication, we may assume a proof of the antecedent and
use it. In constructive terms, we construct a function which applied to
h, the witness, produces a proof of A V B, that is Ah._ The assembled
construction is \A.\B.\h._
Since the proof system is one of refinement, and operates backwards, these
rules, called introduction rules, actually remove connectives from the formula
being proved. This makes sense if the proof is considered in the forwards di¬
rection, when the connective is being introduced. Similar remarks apply to the
elimination rules, described next.
Programming Constructs
The proof constructors are components of a functional programming language.
So far we have function abstraction, the creation of tuples and canonical terms
(using inl,inr). Other functional language components needed will be rules for
term evaluation and accessing arguments of terms. They will be presented in the
following sections. This chapter by no means describes all Oyster's rules, but it
covers enough to give a clear picture. For a complete list see [Horn 88].
3.2.2 Refinements of Hypotheses
In the previous section, operations on formulae were described from the point of
view of proving them, using the refinement rules to introduce their connectives
in the conclusion formula. Table 3-2 summarises the related rules which apply
when the connectives occur in formulae in the hypotheses. In that context,
the effect of the refinement is to access the components which form part of the
construction of that hypothesis' proof. The major connective is "eliminated".
Just as A-introduction creates a pair, A-elimination splits an assumed proof of a
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conjunction to yield the proofs of the pair of conjuncts. These are added to the
hypothesis list. Continuing the example shows this:
A e u(l),B e u(l),h e A a B I- AV B (iv)
A e u(i),b e u(i),he A a b,
hA e A, hB e b,hAAB e h =u(i) hA&zhB H AV b (v)
A e u(l),B e u(l),h e A a B,
hA e A, hB e B,hAAB e h =u(i) hASzhg h A (vi)
iv: This is the last sequent of the proof segment from the last section. To
split the conjunction requires an elimination refinement on the conjunction
hypothesis (elim(h)). In proof terms, new hypotheses are added, for the
individual conjuncts. In construction terms, new witnesses are added corre¬
sponding to the components, and a linking witness, hAAB, noting the com¬
position. The assembled construction is XA.XB.Xh.spread(h,[hA,hB,P]),
where P is the extract term that will be supplied by the proof below this
node. Here, spread takes a pair (first argument) and a list (second ar¬
gument) specifying two labels and a term which may include them; on
execution the function returns this term with the labels substituted by the
elements of the pair.
v: The step from this sequent to the next one is an introduction. To prove
A V B we must prove one of them and state which one. If we pick A,
the refinement rule is (intro(left)). XA.XB.Xh.spread(h, [hA, hB, m/(_)])
is the assembled construction.
vi: The last step is to notice that the proof can be finished since the hypothesis
list contains the conclusion proposition, with its witness, hA.
That last step also completes the construction corresponding to the whole
proof: XA.XB.Xh.spread(h,[hA,hB,inl(hA)]). As we would expect, it is a func-
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tion which splits a pair into its components and uses one of them to show that
the disjoint union of the types is non-empty - equivalent to constructing the
proof of the disjunction.
Here is an explanation of the various refinement rules applying to hypotheses,
it is summarised in table 3-2.
Sequent Construction Refinement Rule
heAABb C spread(h, [hA, hB, Pc]) elim[h)
heAvB\r C decide{h, [hA, PCa], [hB, PcB]) elim[h)
h e A D B \~ C Pc{h{PA)/hB} elim[h)
h e 3x e T.A 1- C spread{h, [hT, hA, Pc]) elim(h)
heVxeT.AY- C Pc{h{t)/hAW} elim{h, on(t))
h : void b C any(h) elim(h)
hz names a proof of a hypothesis Z.
Pz is the proof construction resulting from a proof of Z.
T{p/q} means the substitution of p for q in term T.
Table 3—2: Elimination Refinement Rules
• To prove C assuming we have h, a proof of A/\B, we may need to access the
individual proofs of A and of B. In a constructive proof, we may assume
these exist. This refinement just identifies h as a pair, and produces its
elements for use.
• To prove C using the assumption A V B we must produce two proofs, one
assuming A, and one assuming B. The construction added is the decide
term indicated in table 3-2. According to whether h is of the form m/(_)
or mr(_), the decide function will yield its second or third argument, when
run as a program.
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• To prove C assuming h, a proof of A D B, we may split the proof into
a proof of A, and a proof of C assuming B. Since h is a function which
produces a proof of B given a proof of A, its application to Pa is an actual
proof of B, and is substituted for the label used in the proof of C.
• To prove C assuming 3x G T.A we may need access to the object hr
which exists and the proof that it satisfies A. These necessarily exist in a
constructive proof. This refinement just identifies h as a pair, and produces
its elements for use.
• To prove C assuming Vx G T.A{x) we may want the proof instance for
some particular element t of T. The refinement allows us to specify such an
element (we are required to justify that it is an element of T), and provides
us with a proof of A(t), since h is a function which yields precisely such
objects.
• To prove C assuming h G void is to assume something constructive logic
accepts as a contradiction, inhabitation of an empty type. If we can assume
that, then we can prove anything. The extract term, any(ti) reflects this.
These rules add some more functional constructs to the language: accessing
components of tuples, a decision function (like an IF...ELSE...), and substitution
of values for parameter names.
3.2.3 Case Splits
Although in constructive logics the proposition P V ->P is not generally true for
an arbitrary proposition, P, it is sometimes true for certain P's.
For example, (x —pnat y) V -i(x =pnat y) is true, because a decision procedure
for testing it can be described. The two proof branches would deal with the cases
where x =pnat V and -ix =pnat V, and have corresponding program pieces Px=y and
P^x~y, respectively relying on a hypothesis h that x was or was not equal to y.
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The refinement rule for this particular case split is called decide2 in Oyster, and
the program component is pnatjeq[x, y, Px=v, P^x=v), a function which checks the
equality of its first two arguments and depending on the result returns the 3rd
or 4th argument. When this function is executed, the hypothesis label h will be
substituted by a correctly typed assumed truth, as actual witness. If x =pnat V
the substitution is axiom. Otherwise, x ^pnat V or rather x =pnat V —* void.
To preserve the type constraints, h's substitution must correspond to a function
which also yields axiom but ranges over the type x —pnat V (which is empty),
e.g. A axiom.
Sequent Construction Refinement Rule
x G pnat,




The decide rule corresponds to having a hypothesis which is such a disjunc¬
tion, and splitting the proof at that point, with each subproof having one of the
disjuncts as a hypothesis. The disjunction need not literally be present in the
hypothesis list for this to apply.
Different decision rules are built into the system for the different types, and
there are corresponding extract term constructions, their equivalents for pnatjeq.
3.2.4 The Cut Rule
The "cut" rule, called seq in Oyster, is a common inference rule in sequent
calculi. The proof divides into two branches:
1. a proof of A, the new proposition we wish to assume, from the current
hypotheses, and
2Not to be confused with the decide function which may be constructed as part of
an extract term
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2. a proof of the original sequent, with A as an extra hypothesis.
The latter proof will be of the form AhA.Pc, a function which produces a proof
of C given a proof of A. The associated construction for the seq node is the
application of this function to PA, the proof of A generated from the other proof
branch.
Sequent Construction Refinement Rule
b C (AhA.Pc)(PA) seq(A)
This allows new hypotheses to be added to a proof, perhaps corresponding
to lemmas, or a generalisation of the theorem being proved. Although cut can
be shown to be unnecessary for certain theories, it is required for others, and
can make proofs clearer.
In programming terms, it is like parameterising a function over another func¬
tion or introducing an auxiliary program.
3.3 Substitution
A special inference rule performs substitution of one term for another. This splits
the proof into two branches, one checks that the replacement term is equal to
the original, the other proceeds to prove the original goal, with the substitution
applied. No work relevant to the extract term is done by the substitution, so
the extract term corresponding to the original goal is just the extract term for
the latter of the two proofs below it.
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3.4 Datatypes
Just as different theories may be axiomatised in classical logic, various base types
may be defined for a constructive logic system. In Oyster there are integers, nat¬
ural numbers, atoms (strings of characters), and the empty type void. This is
essential to make the system useful for mathematical theorem proving or pro¬
gram development. Axioms associated with these types, such as their induction
principles, are built in.
More complex types such as products, unions and function spaces, are con¬
structed from the base types, as described previously. Lists of objects of named
types such as integers, int list, can be created with the list constructor. More
general recursive types, such as trees, can also be built using the rec constructor,
which is described in more detail in [Horn 88].
For each type, we must know:
• How to form canonical elements: for the natural numbers, there are two
canonical constants, 0 and s, the successor function. s(n) is a canonical
element if n is a natural number. We do not require that n be canonical,
it is enough for it to be well-formed, since that guarantees that it can be
evaluated into a canonical form.
• When two canonical elements are equal: in the case of the naturals,
0 —pnat 0 and s(n) —pnat ^(m) if Tl —pnat
Equality is always relative to type.
When terms are evaluated as part of a reduction or while executing an ex¬
tract term, lazy evaluation is used. An element is defined to be canonical if its
dominant functor is a canonical constructor as defined for its type e.g. s(0+s(0))
(function definition, such as +, will be explained shortly). Otherwise it is non-
canonical, and may be reduced by use of reduction rules - for example 0 + s(0)
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is non-canonical. No reductions apply to a term dominated by a canonical con¬
stant, since lazy evaluation only evaluates when necessary.
If it becomes necessary to decide whether an equality holds, the rules for the
type will define how that may be done. Some evaluation may then be necessary
to produce canonical terms on each side of the equality, so that they can be
assessed according to the rules for canonical objects.
Once formation and equality is defined for base types, it is defined inductively
for the types constructed from them.
The proof construction of a statement a —Type b is just axiom. The system
checks whether the terms are syntactically identical modulo renaming of bound
variables, and that they satisfy the type constraints.
3.4.1 Types of Types
Since everything must be typed in a typed set theory, there is a type that these
basic types and those types constructed from them using —►, #,\ inhabit. It is
called u(l) in Martin-Lof's system, and is the first of a cumulative hierarchy of
universes, where u(j) contains any objects which involve u(t'), where i < j. So
functions from the naturals to u(l) inhabit u(2).
3.5 Induction and Recursion
Primitive recursive function templates for integers, natural numbers and lists are
provided in Oyster. They permit the definition of primitive recursive functions
in terms of the cases based on the type constructors, corresponding precisely to
the structure of the type. For example append can be defined over the natural
numbers, using the listjnd function constructor.
appendix, y) == listJnd(x,y, [h,t,r,h :: r])
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The left-hand side is syntactic sugar for the right-hand side. The arguments
of listJnd are:
1. The label, x, of the argument over which the recursion is defined.
2. The value of the function when the recursion argument is nil, the empty
list. This can be defined in terms of the other arguments (just y here), and
any known constants and functions.
3. The definition of the value of the function when the recursion argument
is h :: t, i.e. it has a head, h, and a tail, t, and :: is the list constructing
function. This is a quadruple whose arguments are:
(a) the label h,
(b) the label t,
(c) the label, r, representing the value of the recursive call to the function,
append(t, y),
(d) the term which computes the value of the function. This can be de¬
fined in terms of the other arguments, known constants and functions,
h, t and r.
This adds recursion to the functional language being assembled. Details of
other recursion templates can be found in [Horn 88].
Induction is dual to recursion. Applying it as an inference rule splits the proof
into step and (usually) base case branches. The corresponding constructor is just
listJnd as described above, or an equivalent for some other type of induction.
The proof step sets up subproofs which provide precisely the objects required
for the function. For lists, the base and step case proofs supply their proof
objects. In the step case the labels for the head, tail and recursive call are the
hypotheses assuming the existence of the head, the tail and the proof of the
induction hypothesis.
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Sequent Construction Refinement Rule
x £ pnat list b C list.ind(x, PCnil, [h, t, r, PckJ) eltm(x)
3.5.1 Example
An example should clarify this. I will specify a delete function for lists of natural
numbers, and then use the proof to synthesise the function. As before, I will
omit the well-formedness goals, which are numerous and tedious. During the
proof, at the induction step, the recursion of the delete function will be built.
Here is the specification:
Ve £ pnat Vx £ pnat list 3y £ pnat list
Vz £ pnat member(z,x) D z =pnat e V member(z,y)
AVtu £ pnat member(w,y) D member(w,x)
A-imember(e, y)
This requires that all members of x are either e or members of y, all members of
y are members of x, and e is not a member of y. Such a specification of delete
permits the result to be a permutation of the elements of the non-e members of
x, or even have different numbers of occurrences, but that is not important here.
The append function is defined as above, and member as follows:
member(e,y) == list jind(y, void,[h,t,r,h —pnat e\rD
which states that a number e is a member of a non-empty list y if it is equal to
the head of the list or it is a member of the tail of the list (h —pnat e\r), and it
is not a member of the empty list (void).
The first steps of the proof are routine. The universal quantifiers are in¬
troduced, so that we get new assumptions that there are such e and x of the
appropriate types, and the conclusion refers to them. In programming terms, the
universally quantified variables are the input variables over which the function
will range, so they become lambda variables in its description.
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1. e G pnat
2. x G pnat list
=>■ 3y G pnat listVz G pnat member(z,x) D (z =pnot e V member(z,y))
AVtu G pnat member[w,y) D member(w,x)
A-imember [e, y)
The corresponding extract term is AeAx._, where the _ will be filled with the
extract term from the rest of the proof.
Induction on x (refinement elim(x)) now introduces precisely the cases we
need to consider, and the components to describe them with. The proof is split
into two subproofs, the base case and step case, each of which will yield an
extract term. The extract term grows to \e\x.listJnd{x, _, [x^, xt, xr, _]), where
the gaps will be filled in by the extract terms from the base and step cases
respectively. This listJnd builds recursion into the function being constructed.
First, the base case, where x is nil:
1. e G pnat
2. x G pnat list
=>■ 3y G pnat list(Vz G pnat member(z,nil) D z —pnat e V member(z,y))
AVu; G pnat member(w,y) D member(w,nil)
A-imember(e, y)
The construction corresponding to an existential proof is the pair consisting of
the object for which the theorem is true, and the proof that it is indeed true for
that object. The theorem is true if the value of y is nil, so we introduce that,
and then have the obligation of completing a subproof to show that the value
introduced meets the rest of the specification. This is a verification3 component
3It is worth noting that synthesis need not be accompanied by such a separate verifi¬
cation if no specification was made initially. A goal may just require the demonstration
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of the synthesis. It is not used in executing the extract term, but ensures that
the extract term satisfies the specification. Assuming that we complete this
subproof, and its extract term is Pnu, the entire extract term grows to
Xe\x.listJnd(x, (m7&Pn,j), [x/,, xt, xr, _])
Now, the step case. Here, x is Xh :: xt, where :: is the function which con¬
structs lists by joining a head onto a tail. The recursive call, xr is effectively
delete(e,xt), it labels the induction hypothesis, or equivalently, the recursive call
of the function being constructed. Only if this hypothesis or some hypothesis
derived from it is used in the subsequent proof to justify the conclusion, and
included in the function being assembled, will that function be recursive.
1. e £ pnat
2. x £ pnat list
3. Xh £ pnat
4. xt £ pnat list
5. xr £ 3y £ pnat listWz £ pnat member (z, xt) D (z =pnat e V member (z, y))
AVw £ pnat member(w,y) D member(w,xt)
A-imember(e, y)
=>- 3y' £ pnat listWz £ pnat member(z,xh :: xt) Z> (z =pnat eVmember(z,y'))
AVtu £ pnat member(w,y') D member(w, Xh :: xt)
/\->member(e, y')
Essentially the task in the step case is to describe the choice for y according to
whether Xh is e or not. This becomes the specification of most of the algorithm.
that a type is inhabited, without specifying any particular properties. In such cases,
there may be well-formedness subproofs, but verification is vacuous.
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The choice of y' for x will necessarily involve the value y for xt, got from the
induction hypothesis, xT. Since this is an existential formula, it is a pair consist¬
ing of an object and a proof relating to that object, here the value of the function
for xt, y and a proof that that meets the specification, xTy. Using an elimination
rule on this hypothesis produces these components as more hypotheses:
1. e £ pnat
2. x £ pnat list
3. xh £ pnat
4. xt £ pnat list
5. xr £ (3y £ pnat listWz £ pnat member(z, xt) D (z =pnat e V member(z,y)))
AVtu £ pnat member(w,y) D member(w,xt)
A-imember(e, y)
6. y £ pnat list
7. xTy £ Vz £ pnat member(z,xt) D (z —pnat e V member(z,y))
AVu; £ pnat member(w,y) D member(w,xt)
A-imember(e, y)
=>• By' £ pnat list
Vz £ pnat member(z,Xh :: xt) Z> (z ~pnat c V member(z,y'))
AViu £ pnat member(w,y') D member{w,Xh " xt)
A-imem6er(e, y')
Correspondingly, a spread function is built into the function being con¬
structed:
AeAx.listJnd(x, (nil&zPnu), [xh, xt, xr, spread(xr, [y, xTy, _])])
At this point a case-split is made depending on whether x^ is e or not. Ac¬
cordingly, the result must either skip xh or include it. The case-split is made
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using the refinement decide[xh =Pnat e), which produces two subgoals, each iden¬
tical to the current proof node apart from a new hypothesis, either x/, =pnat e or
-'Xh —pnat e- The construction is developed further:
Xe\x.listJnd(x, (nilhPnii), [x/,, xt, xr,spread(xr, [y, xrt,pnatjeq(xh, e, _, _)])])
The two gaps will be filled in by the extract terms arising from the subproofs.
These subproofs are about existential formulae. For each, a suitable object
is introduced for y, and a subproof verifies that the introduced object meets the
specification. The pair of the object and its verification proof's extract term
constitutes the extract term.
• If xh —pnat xr is introduced for y. Let the extract term for this be PXh=e-
• If -iXh —pnat e, Xh :: xr is introduced for y. Let the extract term for this be
Pxhjie-
The final construction is:
XeXx.listjind(x,(nil&z.Pnil),
[ xh 5 xti Xr,
spread(xr,[y, xry,pnatjeq(xh,e,xr&zPXh=e,xh :: xrkPXh7te)})])
The induction hypothesis/recursive call label has been used, so the constructed
function is recursive.
Notice that the way in which the induction hypothesis is used determines
the way the step case part of the definition relies on the recursive call (to the
same function with a reduced value for the recursion argument). Removing
the bits representing proofs about the (in)equality of xh and e, the recursive
definition constructed for the step case is essentially pnat.eq(xh, e, xr, Xh :: xr).
The step case of the function is defined to evaluate the condition, and then
depending on the outcome of that, yield either just the recursive call itself, or
the list constructed by "cons"ing the head of the current list onto the result of
the recursive call. This definition may be arbitrarily complicated, and involve
other functions which have already been defined.
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3.5.2 Defined Induction Schemes
There are constructs for other induction principles (natural numbers and inte¬
gers) built into the system. More sophisticated ones can be established based
on them, such as course of values and induction based on the construction of
numbers as products of primes. This is done by proving higher order theorems
which justify the new scheme, showing that it is well-founded and complete over
the type of objects it refers to. The proof will rely on one of the existing schemes.
The existence of other induction schemes is crucial for programming. The
duality of induction and recursion means that the inductions we choose define
the recursive structures of the corresponding programs. Many algorithms are
distinguished by their ability to access data structures in particular ways and
then act recursively on the result, e.g. divide-and-conquer algorithms. Conse¬
quently, to achieve such elaborate recursive algorithms, we need an extensive
repertoire of induction schemes.
3.6 Synthesis, Verification and Transformation
Correct programs emerge automatically from proofs of their specifications in
Oyster. As I have shown in the previous section, depending on how a theo¬
rem is formulated, the proof may correspond to a synthesis or a verification or
both. Equality proofs only involving universally quantified variables perform
no synthesis, only verification. A synthesis proof including a specification will
have a verification subproof. To achieve a synthesis of a specified function, /, or
satisfying some property P, we need goals of the form
b Vx3y. y = /(x)
and
1- Vx3y. P{y,x)
The proofs of these force us to produce a value for y, normally a defined com¬
putation on x - this is the synthesis. The proof then continues to verify that
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the supplied value for y actually satisfies the equality or whatever property was
required.
Transformation of proofs achieves transformation of programs, so it is possi¬
ble to start with a theorem/specification which would lead straightforwardly to
one proof/program, and augment it to get a proof corresponding to an improved
algorithm. In chapter 7 I will describe how a theorem corresponding to a naively
recursive program can be automatically generalised to a theorem corresponding
to a tail-recursive algorithm, and proved. The program corresponding to the gen¬
eralised theorem then has the properties we intended, as enforced by constraints
placed on its proof structure, equivalence of the two programs, corresponding
to the original theorem, and the generalised one, is assured by the proof too.
3.7 Conclusion
Constructive logic need not be based on Constructive Type Theory, but the con¬
sequences of defining it that way are useful. We can use the proofs-programs
correspondence to extract programs from proofs. Oyster is somewhat restricted
by the types available, though this is not too much of a problem for most prac¬
tical purposes, since most of the ones we use can be simulated or added as new
types.
The use of proof in constructive logics is a promising approach to the design
of provably correct programs, because the proof structure and program struc¬
ture correspond and share a common language. The semantics are essentially
operational rather than denotational. We are working with the actual program
(as a proof). This is in contrast with much other verification and synthesis work
which argue about the program as an object. Such approaches have a separate
level of describing side effect properties of the specification, such as properties
of invariants, and proving them. Constructive logic has the powerful advantage





As I have previously described, middle out reasoning involves the use of meta¬
variables to stand for objects which will become instantiated as the proof pro¬
ceeds. For some cases first-order unification might be enough. However, the
meta-variables could correspond to function symbols, in which case second-order
unification would be required to instantiate them. In general, middle out reason¬
ing might require even higher-order objects to be represented as meta-variables.
An algorithm must be found which can supply suitable unifiers, given terms
which may include higher-order variables.
A further requirement of the algorithm chosen is that it must be capable of
dealing with the language of the terms it will be given to compare. Unification
algorithms are, after all, designed for specific languages, not just different orders
of variables. They may or may not accept types, for example. Second-order
logic allows us to quantify over functions as variables, and therefore write terms
containing functionals. Clearly, whether or not this is a problem may depend
on how precise the algorithm is in its language demands and assumptions. Al¬
gorithms may be deliberately flexible, so as to avoid such problems, and a little
subterfuge may allow terms to pass through algorithms not intended for them.
If two terms in a higher-order language are unifiable, the number of unifiers
may be infinite, so algorithms searching for all unifications may not terminate.
Higher-order unifiability, being semi-decidable, is more tractable, as only a
process checking the unifiability of non-unifiable terms will fail to terminate.
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Huet's classic algorithm for the simply-typed A-calculus, [Huet 75], is a happy
compromise. Although it is a unifiability algorithm, the tree it returns recording
its search includes any substitution sets found. Apart from one special case, these
substitution sets are complete - they describe all the substitutions which will
unify the two terms. The omission is associated with what are termed flexible-
flexible pairs of terms. These are similar to variable-variable pairs in first-order
systems, but give rise to infinite sets of unifiers, causing non-termination in
unification algorithms. Huet's algorithm notes this, and simply records at this
point on the search tree that the terms are unifiable, without attempting to
supply unifiers.
For use with the various CLAM methods I developed using meta-variables for
middle out reasoning, I implemented a higher-order unifiability algorithm based
on Huet's algorithm. Interfacing was necessary to handle differences between
Oyster's language and the simply-typed A-calculus. Preprocessing was required
to establish types of all objects in advance, and carry out normal-forming. Post¬
processing, solutions were filtered to respect the quantification in my problems.
Adaptations were made to present terms for unifying suitably with respect to
quantification, so that universally quantified variables in lemmas were recog¬
nised as variables for unification. Further adaptations dealt with the occurs
check when it arose, and selected an answer in the case of flexible-flexible pairs.
I will describe this in detail in this chapter.
4.1 Huet's Algorithm
The tree of possible unifications is searched and since unifiers, if they exist, will
occur at a finite level, they will be found. The algorithm returns its entire unifi¬
ability search tree including both these successes and any failures, and selection
from the successes is at our discretion.
Huet describes simplifications possible when terms are in r?-normal form,




The algorithm is designed for a typed lambda calculus consisting of elementary
types and the types composed from them using —► , i.e. functions. The theory for
the terms over which the algorithm will be used, Martin Lof type theory, has a
richer set of type constructors, including set union and allowing dependent types.
The algorithm would, therefore, not be validly applied if we used it for arbitrary
terms, but provided that we restrict our unifications to terms whose types do not
stray outside the simply typed, this is not a problem. We are restricted by this
to variables, atomic objects which name constant symbols such as 0 and reverse
(of any order), terms composed from applying functions to variables and atomic
objects, and A-abstractions of these terms as described below.
It is necessary to know the types of all the elements composing both terms
before the algorithm proceeds. This is not decidable for Martin Lof type theory
in general, but can normally be managed for most terms we encounter in practice,
although sometimes only with ingenuity and persistence.
Terms and Unification
Terms are composed of:
• Atoms, which are known constants such as 0, nil, plus, reverse etc. and
a countable set of variable names. A finite number of variables may occur
in any term to be unified. All of these constants and variables must have
known types. Other variable names will be required as the algorithm pro¬
ceeds, their names are drawn from the set of variable names, and they are
assigned types as they are used.
• Applications, which are terms like /(a), which has type /3 when / is of
type a —> (3, and a is of type a. Both / and a are subterms of f(a).
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• Abstractions, such as Xx.e, which has type a —► /? if e has type /3 and x
is a variable of type a. e is a subterm of Xx.e, but x is only if it occurs in
e.
The notion of a tuple is handled by currying in the usual way, so plus{x,y)
is treated as an abbreviation for ((plus(x))y). In the following the I shall follow
Huet in showing functions applied to tuples in brackets in the ordinary way.
Their types will be given as ai x... X an —► /? where Huet would use al5..., an —►
P.
Two terms may be unified if they have the same type and a substitution can
be performed of terms of the same type for their free variables in such a way as
to make them identical.
Normal Form
The main algorithm requires terms to be in a normal form with respect to the
rules of A-conversion, the type-preserving transitive closure of a-conversion and
/^-reduction. Huet also describes a simplification applicable when ^-normalisation
is available too, which was implemented.
Presentation of these rules formally requires some preparatory definitions,
which I give here, following Huet closely. I present both an informal and a formal
version of the rules. The reader may wish to skip this preparatory material and
the formal version initially, and refer back as necessary.
• Context S [e] denotes a term S which contains a subterm e.
• Bound An occurrence of a variable x in an expression E is bound in E if
it occurs in a subterm of E of the form Ax.e.
• Free Any other variable occurrence is free in E.
• Set of Free Variables J(E) is the set of variables having a free occurrence
in E.
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• Substitution E{e/Xy is the term resulting from the substitution of e for every
free occurrence of x in E, (e and x must have the same type).
• Replaceability R(x,y,E) is the property that free x's can be replaced by
terms containing y's in E without confusion of bound variables. For x and
y of the same type, this is true if and only if all the introduced occurrences
of y in Eyv/Xy are free.
R(x,y,E) •<=>■ Ve.(i? = £ [Ay.e] D every occurrence of x in e is bound in E)
The rules are:
a This renames the bound variable in an abstraction by a variable which is
of the same type, for example from Xx.e to Ay.e, where y must not occur
free in e.
Formally: Let E = £[\x.e\. For any y £ 7(E) such that x and y
have the same type, and R(x,y,E), then £ [Xy.e{y/xy\ follows from E by
a—conversion.
0 This applies abstracted functions to terms of the same type. Ax.e(a) be¬
comes e{a/z}5 i-e> e with all free occurrences of x replaced by a's.
Formally: Let e = £[\x.e'(E)\. If Vy E 7(E) : R(x,y,e'), then
follows from e by 0—reduction.
77 This fills terms out to their full size by adding extra variables of the ap¬
propriate type to abbreviated terms lacking their full expression.
Formally: £[e] — £ [Ax.e(x)] where x g 7(e).
So if we have a term Ax1...x„./(e1,..., ep) where the type of / is rx X ... xrg —►
r, with q > p the conversion would be to
Axx...xn, Wp+i,...,Wq.f(e\,..., ep, wp+i,..., wg)
where the tu's are new variables of the appropriate type.
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Since in addition I have used the 77-converted form of the algorithm, the normal¬
isation used here is that all possible /3-reductions are made, and all terms are
^-converted. Therefore the resultant normal form is unique modulo a-conversion.
For any expression of the form Axi...xn./(ei,..., ep), / is referred to as the
head, and the e, are its arguments. If the head is a constant or one of the x,-, the
expression is rigid, otherwise it is flexible.
Substitution
A substitution is a finite set of pairs, each containing a variable and the expression
to be substituted for it, e.g. {ai/xi, ...,ap/xp}, where x,- are all distinct variables,
each of the same type as the corresponding a,-. The a,- are assumed to be normal-
formed.
The result of applying this substitution, o to some term T, denoted oT, is
the normal form of the term (Axi...Axp.T) (al5...,ap). It makes no difference in
which order the substitution pairs are applied.
A substitution is a type-preserving mapping. Since it can only apply to free
variables, the head of a rigid term cannot be changed by a substitution.
Two substitutions p and o are composed as follows: po = {p{ox)/x} such that
p(crx) 7^ x where x ranges over all variables. Since it is defined as a composition
of mappings, composition of substitutions is associative. This is essential for the
working of the algorithm, which assembles potential unifications as it traverses
the terms.





The algorithm proceeds by starting at the top of the two term trees, consid¬
ering the unifiability of corresponding nodes. To start with, we have an empty
substitution, i.e. one which indicates no variable bindings. As each pair of corre¬
sponding nodes is compared, the current substitution is extended to incorporate
any new information. In first-order unification, at each node comparison, there
is a single most general unifier to be composed into the unifier assembled so far,
if the two nodes are unifiable. In higher-order unification, each node compari¬
son may produce a number of unification extensions which do not subsume each
other, all of which may lead to different valid unifiers. Consequently, the algo¬
rithm must develop a match tree whose arcs are substitutions as the comparison
of nodes proceeds. Each node on the match tree corresponds to the current state
of comparison of the two terms, starting with the two original terms, but be¬
coming a set of pairs of corresponding subterms (with the unification discovered
so far applied) as the comparison proceeds. These sets of pairs of uncompared
corresponding subterms are called disagreement sets. Each branch of the tree
from root to leaf, corresponds either to a unifier (perhaps ending with a record of
a potentially infinite set of unifiers resulting from flexible-flexible pairs of terms)
or to an attempt at unification which failed.
Example
An example borrowed from Huet's description should illustrate this before I pro¬
ceed to a detailed description. Suppose we wish to unify the pair < F(X,a),b>,
where lower case letters denote constants, and upper case letters denote vari¬
ables. X, a and b are all of type a, and F is of type a x a —► a.
F is a variable function, so it could be instantiated to anything of appropriate
type, that is a function of two arguments of type a returning an object of type
a. It must have the normal form XuXv.E, where £ is a term of type a. Two
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operations are used to identify variables in ways which could lead to unifications
- imitation and projection.
• Imitation. If E is dominated by a constant, it must be just b, for nothing
else could unify with b. The substitution is {XuXv.b/F}. Applying this
substitution gives us a new pair of terms to compare, < b,b >, which
succeeds immediately, adding nothing more to the unifier.
• Projection. Otherwise, E could be a projection onto one of the A variables
in F's normal form, XuXv.E. Then that variable may turn into b:
— u generates the substitution {XuXv.u/F}. Applying this makes the
unification over the pair < X, b >. This immediately succeeds, with
the additional substitution {b/X}.
— v generates the substitution {AuAv.v/P} Applying this makes the
unification over the pair < a,b >. This pair cannot be unified, so this
branch of the tree records a failure.
Since normal form is assumed, we know that any other substitution for F would
not lead to unification, it would have the wrong type or introduce the wrong
head symbol.
Detailed Description of Huet's Algorithm
The algorithm constructs a matching tree for two terms using two main proce¬
dures, SIMPL and MATCH, which it applies until a unifier is found or the tree
is complete. SIMPL manages the nodes of the tree, MATCH compares pairs of
terms.
The algorithm starts with a disagreement set containing just one pair, the
original pair of terms, which must have the same type or the unification fails
immediately. SIMPL uses this set to construct the first node of the tree. SIMPL
operates as follows on a node with disagreement set S:
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1. It checks all the pairs in the disagreement set which contain two rigid
expressions. Suppose they are: \x\...\xtn,ri(e\, for t = 1,2. If the
headings of any such pair fail to match, either because they have different
numbers of A—variables1, or because rx ^ [\x\...\x2n^r2){x\...x\l), then no
unification is possible using the substitution assembled so far. The node is
marked as a failure node, and its branch terminates.
Otherwise, the pair's members have identical numbers of A—variables,
and the pair is replaced in the disagreement set by all pairs of
corresponding arguments, preceded by the appropriate A—variables:
< Aar1...Aa:1ieJ, \x\...\x2nie2 > for j = l...pi. This is repeated until there
are no more rigid-rigid pairs.
2. Any pairs which have a rigid element first, then a flexible one, are swopped '
round, and will be processed by MATCH.
3. If the set is empty or all the remaining pairs are flexible-flexible, unification
is possible, and no further substitutions are necessary. The branch termi¬
nates, with the node labelled a success. Otherwise the node is returned for
further processing, along with its disagreement set.
Leaving flexible-flexible pairs like this can cause difficulties, because it
does not necessarily provide a substitution we can use. At this point the
number of solutions is infinite. There are two reasons for this, firstly,
even considering the two operations we have used to identify substitutions,
there are an infinite number of ways of interleaving them to reach possible
matches. Secondly, in order to make the algorithm semi-decidable, Huet
omitted three other operations which cause prolific branching, and apply in
the flexible-flexible case, those of elimination, iteration and identification.
1with ^-conversion this could only happen if an ill-typed expression were submitted
to the unifier, and preprocessing should pick that up before here.
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This is the crux of the difference between a unifiability and a unification
algorithm, it controls the explosive nature of the search tree, but fails to
produce some information.
Now assume that the algorithm is at some node on the match tree generated
by SIMPL. The substitution assembled so far is cr, the composition of all the
substitutions on the arcs above, and the node is associated with a disagreement
set, S, the set of outstanding uncompared subterms of the original two terms
under a. Assuming the node has not already been labelled as terminating with
success or failure, a disagreement pair with a rigid element is chosen from the
set, and MATCH is used to produce a set of substitution pairs, S', from it. The
choice of disagreement pair is significant. By selecting from the disagreement
set first-in-first-out, we increase our chances of terminating on failure branches,
without affecting performance on success branches. A first-in-first-out strategy
forces us to cycle through all the disagreement pairs so we find out if any of
them is going to lead to failure in an easily perceived way. A last-in-first-out
strategy could let us loop on a single disagreement pair early in the list, when a
later one might be due to fail clearly. Finite failure trees are important because
they allow us to establish non-unifiability, and hence reject certain choices for
identifying our meta-variables.
If S' is empty, the pair of elements cannot be unified, and o cannot lead to
a unification, so the branch terminates as a failure. Otherwise, for each element
a' of 5', a new arc is grown labelled by a' to a new node. The new node is
created by applying SIMPL to the disagreement set produced by applying o' to
the current disagreement sets' members.
Lastly I shall describe the MATCH procedure, which takes a flexible term
and a rigid term and returns a finite set of their possible substitution pairs.
Since the terms have the same type, and have been 77-converted, they must
have the same number of A—variables. Let the flexible term be
Axf ...Ax^F(ef, • •■epF), let the rigid term be AxJ...Axrnr(e[, ...erPr) and let the type
of F be x ... X aPF —* (3
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The aim is to identify possible matches for F. There are two ways in which
the terms could match:
• Imitation. For F to imitate r being a constant symbol, it must be:
Xzi...Xzppr(<7i(^i, •••, Zpp) j •••■> 9p, (^i) •••> ^pfY)
where the <7's are distinct new variables of the appropriate type. This
substitution is returned. It is the most general one that imitates r, follows
the type structure and preserves references to the original binding of F
everywhere.
• Projection. This covers the case where r is one of the x\...xrn. F is
projection onto one of its arguments:
Xzi...XzpF.Zj{Ji\(zx,..., ZpF),..., hpT(21,..., £pp))
where 1 < j < pp, and the h's are distinct new variables of the appropriate
type. Again, this is the most general form this match could take. All pp
such substitutions are returned.
The set of substitutions is all the substitutions proposed in these two ways.
4.2 Implementation
The algorithm was implemented as described, but some interfacing was necessary
to use it for middle-out reasoning with ClAM. The requirements of the algorithm
are for two terms in normal form, all the components of which are of known
type, and known constant or variable status. Additionally, an indefinite supply
of fresh variable names is required.
For flexible-flexible pairs, I generate a single solution, a new variable of the
correct type.
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4.2.1 Representation of Variables
Middle-out reasoning is implemented in ClAM using Prolog variables, even for
higher-order meta-variables. For example, F(a, X) where F and X are variables,
is just F of a of X, since C1AM uses the of operator for function application.
For higher-order unification, copies are made of the terms with these variables
replaced by labels which are Prolog atoms, so that the unifications proposed
relate to these labels, and an explicit choice can be made, rather than instanti¬
ating one directly. Prolog unification is, of course, only first-order, and would
only admit a single solution, whereas we need to explore a tree of solutions.
If any of these unifications result in a partial instantiation of a meta-variable,
but introduce new variables as described in the algorithm above, these have to
be turned back into Prolog variables on their return to the ClAM part of the
system. The advantage of this approach is that a variable may be progressively
instantiated by different parts of the proof plan, and that instantiation is then
easily available throughout the proof plan, propagated by Prolog's unification.
It is amenable to revision at the planning level, if one proposed unification fails.
4.2.2 Interfacing Middle-Out Reasoning and Higher-Order
Unification
All meta-variables are treated as variables in the higher-order unification. Addi¬
tionally, any universally quantified variables in lemmas or hypotheses may take
any value we choose, so they are treated as variables too. Anything else is deemed
a constant. All terms initially submitted to the algorithm are in ^-normal form,
so interleaving of steps 4 and 6 below is not required.
As pre-processing:
1. Any outermost term structure not legitimate within the simply-typed
A—calculus is matched by Prolog unification, as I can safely assume that
it only contains constant symbols. This is mainly used to filter out mark-
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ers used by ClAM to annotate terms. It is also used when matching an
induction hypothesis and conclusion from the sequent:
VaVyBz. z =pnat u,t append(t, a)
H VaVyBz. z —pnat Hit append(t, h :: a)
Huet's algorithm cannot cope with the polymorphic types of = and the
underlying Oyster connectives. For induction hypotheses and conclusions,
I can take advantage of the knowledge that their outermost quantification
will be identical.
2. Copies are made of both the terms to be compared and their context,
which is used for type-guessing. The context of a term to be unified is the
sequent or theorem from which it originates. Any Prolog variables in the
copies are converted to fresh Prolog constants, but their variable status is
noted.
3. The types of the two terms to be compared are tested to ensure they are
the same. If not, the algorithm fails immediately.
4. The copies of the terms are normalised by /^-reduction.
5. The types of all the symbols in the ground copies of the terms are guessed
and recorded.
6. The expressions to be compared are checked to make sure they are in
y-normal form.
7. All the arguments throughout the term are checked to ensure that they
have the correct types to suit the functions they are in. Although it should
be possible to do this as type-guessing proceeds, that is a very tortuous
operation, in which types of functors are being guessed from their argu¬
ments' types and vice-versa. Consequently I make a second pass, once I
have all the information. As this wasn't the main thrust of my work, lim¬
ited effort was put into refining it, and there is certainly plenty of scope
for improvement.
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As post-processing, the substitution is applied to the terms, anymeta-variable
parts becoming Prolog variables again.
4.2.3 Types
The kind of terms matched is restricted to those compatible with the typed A-
calculus. Thus, use of this algorithm is legitimate as it stands, and needs no
extension. This restriction is imposed both by choice of terms to submit to the
unifying routine, stripping out any ClAM notation, and by some pre-processing,
as noted above.
Finding the type of an arbitrary term is not necessarily decidable in Martin-
Lof type theory. Although usually possible, it is often very difficult. In practice,
though, it is usually feasible. For use with this algorithm, I extended ClAM's
usual type guessing mechanism.
I will not spend much time on this, as it is only a tool to supply information
to the unifying algorithm.
ClAM has some type guessing built in, so that given an arbitrary instantiated
term, it can try to establish its type from information globally available to the
underlying Oyster system.
The existing type guessing concentrated on knowing the types of constants
and constructors, and establishing the types of functions, and therefore terms
occupying their arguments, from definitions. Even then, that would not neces¬
sarily establish the type completely, as from a definition we might only be able to
find out the types of the recursive argument position, and of the result, but not
all other arguments' types. For a variable, a quick check would be done to see if
its name appeared as a universally quantified (necessarily typed) variable for the
current Oyster conclusion - an attempt at using context, somewhat out-of-date
for the ClAM work.
I extended this considerably, because it couldn't identify the types of all the
variables which are generated during the progress of Huet's algorithm. Further,
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it was very sequent-directed, whereas I regularly needed the types of objects
from wave rules.
Firstly I gave it context, by using the entire current planning sequent includ¬
ing the hypotheses, or in the case of an expression from a wave rule, the lemma
from which it was derived. A great deal of information could be deduced from
definitions, quantification, etc.
Secondly, my program assembled the type of any term either top-down or
bottom-up, according as information was available. This meant that it would
approach any term, /(a, 6(c)), say, knowing at most the type of the whole term,
rt, and try to deduce the type of the functor alone ry, i.e. fill out the blanks in
_ x _ —* rt by looking at definitions. If that worked, it would proceed recursively
down to establish the types of the components of /'s arguments. If it failed to
fully instantiate Tf this way, it would try the other way round, by finding the
types of a and 6(c), first.
Standard ClAM retains and uses annotations to align unification in expres¬
sions and rules used to rewrite them. Here, those annotations are polymorphic,
and so have to be removed because we cannot always give them types which
would satisfy the unifying algorithm.
4.3 An Example and Some Problems
Looking at another example shows the algorithm's operation, and some problems
that arise. Restrictions on the acceptability of substitutions suggested by the
algorithm resolve some of the problems.
Suppose we try to unify G(a,b) and f(X,Y(c,d)), where lower case letters
denote constants, and upper case letters variables. The constants and variables
a, 6, c, d, X, Y are of type a, while G and / are of type a x a —► a. I will assume
that both terms have been normalised.
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Trying to identify G, projection makes it a or b, neither of which can match
f(X, Y(c,d)), so these are failure branches. Imitation suggests the substitution
{\u\v.f(Hi(u,v),H2{u,v))/G }. A new arc is grown, labelled by this substi¬
tution, to a new node. The SIMPL part of the algorithm labels this node by
the disagreement pairs of corresponding arguments, once the substitution has
been applied: < Hx(a,b),X and < ff2(a,6),F(c,d) > These are both flexible-
flexible pairs, so the operation of the algorithm is complete. The suggested
substitution is informative about G and X, though perhaps not as much as we
would like. It is not clear how we would effect a substitution for Y(c,d), only
that we could. To deal with this fully we would need to incorporate the explo¬
sive parts of Pietrzykowski's algorithm, or some equivalent. We would need an
algorithm to supply us with a stream of the unifiers, from which we could make
a selection fitting our purpose.
If, however, we have more information, for example that a and X must
unify, we can get more precision from the algorithm. Sometimes, it may be
known that certain subterms must unify, and their prior unification can then
constrain the unification of the whole terms. In fact, with care and knowledge
about the overall task this unification is serving, the unification can often be
turned into a sequence of matches. That is an immense improvement, as second-
order matching is decidable, and matching generally is far more tractable than
unification.
In this example, if we unify G(a,b) and f(a, Y(c, d)), the algorithm proceeds
as before, with the same substitution suggested for G, but the disagreement
pairs labelling the node are different. The first one is now < H^a^b), a >. The
algorithm suggests three substitutions for H\\
• Imitation. { XuXv.a/Hi } - This succeeds. Including this part of the
substitution into the one we have so far for G, we get
{XuXv.f(a, JT2(u,u))/G}
which is valid, but sometimes implausible, since it builds one of its own
constant arguments explicitly into G. Such unifiers can usually be rejected.
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• Projection. { XuXv.u/H\ } - succeeds, Hi(a,b) is just a.
• Projection. { XuXv.v/H\ } - fails, since Hi(a,b) becomes b.
It is worth amplifying on the solution arising from the imitation operation
in this example. The reason why we might wish to reject it is a regular one
in these middle-out problems, and results from our knowledge about the use of
meta-variables for the problem. We will wish G to be a function whose identity
could have been given even before the problem was stated using certain labels,
x's and y's for local variables. Further, we do not wish it to be in any way
defined by the names invented for variables which appear during proof. This
will be described in more detail in 6.3.3. There is effectively a temporal scoping2
which applies to the solutions proposed by the unifying routine. Solutions which
build arguments into their identity by A—abstraction are acceptable, while those
which build in the name of a temporary variable occupying the same location,
are not. In the above example, this means that the imitation would be rejected
where the first projection was accepted. Note that this only applies to entities
which are deemed to have had identities before the start of the problem, i.e.
anything not universally quantified within the problem.
The behaviour with flexible-flexible terms is a problem if we wish to partially
instantiate a meta-variable using the algorithm and then allow later theorem
proving to complete the instantiation. All the infinity of potential solutions
available from a flexible-flexible unification should be considered. In order to
have some way of continuing with middle-out reasoning, I have taken the solution
of noting these flexible-flexible pairs, and using a fresh variable of the correct type
as a replacement. This is translated back into a Prolog variable and identified
by subsequent middle-out reasoning. This is a valid solution, and, I believe, only
postpones a phase of the unifying, taking it up again later when more information
becomes available.
2Dale Miller is to be thanked for this concept.
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In practice, it is rarely necessary to partially instantiate. Judiciously applied,
most unification results in all meta-variables involved being wholly identified.
Usually, by working progressively through the subterms, it is possible to reduce
the problem to a sequence of higher-order matches rather than unification.
4.4 Other Algorithms
Other algorithms attempting some form of higher-order unification have already
been described in chapter 2. They fall into the following categories:
• They fail to cover all the cases I need. This is the case for F-matching,
which will not allow projection.
• They do not terminate when unification is possible, and cause significant
search space explosion. I count Pietrzykowski's second-order algorithm,
and Jensen and Pietrzykowski's w-order version here.
• They are developments from Huet's algorithm. Pym's work partially ex¬
tends Huet's algorithm, but it would require further extension to deal with
Oyster terms more generally. The particular form his extension takes is
specific to the AIT—calculus, and would not be suitable for non-Oyster
applications of middle-out reasoning.
Miller's algorithm is also based, at least originally, on Huet's algorithm.
He gains control over it by designing it for use on a language in which
predicate quantification is impermissable. In effect, it is similar to F-




Huet's algorithm is a good compromise between efficiency and unmanageable
infinite sets of unifiers. The preprocessing and interfacing required is consid¬
erable, but unavoidable. Small adjustments handle the cases of flexible-flexible
disagreement pairs back to the planner for further information, or select a single
valid solution.
By applying problem knowledge, unifications can often be reduced to a se¬
quence of subterm unifications, each of which is actually a match, and therefore
becomes decidable. The knowledge about these subterms was available before,
and used, via embedded annotations, in standard ClAM. This device was sat¬
isfactory for first-order unification, but not for higher-order unification, where
explicit separation was required.
Further problem knowledge filters out some unifications which are not valid





The experiments with meta-variables described in this thesis have been
conducted within the ClAM proof planning system [Bundy et al 90a,
van Harmelen 89] developed by the mathematical reasoning group in Edinburgh.
ClAM is described briefly here - for more detail, [van Harmelen 89] should be con¬
sulted. Although the results regarding meta-variables are not entirely dependent
on this system, the manner of their use is strongly influenced by ClAM's paradigm
of theorem-proving, and the search control mechanisms available in it.
Although originally built for use with the Oyster implementation of Martin-
Lof Type Theory, ClAM is a separate planning system which can be used to
control proof-like operations in various frameworks. These might describe other
logics, e.g. [Wiggins 90]. Even if the object-level system is a logic, its proof-
objects may or may not have translations into programs a la constructive type
theory, as described in chapter 3. Although the planner can be viewed as guiding
problem solution in general, I will describe it with respect to sequent calculus
proofs, since that is the application for which it is mainly used, and for which it
is used here.
90
5.1 The Planning Meta-Level
Reasoning at a meta-level is useful in avoiding a large scale object-level search
problem if that search can be conducted effectively amongst a smaller number
of meta-level operations. Since our understanding of the structure of proofs is
in terms of meta-level properties, it is appropriate for the search to be guided at
that level [Bundy et al 91b].
In Oyster/ClAM the object level is large in two ways:
• As for any theorem prover, there is a choice of inference to perform. This
is the more interesting control problem.
• Additionally, since this is a typed system, there are many, largely trivial,
well-formedness goals, which it is normally convenient to ignore at the
meta-level.
Although the latter kind of inference can usually be completed automati¬
cally without too much search, it would be an undesirable overhead if the well-
formedness subproofs were computed for every attempted meta-level proof, since
some of these will be false starts which will later be abandoned.
A meta-level may work in different ways. It may be:
• a way of heuristically guiding an object level process by explicit considera¬
tion of meta-level domain-related properties at each step. The focus is on
the domain, and the meta-level is very tightly defined for the domain in
question.
• a description of processes in terms of meta-level properties, so as to be
suitable for heuristic guidance at that level, for example in a planning
process. The focus here is on broadly defined meta-level control structures.
These may be more or less designed to suit different kinds of application
and will be tailorable for individual applications. They can include any
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object level information, plus additional meta-level information, such as
the stage reached in a proof and the path being followed. ClAM falls into
this category. In ClAM guidance is through preconditions and following
general patterns of proof structure.
• an abstraction, which is a meta-theory in which a set of meta-inference rules
apply [Plummer 85, Giunchiglia &; Walsh 89, Giunchiglia &: Walsh 91].
This is some kind of analogue of the object level. Inference is defined
at the meta-level to echo the object level, and search at this level should
be cheaper. A resulting meta-proofmay then be translated into object level
proof. An advantage of this version is the comparative ease of reasoning
about its abilities in relationship to the object level.
This list is not intended to be complete or mutually exclusive, just to convey
some of the range of possibilities. Within these categories, different choices of
meta-level description language will naturally be significant.
In the latter two cases, the problem solution may be completed at the meta-
level before any execution at the object level. There may be a hierarchy of
meta-levels.
A smaller meta-level may involve less meta-level search, but fail to have
the precision to distinguish object level situations well, resulting in considerable
object-level search. A larger meta-level may scarcely differ from the object level,
and just carry out most of the object-level search at the meta-level.
In addition to degrees of efficiency, two other types of failure are important
to consider for any meta-level guidance.
Firstly, how often does the meta-level inhibit the discovery of solutions which
exist at the object level? This consideration is more serious for abstractions, since
the abstraction is a whole entity functioning in concert, and any change involves
a complete re-design. Meta-level planning admits more easily of the alteration
and creation of individual meta-level properties and heuristics using them. The
totality of the planning heuristics and their use is still an entity whose joint
92
functioning must be controlled, but it is more flexible. This can be viewed as a
trade-off against the loss of some more powerful results such as completeness.
Secondly, how often does the guidance indicate a solution at the meta-level,
when there is no corresponding solution at the object level? In practice, this has
never happened in ClAM.
The rest of this chapter will look at the ClAM approach to proof plans.
5.2 Main Induction Strategy Proof Plan
5.2.1 Associativity of + Example
Proof plans are best described in terms of an example, such as the associativity
of +. Given a definition of +:
Vy G pnat 0 + y =pnat y
Vx G pnat Vy G pnat s(x) + y =pnat s(x + y)
We wish to prove:
Vx G pnat Vy G pnat \/z G pnat x + (y + z) —pnat (x + y) + z
Introducing the universally quantified x, and performing induction on it pro¬
duces two subgoals, a base case and a step case:
1. The base case,
Vy G pnat \/z G pnat 0 + (y + z) =pnat (0 -f y) + 2
is easily completed by:
(a) using the base case of the definition of + twice to evaluate the terms of
the form 0+ .... Evaluation of terms according to function definitions
is handled by a symbolic evaluation method, described in 5.5.
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(b) then the conclusion is just the equality of two identical terms
2. The step case,
Vy £ pnat Vz £ pnat x + (y + z) =pnat (x -f y) + z
h Vy £ pnat Vz £ pnat s [x) + (y + z) =pnat (s(x) + y) + z
is completed by
(a) three symbolic evaluations using the step case of the definition of plus
to rewrite the conclusion:
Vy £ pnat Vz £ pnat x + (y + z) pnat (x + y) + z
b Vy £ pnat Vz £ pnat s(x + (y + z)) —pnat s((z + y) + z)
(b) whereupon the use of the induction hypothesis makes the conclusion
another equality of two identical terms.
Provided that a suitable analysis has taken place to choose the induction
variable and scheme wisely,
• at least one occurrence of the induction variable will be in an argument
position of a function on which the function is recursively defined, so that
the definition may be used to symbolically evaluate the terms deriving from
this occurrence, and
• the induction scheme will have been selected to create the appropriate
values and term structures for the definition to work on, i.e. 0 and s(...)
in this case.
Each branch resulting from the induction may need to be rewritten a number
of times, by base cases or step cases of definitions, or by using other lemmas
already proved. This will be explained in more detail later for the step case. In
fact I am describing a simple case here, and later in this chapter, I will describe
the more general version.
The overall structure of this proof is an induction, after which
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• the base case will yield at least one symbolic evaluation using the base
part of the definition of some function appearing in the conclusion, and
• the step case will yield at least one rewriting using the step part of
the definition of some function appearing in the conclusion, and should
be followed eventually, usually after other rewritings by a rewrite using
the induction hypothesis - this is termed fertilization, following Boyer
and Moore.
We would always expect to make some use of the induction hypothesis in a
step case. In general, though, we could not expect either branch to terminate
after any particular induction, since further proof perhaps using other inductions
may be required to complete it.
This pattern is what we would expect of anything involving an induction
with base and step cases. I will examine the key stage more closely in 5.2.2 and
show some refinements.
5.2.2 The Key to Successful Induction Proofs
The key to making inductions work is the negotiation of the step case. This is
worth examining in some detail.
In the current ClAM system, induction is described mainly using constructors,
such as the successor function, 's', or the list constructor, Other induction
schemes based on multiplication or addition, for example, are available. There
are innumerable induction schemes, many of exotic construction, but the com¬
mon ones used in straightforward theorems exemplify the general problem. I
will return to the problem of choice of induction scheme later.
Taking c to be some constructor function defining the step of an induction,




where x, a free variable, may occur in various positions in P, as indicated by
the square brackets, and Hx, ...,Hn are hypotheses. Depending on the induction
scheme, the subgoals will be to prove one or more base and step cases. The





To be worthwhile, induction must eventually result in simpler goals to prove.
Looking at a step case like this, it appears to be more complicated than its
parent. However, when the induction hypothesis is used, the resulting subgoal
should be simpler. This therefore, is our aim for the step case of an induction.
In order for the induction hypothesis to be useable, it should appear as a
self-contained term in the conclusion, i.e. as P[x\, P[x\ A Q, P\x\ V Q or the like,
so that the induction hypothesis can be used.
Depending on the dominant connective of P, it may be enough to reproduce
some subterm of P[x] such that the induction hypothesis enables a rewrite on
at least one proof branch. Suppose P[x\ has the form Pj[x] = -FV[x], it may be
possible to reproduce just P\[x\ or Pr[x], whereupon equality will allow us to
rewrite it.
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The task then is to take P[c(x)] and apply a collection of rewrites such that it
turns into c'[P[x]]. Even if some subterm of P[x\ is to be produced, the same kind
of process applies. We need to rewrite, using lemmas or definitions, to ripple the
"difference" between the two terms, initially ttc(...)" upwards towards the root
of the term structure, making sure as we proceed that the pre-induction term
structure is being preserved for later fertilization. This "difference" is termed
a wavefront, and tracked as the proof moves it through the term. It will be
distinguished here by a surrounding box, and underlining the inner term (the
wave hole) which is to be preserved. The arrow signifies the direction in which we
are expecting the obstruction to move in the term structure, more explanation
of this will be provided later. The simplest such rewrites, termed wave rules
because they have this rippling effect, have the form:
E.g. the definition of *
More general forms take account ofmultiple wavefronts, nested functions and
multiple variables within the wavefront. These are described in [Bundy et al 90b,
Bundy et al 91b, Bundy et al 91a].
By marking this wavefront and tracking its progress, we can ensure that our
rewriting is directed towards the desired effect, e.g. raising the wavefront in the
term structure so that enough of the induction hypothesis is restored to permit
a rewrite. To achieve this may take a number of co-ordinated ripples. As we
shall see later, there are other means of removing obstructive wavefronts.
Step cases of recursive definitions have exactly the right form to achieve
this effect, but existing theorems may too, perhaps in more than one way. For
example the associativity of append:
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yields two wave rules derived from a single theorem. This effect is designated as
longitudinal, because it raises the wavefront in the term.
Not all definitions move wavefronts upwards, some of them move them side¬
ways, or transversely:
/(|c(g) ,y,a) =»
Both forms ofwave rule mark the movement of a portion of term structure around
a constant skeleton term. In both cases, the direction of movement is important.
In the longitudinal case, the upward movement leaves behind increasingly larger
contiguous pieces of skeleton. This leads towards the possibility of reproduc¬
ing sufficiently large skeleton subterms that fertilisation can take place. In the
transverse case, the portion of term structure being moved remains within the
skeleton, but moves sideways towards a variable which is still universally quan¬
tified. Here, too, fertilisation can take place, because that variable can "soak
up" the extra term structure, as the hypothesis copy of the variable need not be
instantiated to the same value as the conclusion copy.
An example of a transverse wave rule is the tail-recursive definition of reverse:
reversed h :: t , a) =>■ reverse(t, h :: a )
Notice that the wave hole notation on the right still indicates the part of the
expression which persists from before the application of the rule. Lemmas may
also move the wavefront transversely:
Here the depth of the wavefront in the term is not changed, but the direction of
the arrow has.
This notion ofmoving a wavefront transversely is useful when both the induc¬




b Vt/c. P[RS f, [yeJ]
This new piece of notation, [.. .J focuses on yc, annotating the location in the
conclusion which corresponds to a universally quantified variables in the hypoth¬
esis. Such variables may be instantiated to any value. They are called sinks,
because wavefronts can be "poured" into them. Indeed, ClAM detects when this
is happening, and expands the sink annotation to include the captured wavefront.
If there is a rewriting which can move the wavefront to be around yc:
Vyh. P[x',yh]
H Vyc. P[x', >'\yj
then we can give y/, a value to suit, i.e. c"(yc). This kind of operation is useful
in proofs involving variables designated as accumulators, the role played by the
y's here, since it can have exactly the desired effect of moving a wavefront onto
a sink acting as an accumulator. The notations to mark sinks and distinguish
the directions of wavefronts are recent additions to ClAM, and were not available
when I was working on it for tail-recursion optimisation. Consequently I will use
the notation relevant to the version of the ClAM system available to the work
being described. I shall return to the use of accumulators later, in Chapter 7.
Characterising the effect of different usages of lemmas and definitions on key
components of the sequent is essential to defining the structure of proofs. The
terminology describing this forms part of the meta-language used for planning.
This approach has the advantage that different formulations of the same concept
can be accommodated naturally. Since the different formulations are provable
from each other, the theorems stating their relationship become available lemmas
classified by their rewriting effects, as in the Boyer-Moore theorem prover. This
is as true for base case rules as it is for wave rules, so the symbolic evaluation
method including the defined base case append{nil, x) =>- x, would also include
append(x, nil) =>■ x as a reduction rule, once proved.
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5.2.3 Choice of Induction
The choice of induction scheme is undertaken by the induction method, and also
incorporated into the overall induction strategy.
The initial choice of induction is crucial to successful management of step
cases, since it will define the initial sequent. It involves two choices, of the
induction variable and of the induction scheme. Induction must take place on
a free variable, so any variables which are free at that point in the proof, or
can be made so because they are universally quantified in the conclusion, are
candidates.
If the selected variable is universally quantified, it is made free by an intro¬
duction rule of inference (Oyster proofs work backwards, remember, so intro¬
duction rules rather perversely seem to remove connectives - they are of course
introducing them in the forwards direction). This will make the first universally
quantified variable free, so ClAM does a little work to re-arrange leading univer¬
sal quantifiers so that only the required one becomes free. As we have seen, it
may be advantageous later to have the others still quantified, as this will make
the induction hypothesis more powerful.
Following Boyer and Moore's induction analysis, ClAM's induction selection
is guided as follows:
1. Find a variable, x, say, on which induction could be performed,
2. Check that at least one of its occurrences is in an argument of a function
such that a wave rule applies,
3. Take an induction scheme from the list of schemes ClAM knows, and check
that for all the occurrences of x in positions where wave rules are available,
the scheme will create a term such as c(x) at that position such that a wave
rule applies,
4. Preferably, but not necessarily, all occurrences of the variable will have
some wave rule available.
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If any of these steps fails, it backtracks and tries again.
This insistence on availability of wave rules initially sets up something with
a good chance of enabling a successful ripple to fertilization of the step case.
If that stage fails, within the attempt to apply the whole induction strategy,
backtracking will try other inductions on this sequent.
5.2.4 Induction Strategy
The general structure already suggested can now be refined further. I will refer
to this below as the "Induction Strategy", when I explain how it is incorporated
into the planner. We expect the selected induction to lead to the following two
kinds of subgoals.
Base Case
The free variable selected for induction will have been replaced throughout by
a constant. Simplifications by rewriting using base cases of definitions may
apply, and also similar results which have been proved as theorems, involving
base case values such as 0 and nil. Achieving some simplification like this may
enable others, so symbolic evaluation , which is used for base cases, is allowed to
include any reductions processing a constructor symbol. For example, rewriting
(0 + s(y)) -\- z to s(y) + z makes it possible to continue rewriting using the
step case of + where that wasn't possible before. Rewriting using equalities
present as hypotheses is also tried. It is quite difficult to draw a hard line
between symbolic evaluation, and other kinds of rewriting, and the constituents
of symbolic evaluation are revised from time to time in ClAM.
Step Case
This has already been described. It consists of rewriting by step cases of defi¬
nitions, or other longitudinal wave rules, or failing them transverse wave rules,
until simplification takes place by fertilization.
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5.3 Constructing Proof Plans
The construction of the plans follows the shape of the proofs, which are tree-
shaped. At each stage, the planner has a partial proof tree, and chooses a leaf to
work on (see section 5.6). The leaf will be characterised by the sequent derived
at that point in the meta-level representation of the proof (I will refer to this
as a meta-proof). The action of the planner will be to complete that portion of
the meta-proof, or find a way of developing it, which will extend the tree to new
leaves, and then recurse. When there are no more leaves to work on, the proof
is complete, and the plan construction has succeeded.
Proofs are analysed to establish regular components. Methods are designed
corresponding to these components, so that the planner's linking of them cor¬
responds to building a meta-level representation of the proof. Each method is
designed to detect whether the circumstances in which it is applicable pertain,
and then compute a tactic - an appropriate collection of object level inferences,
tailored to have the desired effect on the particular sequent. Methods are de¬
scribed in detail in section 5.4. The particular combination of methods which
forms a meta-proof is also that which combines all the methods' tactics to form
a proof.
ClAM uses the Induction Strategy plan, if possible, to save it from considering
all the methods individually. Commonly, a number of applications of this will
complete a meta-proof, perhaps with some symbolic evaluation to tidy up.
In the event of the Induction Strategy failing to lead to a solution, the planner
will try to apply the components separately, since a more flexible combination
may succeed.
This design makes ClAM adaptable to new problem areas since it is easy to
incorporate new purpose-built methods.
Since ClAM is built in Prolog, Prolog can easily be used for arbitrary compu¬
tation within it, as required by the methods.
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5.4 The Plan Components — Methods
5.4.1 The Description of a Method




name slot: Prolog term
input slot: sequent
[...Preconditions...], preconditions-slot: list of conjuncts
[...Postconditions...], postconditions-slot: list of conjuncts
[...Outputs...], output slot: list of sequents
tactic(...Args...) tactic slot: Prolog term
Figure 5—1: The General Form of a Method.
Each method defines a mapping from an input sequent to a list of output
sequents. The mapping may be partial, since it may not be fully instantiated.
The slot usage in these frames is now described.
• Name The method's name and some arguments which will parameterise
it in use. Some arguments may be used as output, to communicate with
other methods in a combined plan.
• Input This becomes instantiated to the meta-level representation of the
sequent1 the method is to work on. Since the frame is stored as a Prolog
term, individual methods may require a certain structure of the input
sequent, thus imposing implicit preconditions.
1If the sequent representation currently contains meta-variables, it is not strictly a
sequent.
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• Preconditions These are explicit preconditions which are tested to de¬
cide whether the method is applicable. Although they could be arbitrary
pieces of Prolog code, it is conventional to use a specially designed library
of predicates which describe just those qualities that are interesting in a
sequent, such as subterm structures, recursive structures, results of substi¬
tutions etc. This description language is also used for postconditions, so
there is some uniformity, and a common way of describing the results of
the successful application of the method. The connectives for this language
incorporate those concepts which are appropriate to the meta-language of
theorem-proving, such as "forall", "not" and "thereis" to encourage plan¬
ning in those terms.
An important feature of this method description language is the ability
to use other methods on a given sequent and discover what the effect of
applying them would be. This is used to create compound methods, as
described below.
The execution of the Prolog clauses in both this slot and the Postcondition
slot may cause Prolog variables shared with other parts of the frame, such
as the Output, to be instantiated. Backtracking may occur.
There is no guarantee that the method will succeed if its preconditions are
satisfied, but they are some protection against attempts which will fail.
• Postcondition If the preconditions succeed, the postconditions will suc¬
ceed too. These are explicit postconditions which will be true after the
method has successfully applied to the sequent. The postconditions per¬
form further computations to generate the subgoal sequents.
• Output This is a list of sequents which are the subgoals remaining to
be proved after the method has been applied to the input sequent. For
methods which complete a proof branch, this list will be empty. Since this
is the information which goes forward to the planner's continuing attempts
at proof, it is important that it be as detailed as possible.
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Tactic This Prolog term is the actual tactic which will be used on the
object level sequent. It is a macro of inference rule applications, or the
name of one.
5.4.2 Example — The Wave Method:













The arguments to the name (Pos, [Rule,Dir]) may already be instantiated
at the time of use, or may become instantiated through use. Oyster and ClAM
use ==> for K H==>G will be instantiated to the input sequent.
The list of preconditions operates as follows:
• matrix(Vars .Matrix,G) requires that G is a formula Matrix universally
quantified by Vars.
• wave_rule (Rule .long(Dir) ,L:=>R) instantiates the variables to respec¬
tively: the name of a wave rule, its direction of use, the form of the expres¬
sion which may be rewritten using the rule and the form of the result of
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the rewriting. Wave rules are identified as a pre-processing step when all
the definitions and lemmas are loaded. They are stored with Prolog vari¬
ables for the universally quantified variables for ease of checking matches.
Backtracking over this will produce other wave rules.
• exp_at (Matrix,Pos, L) requires that subexpression, L, of Matrix is at
position Pos. By Prolog unification it is constrained to match the left
hand side of the wave rule. By backtracking, all such subexpressions can
be found, depending on the success of later conditions.
Having identified a candidate wave rule rewrite, the Postconditions calculate
the result:
• replace (Pos ,R,Matrix,NewMatrix) means that NewMatrix and Matrix
are identical, except at position Pos, where NewMatrix contains R. I.e.
NewMatrix is Matrix with the rewrite applied.
• matrix(Vars .NewMatrix,NewG)] NewG is NewMatrix with the universal
quantification restored.
The single output sequent is then constructed from the original hypotheses
and the new conclusion formula. The actual tactic is suitably parameterised by
the identification of Pos and [Rule ,Dir] .
5.4.3 Compound Methods
The major methods which describe common proof structures may be created by
combinations using analogs of the tacticals (derived from LCF) used to combine
tactics:
• Methodl or Method2 - attempts Methodl, and then Method2 as an alter¬
native if Methodl fails.
• try Method - attempts Method, but does not fail (as a precondition for
example), if Method does. This can be useful if a particular method is
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likely to apply. If it does, progress has been made, but if not, we don't
want its failure to invalidate the applicability of the current method. If it
fails, it passes on as output sequent just the input sequent it received.
• Methodl then Method2 - attempts Methodl and then on each of the sub-
goals so produced, Method2. A variant syntax which is often useful is
Methodl then [Method2a, ..., Method2n] where the list of methods is at¬
tempted on the subgoals. The first of the list applying to the first subgoal,
the second to the second etc.
Repetition is achieved by creating new methods which are defined just to
be the iteration of others. An iterator construct takes a list of methods and
a representation of a sequent, and builds a new method which will apply the
methods from the list exhaustively. Such constructs are added when the methods
are loaded up initially.
In addition to the methods, there are submethods, which are defined in the
same way as methods, but which are not available to the planner independently
for plan formation, and may only be used as components of other methods. This
facilitates the organisation of logically discrete entities which are not used at the
planning level.
The general strategy described in section 5.2 starting with an induction,
and proceeding to fertilization with the induction hypothesis, is built from the
methods described in the next section, linked by the combinators above.
5.5 The Basic System
The basic ClAM starts with some methods supplied, which the user may add to
or remove. They are:
• tautology - for identities of the form X — X, where X may be universally
quantified, and simple logical tautologies. Like symbolic evaluation, this is
subject to periodic revision.
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sym_eval - the symbolic evaluation method, is an iterator construction of
the following:
— equal - rewrites of variables using equalities of the form
variable = term or term = variable
— base - rewrites using base cases of definitions.
— step - rewrites using step cases of definitions.
— reduction - rewrites using lemmas corresponding to alternative def¬
initions, involving constructor symbols such as 0,nil,s,::.
wave - looks for the applicability of a wave rule, preferring longitudinal to
transverse rules.
casesplit - if there is a conditional wave rule that might apply and the
condition can be identified as one of a complementary set, then the case-
split corresponding to the complementary set can be introduced.
strong_fertilize - when the current goal has been rewritten so that it
matches the induction hypothesis.
weak_fertilize - when all possible rewriting has applied to the goal, but it
doesn't match the complete induction hypothesis, sometimes the induction
hypothesis, can still be used to rewrite a subterm of the goal. We call
this weak fertilization. This is possible if it is an equality, implication or
dominated by another transitive predicate.
generalise - generalisation of repeated non-trivial terms, as performed by
the Boyer-Moore theorem prover.
existential - takes a goal of the form 3x.P(x), and generates the subgoal
P(X), with X a (Prolog) meta-variable, and associated tactic intro(X).
This is the form of the eventual subgoal, and with luck, subsequent proof
will instantiate X. In fact this is a limited version of MO R.
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• ind_stratJ - the basic induction strategy described earlier.
• induction - chooses an induction by finding an eligible variable and suit¬
able induction scheme. The variable must be free or universally quantified
in the current goal. It must occur in a subterm such that the function
surrounding the variable is recursively defined on the argument position it
occupies. There must be a suitable induction scheme (these are all defined
externally) which subsumes all the schemes suggested at all the occurrences
of the variable. If possible, there should be no occurrences of the variable
in non-recursive argument positions of functions, this corresponds to Boyer
and Moore's unfiawedness.
The subgoals produced are the base and step cases corresponding to the
induction scheme.
5.6 Search Strategy for Plan Formation
The planner may only combine methods by assessing their applicability at each
sequent and constructing a tree of applications of corresponding tactics. It starts
with the current sequent, and tests to see which of the methods can be applied,
in a user-determined order. Methods which cause termination of a proof branch,
such as symbolic evaluation and strong fertilization are tested first. After that,
it is sensible to prefer methods which are cheap, in the sense that they reduce, or
at least do not increase the complexity of the sequent to be proved. Expensive
methods like induction and generalisation, which increase complexity, come at
the end of the list.
Development of the plan depends on the search strategy in use:
• Depth-first. Takes the current sequent and extends it as indicated by the
first applicable method. The next current sequent is the first of the child
sequents.
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• Breadth-first. Takes all applicable methods and branches the search tree
for the effects of each of them. On each branch, the new current sequent
is the first child sequent.
• Iterative-deepening. Similar to breadth-first, but cheaper. The search
space is explored to a finite level each time, developed by depth-first search
down each branch.
• Heuristic. Heuristic control over the selection of methods.
Overt control over the choice of sequent to develop, can only be achieved by
tweaking the construction of the list of output sequents from each method. It is
difficult to achieve this through the heuristic planner, since at that level, detailed
strategic information is not readily available. This is a weakness of the system
which should be tackled, especially for using meta-variables.
Further control is achieved by combining methods into a strategic plan. Em¬
phasis is thus placed on completing proof segments which match that structure,
i.e. including a fertilization in step cases. This makes it easier to gauge when
an induction choice has succeeded, because the components are explicitly linked
as part of a compound method. If left separate, on failing to reach a fertil¬
ization, the system could develop a badly chosen proof branch even further by
more inductions, when it should retrace its steps and reconsider the previous
induction.
5.7 Library
ClAM is designed to be a planning shell for theorem proving. It has a considerable
library of definitions and theorems available which may be loaded and classified
by their effect. Users' own theorems and definitions extend this. Methods are
just other library objects, which may likewise be borrowed or adapted. This
makes it very easy to experiment with new classes of proof.
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5.8 Comparison with the Boyer-Moore Theo¬
rem Prover
ClAM is an effective and flexible tool, proving many theorems from the Boyer
and Moore corpus. Those on which it fails mainly involve differences in the
type system which makes some of the functions difficult to define when they are
required to be total, or are in domains we have not explored yet.
It improves on the Boyer and Moore theorem prover, in the sense that it can
structure the linking of its components at an articulated meta-level, subject to




In this chapter I shall discuss middle-out reasoning in general, explaining why
it is needed, addressing its potential uses and describing some control issues.
Subsequent chapters detail my development of middle-out reasoning solutions to
particular classes of problem.
Many proofs can be made routine to some extent. There are decision pro¬
cedures for propositional logic, both classical and constructive. Certain classes
of theories in first-order predicate calculus are decidable. For example if a the¬
ory has no function symbols, and only monadic predicates, there is an essential
finiteness about it, since its Herbrand Universe must be finite. This curtails a
source of explosiveness in applying inference rules, in that quantified variables
can only refer to a finite number of objects. For such theories there are algo¬
rithms which are guaranteed to find a proof if one is available, and to terminate
if no proof is available. They will co-ordinate the application of inference rules,
and may even choose suitable objects for existentially and universally quantified
variables[Wallen 90].
Even within a decision procedure, there may still be choices to be made.
Attention can be further directed towards controlling search, so that proofs are
found efficiently, and they are "good" proofs according to some criterion such as
economy.
In general, though, there are certain kinds of steps which are inherently ex¬
plosive, or certain domains make them explosive, and the procedures above
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work precisely because they don't have to deal with such problems. These prob¬
lematic steps are associated with certain inference rules or with axioms. For
most interesting theories these steps are unavoidable:
• Introducing objects for existentially quantified variables in a goal. Elim¬
inating universally quantified variables in a hypothesis. If functions are
available as part of the domain, there are clearly an infinite number of
objects which could parameterise the inference rule.
• Induction - there may be an infinite number of schemes.
• Using the cut rule to sequence in a new hypothesis which may then be used
to justify the current conclusion, but must also be proved in its own right.
There are two aspects to this problem of using inference rules which lead
to an explosion of the search space. Firstly we must decide when to use these
explosive rules - at each of the many nodes of the proof tree at least one such
inferences is available, but may be superfluous, and could complicate the proof
needlessly. Secondly we must choose how to parameterise them - these steps
involve new terms. Unfortunately, it will not normally be obvious what the
parameterising term should be. This is because we need to introduce a term or
formula which will be required at a later point of the proof, and which will only
become identified at that point. A way of finessing part of this difficulty is to
work on the proof at the meta-level, where the rigour of the inference rules may
be postponed.
This seems to correspond to human proofs, where there appears to be a grasp
of the overall proof structure which enables us to hypothesise a sketch of the proof
and then fill in the gaps. In general, the sketch may involve arbitrary amounts
of detail, perhaps just a pattern of applications of certain types of inference rule,
maybe including some indication of the way the terms or variables are to be
handled. Whatever the degree of detail is, such a structure must be selected,
adapted and applied. Without one, it is very difficult to control such processes
in general.
113
6.1 When to Apply Explosive Steps
The question of choosing when (including whether) to apply the explosive steps
has not been dealt with extensively in this thesis. Some straightforward op¬
tions are available which make it possible to concentrate on the parameterisation
choices, which are more tractable for an initial study.
To choose when to apply explosive steps middle-out would require an explicit
representation of the proof with variable parts of the structure becoming instan¬
tiated to methods or proof steps. That would involve higher-order unification on
a large scale and would be difficult to control. The alternative I have chosen is to
use CLAM's planning system, which constructs plans flexibly but has an implicit
representation of the proof.
Development within the ClAM system allows proofs to be planned using
"methods" to assess the applicability of macros of inference rules. The plan
corresponds to a whole proof, so the planner's selection of methods corresponds
to a choice about when to attempt particular kinds of inference. To experiment
with MOR, I wrote new methods and adapted some standard ClAM methods.
The methods which initiate some of the problematic structures were given very
low priority, to prevent the explosive choices occurring frequently, and designed
only to apply in limited circumstances. These factors controlled the selection of
these methods by the depth-first and iterative-deepening planners, which have
been described in chapter 5.
By leaving some of the details as meta-variables, a whole class of plans,
corresponding to all the possible instantiations of the meta-variables, can be
described in one move. This will be explained in the next section.
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6.2 How to Apply Explosive Steps
The general idea here is that we know roughly what we're going to do but not
some of the object level details yet. It is possible to exploit the planning meta-
level to construct a plan using meta-variables, instantiate them while planning,
and then execute the instantiated plan. The basic C1AM system already does
a little MOR for existential goals, which is described below. The work of this
thesis was to take this approach, and extend it to other kinds of proof.
For some of these kinds of proof the instantiation of the object might happen
progressively over some stages of method application. Sometimes identifying the
object(s) concerned requires higher-order unification.
I concentrated on certain classes of proofs involving generalisation. Particular
types of proof were chosen and analysed, so that their structures would be known
and could be used to build methods. These new classes of proof were then added
to the existing repertoire.
6.2.1 Existential Goals
Suppose we have a goal:
Hypotheses b 3x £ t.P(x)
In principle, any validly typed term constructed from the Herbrand Universe
and free variables in the sequent might be introduced for x. Often though, some
simple MOR can choose a suitable object to introduce.
This is the only piece of MOR the unadapted version of ClAM does already.
At the method level, a meta-variable, Y, ranging over terms of type t is used for
x. The meta-level proof process can proceed as if the appropriate inference rule
had been applied which would normally require a named object introduced for
x. Sometimes this will instantiate Y suitably.
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For example in:
a £ t b 3x G t. x — t a
The next sequent in the method search space will be:
a G t b Y =t a
and one of the basic methods (called tautology, but used for various purposes)
immediately unifies this with the reflexiveness of equality (the axiom is stored
with Prolog variables, as E = E), instantiating Y to a. This in turn instantiates
the specification of the existential introduction.
Although similar approaches could apply for universally quantified hypothe¬
ses, most of our proof plans are asymmetric. They tend to concentrate on the
conclusion of the current sequent. Instantiation of universally quantified vari¬
ables in hypotheses is achieved by methods which check explicitly whether any
of the hypotheses could support the current conclusion, if necessary by suitable
instantiation. Only then is a universally quantified hypothesis instantiated.
As it stands, the existential method is too eager. It will be satisfied with the
first term found to complete a proof branch. If we want the proof to proceed
with some less easily found term standing as existential witness, we must restrain
the existential method or force backtracking to occur.
6.2.2 Induction
Induction requires us to reason both about a scheme that will work for the
problem at hand, and its inductive structure.
For MOZ to select an appropriate induction scheme for x, in
h VxVy.(even(x) A even(y)) D even(x + y)
we could postulate a step case of the form:
1. x' £ pnat
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2. Vy.(even(x') A even(y)) D even(x' + y)
b Vy.(ei>en(C(x')) A even(y)) D even(C(x') + y)
where C is a variable function representing the step case construction. The
action of the planner should then be to instantiate C.
Difficulty arises here, not just in this instantiation, but in the indeterminate
nature of the inductive subgoal structure it implies. ClAM's methods are quite
self-contained, and each one has information about the subgoals it produces.
The subgoals from the basic induction scheme over the natural numbers are one
base case and one step case:
P(0) Vx' G pnat.P(x') D P(s(x'))
Vx G pnat.P(x)
A scheme whose step case skips by n applications of s (denoted by s") has n
base cases and a step case:
P(0) ... P(sn-1(0)) Vx' G pnat.P(x') D P(s"(x'))
Vx G pnat.P(x)
The induction method would not be able to generate the appropriate list of
subgoals until C had been instantiated. It would have to create a variable list of
subgoals. Once the proof structure becomes variable like this we are engaging in
middle-out planning rather than MOR. For arbitrary induction schemes, there
may be a variety of base and step cases.
6.2.3 Using the Cut Rule
This is the mechanism that allows us to add any new hypothesis we like to the
proof. Clearly this has great potential for explosive proof steps.
As described in chapter 3 this is known as the seq refinement in Oyster. Two
subgoals arise:
• To prove the original conclusion given the new hypothesis as well as the
original ones,
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• To prove the new hypothesis from the original hypotheses.
By analysing the purposes of applying this rule, some control can be regained.
Typically, using the cut rule falls into one of the categories described below.
Generalisation
The new formula is a generalisation of the current conclusion. This covers useful
and challenging classes of problems. There are four tasks - deciding to generalise,
choosing a generalisation, proving it, and using it to justify the original formula,
i.e. showing that it is a generalisation.
M 0 R is particularly useful for generalisation, as a generalisation involves the
introduction of a new formula, and we need to have a way of choosing it. As
a result of my analysis of generalisation (chapter 9), I believe I have shed some
light on this. My analysis provides a much needed structure, both for assisting
M.OR, and to inhibit over-generalisation. Since the whole of chapter 9 is devoted
to this, and a variety of examples has already been provided in chapter 2, I shall
not go into it any further here.
Case Analyses
The new formula establishes a case split. Common examples are:
• (x < y) V -<(x < y)
• (x = y) V -.(x = y)
assuming any two natural numbers, x and y.
Although the law of the excluded middle is not generally valid in constructive
logic, it is alright in those instances where a procedure can be given which will
test which of the disjuncts is the case, given arbitrary inputs of the correct types.
The proof obligation for such a formula consists of the definition of a decision
procedure.
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Although this kind of task involves MOR, to decide the formulae involved
in the case-split, the meta-level problem of deciding when to introduce a case
analysis lies more in the realm of middle-out planning than MOR. The reason
for this is that case splits change the overall proof structure more than generali¬
sations do, and detecting the need for a case split may require knowledge about
the state of more than one proof branch.
Let's consider how we know a case split is needed. Each case of the split
normally corresponds to a condition. Each condition is an assumption needed
to complete one branch of the proof. If we are only looking at one branch at
a time, it is difficult to distinguish an arbitrary subgoal from a component of a
case split we should have introduced several stages earlier. There may be clues,
perhaps if we use a definition defined in cases, even then, the exact form of the
split may not be obvious. A clear sign of needing a case split is when the set
of outstanding subgoals for some sub-proof-tree correspond to a known set of
mutually exclusive disjunctive cases. So the discovery of the need for a case split
usually happens in an otherwise successful proof, and the existing steps can still
be used.
The effect on the proof-tree of introducing the case split is also different
from generalisation. We take the existing proof, and just inserting the extra
assumptions makes it work, or at least the branch we have been proving so far
works. The proof of the validity of the case split need have no similarity to the
main proof. Explicit proof plan manipulation is required, neither the point at
which the case split will be required, nor the kind of case split it should be, can
necessarily be determined at the proof node where the split should be inserted.
This is quite a different relationship to the original proof structure from
generalisation proofs. In them what was previously the main proof becomes
fairly trivial. The proof of the inserted generalisation is similar, but different
to the failed proof attempt. Although generalisation involves the planning level
too, we backtrack and start planning a different proof rather than an insertion
into the existing proof.
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The ease with which we can detect and carry out a case split will depend on
the planning system in operation, more than just the reasoning system.
Using Lemmas
The cut introduces a lemma which allows us to rewrite some expression in the
sequent, i.e. to perform a substitution. Sometimes, the current sequent will just
be a special case of the lemma - this is already dealt with by ClAM's standard
methods.
6.3 MO R and Unification
The meta-variables involved in MOR. may be first-order or higher-order. Con¬
sequently, higher-order unification is used to identify the meta-variables.
Even if a variable is first-order, we cannot necessarily use just first-order
unification to identify it, because it might appear within a term couched in
language which is not first-order. This can occur if function variable symbols are
present, even if, when /?—reduced, the expression involves no function variables.
An artificial example might be unifying X + 0 and ((AuAv.v)(*)(+))(.s(0))(0)
where X is a variable. A—conversion should take care of this kind of problem, but
it would not note scoping due to universal quantification, as in V/. E/(s(x)) =
/(s(x)) + E /(x) we would have to be careful not to confuse these /'s with others.
So using unification algorithms which are higher-order than we need covers
all the sorts of variables we might need, in that it will handle n'^-order variables
for any n. We could consider reverting to first-order unification when only first-
order variables occur in the term, even if it does strictly contain entities which
look like constants but are actually second-order variables, such as / above. It
is debatable whether it would be worth the effort.
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6.3.1 Types
Working in a typed logic, MO2 must also establish the types of any new meta¬
variables. These types are required for the higher-order unification algorithm
and they are apparent from the context. We are always in the position of in¬
serting meta-variables to fulfill particular roles. Sandwiching them into existing
expressions tells us what their types must be, if we can guess the types of the
components of the existing expression. Although not decidable in general, these
can be guessed in practice for all our theorems.
6.3.2 Using Embedded Control Notation
Some of the information available to us about wavefronts, for proof control, can
be used to turn unification into matching, as I mentioned briefly in Chapter 4.
There, I pointed out that this was desirable to reduce the number of solutions
suggested by unification.
There is a further reason why the unification operation must be reduced
to its constituent parts of unifying corresponding subterms. This relates to
the use of embedded control information when higher-order unification will be
applied. Some of the functions the embedded notation performs are effected by
first-order unification in our usual first-order systems. These functions are not
so straightforwardly realised by the more complex higher-order algorithm, as I
shall explain.
The usage we make of wavefronts to record the status of the conclusion
through its components is essentially the same as in regular ClAM. Our use to
choose suitable wave rules is also the same except that the unification process is
changed to identify meta-variables, and some complications arise here.
This second process encompasses several activities, which are performed si¬
multaneously by first-order unification, but must be distinguished for higher-
order unification. This is necessary firstly because the higher-order algorithms
cannot handle the notation being present in the terms, due to typing prob-
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lems, as already noted in the previous chapter. Secondly, even if the notation
could be left in situ, it would not perform the functions we wish of it when a
higher-order unification algorithm was applied. Therefore functions which the
wavefront notation performs implicitly in first-order unification must now be
performed explicitly.
The functions of wavefronts in choosing wave rules to match an expression
are:
• to align the use of the rule, so that its components are fitted to the cor¬
responding components in the expression, so wavefronts match wavefronts
etc.
• to identify types of rules (transverse or longitudinal) and directions of
wavefronts. This identification may be used either to select appropriate
rules or to inform the planner as to what has been found.
In first-order unification, wavefronts can only match each other. We can
just leave the wavefronts in place and unification does all this. Higher-order
unification is less helpful. It would instantiate variables to wavefront notation,
or use projection to ignore the notation. We have to do our own alignment,
identification and selection.
My solution to all these problems is to unify progressively from the holes to
larger and larger terms.
6.3.3 Inadmissible Unifications
In Chapter 4, it was noted that unification may suggest substitutions for meta¬
variables, but some of these unifications, although perfectly satisfactory for uni¬
fication purposes, will not be sensible substitutions. These substitutions are
barred by temporal scoping. Here is an example of how this arises.
Suppose, for example, we have the following meta-sequent:
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1. h G pnat
2. t 6 pnat Zt'sf
3. Va (E pnat list3y € pnat list, y =pnatiist F(reverse(t),a)
b VaGpnat listBy Epnat list. y—pnatiiitF( append(reverse(t), h:: nil) ,a)
where F is a meta-variable to be instantiated through the demands of the sub¬
sequent proof. The wave front information shows how rippling is progressing,
and tells us how to align this term with a wave rule to effect suitable rewritings.
For reasons that will be explained in chapter 7, the next proof step is to use a
special version of the associativity of append lemma, and we expect to identify
F by considering unifications of
append(append(reverse[t), h :: nil), a)
with
F(append(reverse(t), h :: nil), a)
Higher-order unification suggests four unifiers for F:
i. \u\v.append{u,v)
ii. XuXv.append(u,a)
iii. XuXv.append{append(reverse(t),h :: nil),v)
iv. XuXv.append[append{reverse{t),h :: nil), a)
At this point in the proof, each of them would be a valid object to use for F in
terms of Oyster's logic, as well as in terms of the unifying algorithm. The last
three are not sensible choices, because they build current universally quantified
or free variables (a, t) into the identity of the function, F. As F must have been
identifiable without reference to these internal names, prior to proof, they break
the rules of temporal scoping. For that reason, my system discards them. In
doing this it is using meta-knowledge about the type of problem being solved.
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Another restriction useful in pruning unifiers would be a notion of generality.
Some unifiers specify constant terms directly in order to unify, rather than giving
a more general unifier using arguments. E.g. -F(O) can be unified with /(0)
either by letting F be Ax./(0) or Ax.f(x). Although the former must always be
acceptable, it is unlikely to be preferable, as we would normally choose the more
general solution.
6.4 Normalisation
The expressions resulting from MO R may require some A—conversion to en¬
sure that subsequent methods are not impeded from applying. Any such nor¬
malisation of a conclusion and its corresponding induction hypothesis must be
co-ordinated.
An example of this need for normalisation occurs in the base case of the
proof from which the sequent above was extracted. F becomes instantiated to
\u\v.append(u,v). The base case of the proof is then:
hVaGpnat list 3yGpnat list, y —pnatiut \u\v.append(u,v) of reverse(nil) of a
Oyster's base method applies to reverse(nil), enabling it to be rewritten to nil.
It does not apply to the conclusion resulting from this, involving a non-/?-reduced
term. The solution I adopted was to /3-reduce any instantiated expression before
trying to use a stored lemma to rewrite it. Use of stored lemmas on expressions
not involving meta-variables only uses first-order matching, so this normalisation
would not routinely be done by standard ClAM.
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6.5 Implementing MOR with Methods
I implemented MOR within the ClAM system. This allowed me to experiment
with various interesting "how" problems. The approach I took was to build
some new methods to introduce the generalisations appropriate to the particu¬
lar problems, using meta-variables as required for MOR. Some existing methods
underwent major changes to take account of the presence of meta-variables. I
shall describe these in the subsequent chapters devoted to the different gener¬
alisation problems undertaken. Other existing methods were adapted in minor
ways to take account of the possible presence of meta-variables. I will describe
them below, since the purpose of these changes was largely negative, to stop
methods applying inadvertently, when insufficiently instantiated.
I used ClAM's own search control of applying a list of methods preferentially
depth-first or via iterative deepening to control reasoning using meta-variables.
This was effective in instantiating meta-variables, and is described in detail, in
the chapters on the generalisations tackled.
Representing meta-variables by Prolog variables has the advantage that no
extraneous term structure is inserted into sequents to label these variables ex¬
plicitly, and using Prolog to instantiate them propagates values appropriately
wherever those Prolog variables are in the meta-proof. The disadvantage is that
they are not explicitly labelled, and therefore become invisible with respect to
MOR, once they have been instantiated.
6.5.1 New Methods
I designed new methods to introduce particular generalisations involving meta¬
variables for MOR. They were incorporated into the same framework as the rest
of ClAM's methods. These are described in detail in the subsequent chapters.
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6.5.2 Inhibiting Methods with Inadequately Specified
Input
Some restrictions are necessary to control mis-application ofmethods when meta¬
variables are present. This is achieved by augmenting the preconditions to re¬
quire the absence of meta-variables. Such restrictions are implemented in the
following methods:
Symbolic Evaluation
The base and reduction submethods appear as part of ClAM's symbolic eval¬
uation method, early in its preference list of methods. The adaptation which
instantiates functional meta-variables is mainly in the wave method, and also the
step submethod, later in the list. It would be sufficient to make this restriction
only apply to higher-order meta variables, but it never encounters any others.
Strong Fertilization
Strong fertilization is a highly preferred method to apply, since it reduces the
complexity of the conclusion significantly. It appears early in ClAM's preference
list, well before the wave method and step submethod which can instantiate
functional meta-variables. It must not be applied before these variables have
been instantiated, because it could cause the meta-variables to vanish before
instantiation had occurred. Returning to the sequent above:
1. h E pnat
2. t E pnat list
3. Va E pnat list3y E pnat list.y —pnatust F(reverse[t),a)
b Va E pnat listBy E pnat list.y =pnat list F(append(reverse(t) ,h:: nil), a)
Strong fertilization would apply easily, since the a's and y's could be introduced
corresponding to each other, and the F terms are unifiable, as a flexible-flexible
pair.
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The result would be quite useless. The induction would be invalid, as the
measure which ensures induction is well-ordered would not have decreased. The
proof plan branch would terminate without ever having identified F.
Existential
This, too, was restricted so as not to apply when meta-variables were already
present. Controlling two speculations at once is hard.
6.5.3 Changing the Planning Search Space
A simple piece of search control is the alteration of the order of generation of
subgoals in the planning space, so that the planner finds the informative ones
first. The order of goals in the proof space need not be affected. This is a crude
static version of the kind of dynamic control of search for plans described below.
It is used in the induction method, where ClAM normally generates base and step
subgoals for the planning space in that order, the same order that Oyster uses.
This is unfortunate for the planner, because the lemmas which apply rewrites
in base cases match more easily and less informatively than those in step cases.
Once reverse(nil) has been rewritten to nil, the base case of the example I have
used above is
b Va G pnat listSy 6 pnat list.y =pnat iut F(nil, a)
Many definitions of functions over two lists would match F, mostly wrongly, and
cause unnecessary backtracking. My adapted induction method generates the
step subgoal(s) first, so that the planner encounters them first.
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6.6 Middle-Out Planning
A desirable extension to the whole system would be middle-out planning. There
are two main abilities such a planner should have:
• The creation of plans with variable components - i.e. with gaps left in for
inductions of unknown structure, or for case splits or some other inference
which might be needed later.
• Use of different search strategies. Currently, the planner can operate depth-
first, breadth-first, via iterative deepening or as guided by a limited heuris¬
tic mechanism. It would be useful to be able to direct the planning to ex¬
tend the meta-proof as instantiation takes place, postponing nodes which
aren't providing such information, and come back to them when progress
has been made and the information has, at least partially, instantiated the
uninformative node. The search would be driven dynamically by successful
instantiation of meta-variables, rather than by a fixed strategy chosen in
advance.
A simple example of this is the step case/base case swop described in the
previous section. Plenty of base case rules could apply, but the information
present to select between them is slight.
6.7 Conclusion
MO 2 is a useful extension to the existing planning system. With care and use of
proof structural information, all the existing functionality can be preserved. We
are able to attempt new problems, but different kinds of problem make differing
demands on the planning as well as the reasoning parts of ClAM. Reasoning
may be performed at the meta-level, which instantiates unknown quantities in
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a proof "on demand", and the instantiated plan can then create a valid object




from Naively Defined Specifications
In this chapter I will describe how MOR can be used to synthesise tail-recursive
functions from given naively recursive specifications. Most attempts at gen¬
erating tail-recursive programs transform an existing program, perhaps guided
by templates. Characterising tail-recursion through proof structures provides a
means of guiding synthesis of the corresponding programs.
This is an interesting problem which can be captured by generalisation. It
involves finding a way of accumulating the work done by the naive function at
each stage rather than stacking it up to be executed.
To try to make this palatable, I will describe the work in several stages,
and illustrate it with examples. In section 7.1 I will compare naive and tail-
recursive versions of execution for list reversal and relate this to the structure
of the corresponding proof and extract term. Then, in section 7.2 I will discuss
the characterisation of the synthesis of tail-recursive functions through proof.
In the light of this characterisation, I will show how a tail-recursive algorithm
may be found from a naive one (7.3), and how these proofs are structured (7.4).
In section 7.5, I will explain the adaptations to ClAM to let it use MOR at the
various stages where it is needed to find suitable proofs and synthesise. Then
section 7.6 will show how the search for a proof is controlled with reference to
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the (by now familiar) reverse example. Lastly I will give a list of functions this
system can synthesise, and draw conclusions about the merits of the approach.
When I carried out this work on tail-recursion, I used the version of ClAM
current at the time, not the newest version, which has only become available
since. In my description, I will revert to the notation available in the version I
used, i.e. omitting directions of wavefronts and annotations marking sinks.
7.1 Comparison of Naive and Tail-Recursive
Reverse
7.1.1 Naive Reverse
Suppose we have a definition1 using naive reverse, so that we know that:
Vx3y. y =pnatUstreverse(x) (7.1)
where reverse(x) is defined as:
listjnd[x, nil, [h, t, r, append(r, h :: nil)])
As a reminder of what this looks like in more familiar terms:
reverse(nil) =— nil
reverse[h :: t) == append(reverse(t), h :: nil)
This corresponds to a function which when given the list hx :: h2 "... to reverse,
will compute reverse's definition to construct the term
append(reverse[h2 :: ...),hx :: nil)
1This formulation is appropriate in the constructive type theory framework because
it yields an executable extract term corresponding to the witness for the existence of y,
i.e. the na'ive function.
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and then again to construct the term
append(append[reverse(...), h2 :: nil),hi :: nil)
and so on:
append[append[append[...,...), hi :: nil), hi :: nil)
which it will be unable to evaluate until the end of the t list, and reverse(nil)
is reached. This is what is implied by this version being naively recursive. Each
call to the function cannot complete its evaluation because it is waiting for one
or more of its subordinate calls to complete. A stack of these builds up.
This stacking mirrors an underlying machine implementation. I will give a
simplified account assuming a call-by-need or lazy evaluation, where only those
arguments are evaluated which are necessary for the outermost function to be
evaluated. Suppose a function call is in a frame at the top of the stack. The
operation of the machine is to take such calls, evaluate them, and replace them
by the result of their evaluation. reverse(hi :: hi :: ...) is defined in terms of
append:
append[reverse[hi :: ...),hi :: nil)
STACK
but this call cannot be evaluated without evaluating the reverse inside it,
and another call is placed on the stack above the first one:
append(reverse(...), h2 :: nil)
append[reverse{hi :: ...),hi :: nil)
STACK
... and so on, since this contains yet another call which must be evaluated.
The stack is forced to grow, clogged up with function calls waiting to complete
their execution. Time is spent on the management of a larger stack.
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7.1.2 Tail-Recursive Reverse
A tail-recursive version, reverse2, would constantly accumulate the reversed por¬
tion of the list traversed so far. Using an accumulator, a, this is defined as:
reverse2(nil, a) == a
reverse2[h :: t, a) == reverse2{t, h :: a)
When a is taken to be nil, reverse2 reverses a list in the first argument position.
To compute reverse2[{hi :: h2 :: ...),nil), the equivalent steps to the naive
computation above are:
reverse2[(h2 :: :: nil)
then
reverse2((...), h2 :: hx :: nil)
and so on. There is no need to use more stack frames, as each call can be
completed and replaced by its recursive call to itself.
Diagrammatically, the machine initially has the following stack:
reverse2((h2 :: hi :: ...),nil)
STACK
and it can replace the top frame as follows:
reverse2((hi :: ...),h2 :: nil)
STACK
and then:
reverse2((...),hi :: h2 :: nil)
STACK
Although the same number of recursive calls are used, the space required
by the tail-recursive algorithm is much smaller. The advantage is not only that
such an algorithm takes up less stack space, but that it can be transformed into
a program without any recursion at all, i.e. one which is iterative.
The definition of tail-recursion in computing terms is that the recursive def¬
inition of the function calls on itself only once, and that that call is the last
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action in the body of the definition. This does not mean that the definition of
the function may only refer to itself once. Multiple references are allowed if each
is within a separate branch of a conditional, and is the last action in its branch.
7.1.3 A "Tail-Recursive" Theorem
The theorem generalising 7.1 which can yield a tail-recursive function is
VxVaBy. y =pnat u,t append(reverse(x),a) (7.2)
append works to accumulate the list processed so far onto the accumulator a,
achieving much the same effect as reverse2, above.
Thus formulated, the construction of the witness for y can provide the (tail-
recursive) function we are interested in. It must satisfy the definition of tail-
recursion given above. By speculating the form a suitable generalisation would
take, and circumscribing its subsequent proof so that the construction of y's
witness meets the definition of tail-recursion, we can synthesise a tail-recursive
function for a specification.
The difficulty for an automatic system, given 7.1 is in guessing what the
generalisation is, and what the accumulating function (append in 7.1.3), should
be. The structure of the proof provides information, which can be used by .M 0 R
to generate the answer to this question. In the next sections I will explain how
this works and what the search control problems are.
7.2 Characterising The Synthesis of Tail-
Recursive Functions
As I have just described, tail-recursive functions are those which are defined
so that an evaluation of a call to the function may be completely replaced by
another recursive call on itself, with different arguments. This is apparent in
the reverse example above. In the naive version, the evaluation is continually
134
postponed until all the list has been unravelled. In the tail-recursive version,
each evaluation is replaced by a recursive call where the recursion argument
is reduced. There are still as many recursive calls in either version, but the
tail-recursive one can be implemented as a while loop.
In the constructive logic framework, tail-recursion is determined by the way
we use the induction hypothesis. The witness for this hypothesis is the construc¬
tion corresponding to the function's recursive call on itself. If we are able to use
it (or one of its subterms) alone as the justification of the goal, then no further
work is required after the recursive call, and the function is tail-recursive. If
instead we have to embed it in some function, that function application enters
into the construction, which is no longer tail-recursive.
Although in my definition of tail-recursion, I mentioned the possibility of
conditionals, that is a complication I do not address in full in these proof struc¬
tures. The functions synthesised here involve primitive conditionals inherent in
recursive definitions, such as whether a number is 0 or s(_), and whether a list
is nil or non-empty. Splitting into such conditional branches happens naturally
as a result of induction. More complex conditions, not arising as part of the
induction, and necessitating a case split, fit the proof requirements described,
but are beyond the capabilities of the planning implementation at present. As
I explained in chapter 6, introducing case-splits requires more advanced plan¬
ning. Such extended MO R and middle-out planning involving conditionals is an
avenue for further work, see chapter 11.
I shall illustrate the construction of the recursive step by contrasting the
crucial steps in the two proofs: of the theorem which corresponds to a naively
recursive algorithm, and the one that corresponds to a tail-recursive algorithm.
7.2.1 Naive Reverse
This proof is artificial, because it synthesises a function we already know, but it
is informative for comparison with the tail-recursive version.
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The theorem is
h Vx G pnat list3y G pnat list.y —pnatiiet reverse(x)
Introduction of x followed by induction gives the following step case:
1. x G pnat list
2. h G pnat
3. t G pnat list
4. ihn G 3y.y =pnatu,t reverse(t)
b 3y.y —pnat u»t reverse^ h::t)
The extract term corresponding to the whole proof is Ax.listJnd(x, _, [h, i, i7in, _]),
where the gaps are to be filled by the extract terms from the base and step proofs
respectively. Elimination on the induction hypothesis grows the proof tree to this
node:
5. y' G pnat list
6. ih'n G y' =pnot u,t reverse(t)
7. ihen G ihn —3v.v=r„at |,„reuer*e(t) V
h 3y.y =pnat u*t reverse( h :: t)
Note that using the induction hypothesis has given us those entities that it
witnesses - it breaks down into a pair y'&ih'n (7), which is a list y' (5), and y'
is the reverse of t, as proved by ih'n (6). I will sometimes elide hypotheses such
as (7) in sequents, when they do not actively contribute to the proof, and they
obscure the presentation. The extract term grows accordingly:
Ax.listJnd(x, [h, t, ihn, spread(ihn, [y', ih'n, _])
Longitudinally rippling the conclusion using the definition of reverse2 changes
the conclusion, but not the extract term:
2Unfolding and folding according to definitions have no effect on the extract term
because they only affect the representation preferred by the human user.
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b 3y.y pnat list
Now this key branch of the proof can be completed. The object introduced
for y is append(y',h :: nil), and extract term is further instantiated to
Xx.listJnd(x, [h, t, ihn, spread{ihn, [y', ih'n, append(y', h :: ni/)&;_])
The two gaps are, respectively, for the base case and the proof that the introduced
object is suitable, i.e. that
append(y',h :: nil) =pnatiist append(reverse(t),h :: nil)
In the step case, the essential part of the recursion has now been built. Sig¬
nificantly, it wraps an extra function call (append(...,...)) which will have to be
executed at each recursion, around the recursive one (y').
append{reverse[t),h :: nil)
7.2.2 Tail-Recursive Reverse
I shall now describe a proof for the corresponding tail-recursive version of re¬
verse and compare them. The proof starts off similarly to the one above, x is
introduced, used for induction, and the definition of reverse is used to ripple the
conclusion:
1. x G pnat list
2. h E pnat
3. f E pnat list
4. iht € Va'By.y =pnatiist append(reverse(t),a')
b Va3y.y =pnatiist append[ append{reverse{t),h :: nil) ,a)
The extract term corresponding to the whole proof is Ax.list_ind(x, _, [h, t, iht, _])
as before. Although neither Oyster nor ClAM would distinguish the names of the
accumulator, a, in the induction hypothesis and conclusion, the fact that they
are distinct is crucial to this solution. To emphasise that, I have renamed the
hypothesis a as a'.
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Unlike in the previous proof, it is now possible to use associativity of append
to ripple the wavefront transversely. This is a preparation for the following stage.
1. x £ pnat list
2. h £ pnat
3. t £ pnat list
4. iht £ Va'By.y =pnatii»t append(reverse(t),a')
h VaBy.y =pnatUst append(reverse[t), append{h :: nil,a) )
This substitution justified by the associativity of append has no effect on the
extract term. As for any substitution, it results in a proof branch to justify that
the terms involved in the substitution were equal.
The definition of append simplifies the conclusion, again without affecting
the extract term:
I- VaBy.y =pnatii»t append(reverse(t), h :: a) )
Now we take advantage of the fact that the two a's acting as accumulators
may be different. We can instantiate a' to be whatever term causes the induction
hypothesis to match the conclusion.
Introducing a free a for the universal variable in the conclusion, and instan¬
tiating a' to h :: a, the sequent becomes:
a £ pnat list
ihl £ By.y =pnatiist append(reverse(t),h :: a)
b By.y =Pnatu»t append{reverse(t),h :: a)
For the extract term, these steps correspond to introducing a A-term to the
extract term, and, since universal quantification is identified with the dependent
function, to a substitution to be applied to the extract term below this node
(denoted by the subscript in curly brackets). The extract term has become:
Xx.listJnd(x, _, [h, t, iht,
( :: il a)
h ::
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The crucial difference which makes this proof synthesise a tail-recursive func¬
tion happens next. The witness arising from the induction hypothesis can be
used directly for the conclusion, without involving any other function applica¬
tions. This is the essential feature which guarantees that the function extracted
will be tail-recursive with respect to this step.
ihl can now be introduced directly as evidence for the conclusion, completing
the step case definition. Unlike the naively recursive version, it is not introduced
as part of a term:
Xx.listJnd(x, [h, t, iht, Xa.(ih?){iht(h:.a)/iha}])
The substitution is applied automatically, making this:
Xx.listJnd{x, _,[h,t, iht, Xa.iht{h :: a)])
The distinguishing feature of a tail-recursive synthesis has been achieved. A
hypothesis which is an instance of the induction hypothesis has been used alone
to provide the witness for the existential conclusion.
7.3 Building a Tail-Recursive Algorithm from
a Naive One
The example in the previous section illustrates the difference between these types
of algorithm. By considering this for an arbitrary function /, we can identify
a general pattern which can be exploited to synthesise tail-recursive algorithms
from naive ones.
7.3.1 Naive Operation of Primitively Defined Functions
We will suppose that / is primitive recursive on its first argument,
/( c(x) ,z) == f'(f(x,z),x,z)
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where c represents some recursive constructor, such as successor, or 'cons'ing a
head onto a list. I use z to denote arbitrary other arguments, although there
need not be any.
Notice that this pattern corresponds to our notion of a longitudinal wave
rule, where some portion of a term is moved upwards through an unchanged
surrounding term. Similarly to the reverse case, attempting to evaluate / results
in a stack of calls to /' building up.
7.3.2 Tail-Recursive Operation
The tail-recursive version described here also unfolds its definition upon its ar¬
guments, but uses an accumulator to store the value of the computation so far.
This value is carried forward into the recursive call, which is the result of the
original call.
One must be cautious in saying this, though, as depending on how much
work is done to simplify the accumulating expression, what is accumulated may
still require evaluation itself. For example one might build up and carry around
an accumulated term like
... append[hn :: nil, append(hn_i :: nil,..., nil))...
and evaluate it at the end instead of at each stage. This may be less efficient
but it would still be tail recursive. It could still have reduced demands on the
stack, since such argument values would probably be stored via a reference to
some memory location.
With or without a simplified accumulator, tail-recursive evaluation is not
postponing a stack of function calls which take up space. At each recursion, the
current recursive call applies to the recursion argument and accumulates onto
the processing that is completed. When the recursion ends, the accumulator
holds the result.
Some functions, such as reverse2:
reverse2( h ::t,a) == reverse2(t, h :: a)
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are defined so as to build this action in immediately.
This is the kind of function we want to synthesise, but instead of defining a
new tail-recursive function, such as reverse2, with an extra accumulator argu¬
ment, we build its equivalent compositely. We achieve this by:
• taking the original function definition as a specification, and
• using this specification in a proof structure which enforces tail-recursiveness.
I.e. one which takes the wavefront and accumulates it. We add an accu¬
mulator and functions to do the accumulation. I.e. some a and g, such
that
g{ f'{f{x,z),x,z) , a) ==g[f(x,z), f"{a,x,z) )
This characterisation describes a tail-recursive function, while tying it to the
original function's definition. Not all formulations of tail-recursion require accu¬
mulators, I will return to this point later.
As I indicated at the start, the problem lies in guessing what the accumulating
functions, g and are. Although no general way is known of generating them
automatically, we can describe the structure of the associated synthesis proofs.
Constructing such a proof may indicate what these unknown functions must be.
7.3.3 Making the Specification Guide the Proof
Let us take an initial goal stating that a value y can be constructed which is
equal to the value produced by the naive specification, /:
Vx G tx\/z € t^By £t.y=tf (x, z) (7.3)
Provided we can come up with a function which computes y, and satisfies the
equality, we know that it, too, meets the specification. If we follow our noses, as
in 7.2.1, we will just get a naive function, like the specification. If we generalise
the theorem to build in an accumulator and suitable functions, we can turn
out a tail-recursive function, as I have just described. I say "generalise", firstly
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because the function encapsulated here is more general than the original, just as
reverse2 is more general than reverse - it covers a wider range of values, but on a
subset of them, can cover all the functionality of the original. Secondly, because
we will expect this new goal to be a hypothesis used to imply the original, so in
logical terms it is a generalisation.
At the meta-level, the new goal proposed is:
Vx G tx\/z G t-iia G t3y G t. y =t G(/(x, z), a) (7.4)
MO R can be used to guide the choice of the function G.
The types of G and a can easily be inferred, a is to accumulate an object
which can be the result of an evaluation of /. Since / produces objects of type
t, a must have type t. G is then obliged to be a function which takes two terms
of type t, and produces another one, since it is an argument of =t. The new
universal quantifier for a should follow all the other ones, since when it is used,
it may be for a term involving them.
By using the cut rule, we split the proof into two branches:
• To prove the generalised goal corresponding to the tail-recursive algorithm.
The planning should identify a G which gives us a tail-recursive algorithm.
The extract term resulting from this will execute tail-recursively.
• To prove that the original goal can be justified by the generalised goal,
guaranteeing that the tail-recursive function gives the same results as the
naive one. This must include specialising the more general function for the
set of values where it includes the original function. I.e. in the reverse2
case, where the accumulator starts at nil.
In the next section, I will explore how the proof can identify G. I will describe
this first for the reverse example and then more generally. Subsequently, I will
describe how such proofs are selected by planning from the initial naively defined
goals.
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7.4 The Structure of Tail-Recursive Synthesis
Proofs
7.4.1 Tail-Recursive Reverse
The proof proceeds largely as in 7.2.2. The generalised goal is:
hViG pnat listVa G pnat listBy G pnat list, y —pnatiut G{reverse[x), a)
Induction
Recursion analysis suggests x as a candidate for induction, since it is a universally
quantified variable occurring in the recursive argument position of reverse, and
so a suitable wave rule exists for subsequent rewriting. The definition of reverse
suggests simple list induction.
The result of the induction is two new goals, the base:
h VaG pnat list3y G pnat list, y —pnatu»t G{reverse(nil),a)
and step cases of the induction:
1. /iG pnat
2. t G pnat list
3. Va G pnat listBy G pnat list, y =pnat u»t G(reverse(t), a)
(- Va G pnat listBy G pnat list, y —pnatiitt G(reverse( h ::t),a)
The base case is too uninstantiated to be informative, unlike the step case.
Longitudinal Rippling
It is now possible to use the definition of reverse to move the wavefront upwards
in the term structure:
h Va G pnat listBy G pnat list.y =pnatiist G( append(reverse(t), h :: nil) , a)
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Transverse Rippling
So far, all the steps have been unaffected by the presence of the meta-variable, G.
Here, though, comparing with the earlier proof, we would expect to use the as¬
sociativity of append to move the wavefront sideways so that the conclusion can
be justified by the induction hypothesis. If G is identified as XuXv .append(u,v),
associativity can be used in exactly the same way, and the meta-level proof con¬
tinues as before, with G instantiated. Notice that the A—variable arguments are
in an order determined by the unification to match the function in the wave rule.
This is achieved by extending the wave method to use higher-order unification,
as described in chapter 4, and section 7.5.
Fertilization
1. h G pnat
2. t G pnat list
3. Va G pnat listBy G pnat list, y =pnat j,«t append(reverse(t), a)
h Va G pnat list
By G pnat list, y =pnatiitt append{reverse[t), append[h :: nil, a) )
Fertilization now applies.
This a little different from the tidier proof I showed earlier, as it fails to sim¬
plify the argument in the accumulator position. Ideally, we would have simplified
the append[h :: nil, a) subterm first. Without wishing to get too side-tracked
into a discussion of planner control, I should point out some problems with
achieving such a simplification. Firstly, ClAM applies any method which can
terminate a branch, preferentially, so fertilization will apply before the symbolic
evaluation which would perform this simplification. Secondly, this is not a sim¬
ple reduction, it needs two uses of the different parts of the definition of append.
Thirdly, it is really a special case of having the power to ripple in - rippling wave-
fronts down into an accumulator, which has only been implemented in recent,
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experimental versions of ClAM. Without directional information this is hard to
control. Fourthly, it is possible to force rippling in the old version by abandon¬
ing loose coupling of ClAM methods under the planner's control in favour of a
strictly defined supermethod, like the overall induction strategy.
Base Case
Once G has been identified as append, the base case is handled by the symbolic
evaluation method:
t-VoG pnat listSy E pnat list, y =pnat u,t a
the existential method:
^ —pnat list ®
and finally the "tautology" method, which handles simple equalities.
Justification
1. j E Vx E pnat list
Va E pnat list3y E pnat list, y —pnat list append(reverse(x), a)
h Vi£ pnat list3y E pnat list, y =pnatiist reverse(x)
The universally quantified x from the conclusion is introduced and its equiv¬
alent in the hypothesis is eliminated, instantiating it to the same thing:
2. x E pnat list
3. j' EVa E pnat list3y E pnat list.y =pnatiist append[reverse[x), a)
(- 3y E pnat list.y =pnat u,t reverse(x)
A value, a0, for a must now be produced. Since we are expecting to use the
y generated by the hypothesis for the conclusion, a0 must be such that:
reverse(x) —pnat list append(reverse(x) ,a0) (7.5)
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This equality guarantees that the synthesised function is everywhere equal to
the original.
By eliminating j' taking nil for a0, and eliminating the resulting hypothesis
again to produce a value y' for y, we reach this sequent:
4. j'nil £ By £ pnat list.y =pnatiist append{reverse[x) ,nil)
5. y' £ pnat list
6- 3nil € y' =pnat list append{reverse(x), nil)
h 3y £ pnat list.y —pnat list reverse(x)
We select y' to introduce for y, and then the symbolic evaluation and the
"tautology" method complete this branch of the planning proof.
This branch is not straightforward without meta-knowledge about the gen¬
eralisation hypothesis. We need to know which hypothesis is the generalisation,
and what value to initialise the accumulator to.
7.4.2 General Tail-Recursive Synthesis
Having examined the automation of the synthesis proof for the particular case of
the reverse function, I shall now look at it in schematically, and discuss some of
the problems of planning the various stages. There is no guarantee that all these
steps will work in any particular case, but we can look at the shape of what is
happening.
Starting with the original goal as:
h Vx £ tx\fz £ t?3y £ t.y =t /(x, z)
the generalised goal is:
b Vx G tx\/z £ t-iVa £ t3y £ t.y =t G(f(x,z),a)
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Induction
Recursion analysis suggests x as a candidate for induction: The definition of /
suggests induction based on x, with step case defined on c(x).
The result of the induction is some base and step goals. The latter are more
informative, suppose one of them is:
1. x E tx
2. Vz E t2Va E t3y E t.y =t G(f(x, z),a)
h V2E f2Va E t3y E t.y =t G(/(|c(x)"|, z), a)
Longitudinal Rippling
Using a longitudinal wave rule:
f(\c(X)\Z) -> f'(f{X,Z),X,Z)
A longitudinal ripple takes place:
h Vz E t2Va E t3y E t.y =t G( f'(f(x,z),x,z) , a)
Potentially, there could be further longitudinal ripples here and G would
become partially instantiated. This would be difficult for us to handle at the
moment, because it would require us to think of G as a composite function,
G'(G"(...)), and only to instantiate G". In the absence of knowing the types of
G' and G", the unification algorithm is unable to do this.
However, it is hard to see many cases when this might be needed, as any
such G" would almost certainly have to be monadic. Access to the accumulator
would be only via the topmost part of the function, or there would be little point
in having it.
Transverse Rippling
Using a transverse ripple of the form:
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f'(f(X,Z),X,Z) ,A)->g(f(X,Z), f"(A,X,Z) )
we move the wavefront sideways onto the accumulator so that the conclusion
can be justified by the induction hypothesis. G is instantiated to g, throughout
the meta-level sequent:
1.
2. Vz £ t-£ia £ t3y £ t.y —t g{f{x, z), a)
1-V?G t5Va £ t3y £ t.y =t g[f[x, z), /"(a^x, z) )
This completes the instantiation of G.
Although this step is what we're aiming for, we should not make it higher
priority than longitudinal rippling. Since the new accumulator was wrapped
around the outside of the original term, we expect to ripple longitudinally to
reach it. Allowing transverse ripples earlier would permit other universally quan¬
tified variables to function as accumulators and be rippled into. If we could do
that anyway, we should not have attempted to add another accumulator.
A further possibility which has only become available in the new versions of
ClAM is wave annotation which records directions of wavefronts. This would now
make it possible to direct wavefront movement longitudinally up the term tree
from the induction variable and then longitudinally down into the accumulator,
Currently the system can only move the wavefront up and then transversely onto
the accumulator. A supermethod could keep track of wavefronts explicitly and
control the direction of wavefronts like this itself. This has not proved necessary
for any of the problems I have attempted.
Fertilization
The derived induction hypothesis now implies the current conclusion, and fertil¬
ization can take place.
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Notice that the order of the quantifiers is important. The accumulator should
be last, to be able to instantiate to anything involving any of the other universally
quantified variables.
Base Case
As in the reverse example, once G has been identified, routine steps of the
symbolic evaluation, existential and tautology methods handle this.
Justification
1. j E Vx E txVz E t^Va E t3y Et.y=t g{f{x,z),a)
hViG txVzint^By E t. y =t f(x, z)
Each universally quantified variable in the conclusion is introduced. For each
of these, the corresponding one in the justifying hypothesis is instantiated to
follow it, until there are no more in the conclusion:
n. in EWaE t3y E t. y -t g(f(x,z),a)
b 3y Et.y =t f{x,z)
As in the reverse example, a suitable value is picked for a, and the branch
completed using the symbolic evaluation, existential and tautology methods.
To preserve the tail-recursion which has been constructed, it is important that
the same witness is used for the existential variable in the conclusion as in the
hypothesis. Otherwise, if a surrounding function were built on, tail-recursiveness
would be lost.
7.4.3 Picking a Base Value for the Accumulator
We need an a such that
/(z) =t (7.6)
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Finding a suitable value for a such that (7.6) is true could require arbitrary
amounts of theorem proving, but a feasible means of doing so for most cases is
to use further MOR to look for a lemma in the ClAM library of the form
Vx. g(x, A) = x
and take the value A becomes instantiated to for a. Since such a lemma is likely
to be stored as a useful reduction rule, we have a good chance of finding a value
this way.
7.4.4 Overall Pattern
The overall pattern is:
tail-recursive generalise
induction justification
symbolic evaluation wave (one or more longitudinal)
existential wave (transverse)
tautology fertilize
7.5 Adaptations to CLAM for MOJZ
Having seen what must be achieved by the planner, I'll turn to examining how
it does it.
As described in chapter 5, ClAM uses methods to describe the preconditions
and effects of proof components. I took the approach of modifying some of these
and adding new ones for particular experiments, taking advantage of the existing
framework.
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Most of the methods are largely unchanged, except to inhibit their opera¬
tion when insufficiently instantiated, as described in chapter 6, or to add beta-
reduction, to normalise functions which have been introduced as A—functions.
A new tail-recursive generalisation method was introduced, major changes took
place in the wave method and minor changes were made to restrict the existential
method. I will describe these three in detail and their operation in conjunction
with the planning mechanism.
Allowing the methods to operate independently like this works for straight¬
forward examples. It seemed an attractive option to start with, as it followed one
of the ideas of ClAM, that the methods have an independent validity, and should
be able to operate linked by the planner under the control of their preconditions.
In this case though, using independent methods sometimes throws too much
knowledge about the proof branches away. Eventually I built a compound super-
method, embodying a strategy incorporating several methods, to perform tail-
recursive generalisations. This also became necessary because the inhibitions
built into the adapted existential method, to stop it producing trivial unwanted
solutions, became harder and harder to define so that they would impede the
method only in the right places, without meta-knowledge of the current proof
stage. This will also be described, after the free-standing version.
7.5.1 Tail-Recursive Generalisation
This new method detects a specification sequent, and uses the cut rule to intro¬
duce a generalisation which At 0 k will use to synthesise a tail-recursive function.
Preconditions
The method applies when the goal is of the form
Vx E txVz e U3y e tv. y =(y f(x, z)
The z may be absent.
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This is a universally quantified expression consisting of an equality between
an existentially quantified variable and an arbitrary term containing any of the
universally quantified variables but not the existentially quantified one.
If MO Z is already taking place on the goal, initiating further MOZ is likely
to be unwieldy or explosive, so a check is made that it does not currently contain
any meta-variables. Specifically, since the generalised goal has the same form as
the ungeneralised one, the lack of such a check would result in generalisations of
generalisations, etc., in the case of the iterative deepening planner, although the
depth first planner should never reach that depth in the list of methods again if
it is successful.
Postconditions and Output
The generalisation is computed:
Vx E txVz E tfia E t3y E t. y —t G of /(x, z) of a
The first output sequent is the proof of this generalisation from the original
hypotheses. The second is the justification proof branch - that the generalisation
implies the original conclusion:
1. Vx E txVz E tfia E t3y E t. y =t G of /(x, z) of a
h Vx E tzVz E tz3y E t. y —t /(x, z)
Tactic
The tactic, or macro of Oyster inference rules, is given here. The seq uses the
cut rule to introduce the generalisation. After that, there are two branches, the
first of which is the synthesis of the tail-recursive function. The second branch
is the justification proof.
In the version of this method used by the supermethod, I do nothing more
to these branches, leaving them to be completed by later methods. This is done
by using apply(idtac).
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In the loosely-coupled non-supermethod version, the tactic below is supplied
to complete the justification proof. I use the sequence of operations I have already
described in the paragraph on justification in 7.4.2, interspersed with calls to the
well-formedness tactic. The intro uses the generalisation hypothesis witness for
the existential variable in the conclusion, and the rewrite finds a lemma which

















7.5.2 Longitudinal Wave Method
This method acts like the standard one, except that it takes account of the
possibility that the input sequent could contain meta-variables. The unification
of the left-hand-side of a wave rule with a subterm of the sequent's conclusion is
controlled to allow higher-order unification, by using the wavefronts to identify
the smallest and then successively larger subterms which must unify.
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Given as input a sequent such as the generalisation:
,z) of a
its functionality is described in this subsection.
hVzG tx\/z € tzWa G t3y e t.y =( G of (/( c(x)
Preconditions
I shall assume a longitudinal wave rule:
*("(20 K'MX,Z),X,Z)
Where upper case indicates variables, lower case constants, and a superscript
arrow denotes the presence of zero or more arguments.
As usual, wave rules like this are selected and tested in turn. In standard
ClAM the left-hand-side of the rule would be tested to see if it unified as a whole
with some subterm of the sequent. The wavefront markers would automatically
be aligned by any valid first order unification.
In the middle-out system, separate unifications are performed successively
with each of the following, and progressive instantiation takes place.
1. the respective waveholes, x and X
2. the smallest terms containing the wavefronts, c(x) and /c(x)
3. the whole left-hand side of the rule, /(c(x),(z)) and <£(/c(x), Z). Note
that if this ever matched something where / were variable, we'd have the
problem of a flexible-flexible pair.
Although for the current task no higher-order meta-variables occur in the wave-
front subterm, they might if this method were being used to reason middle-out
about an induction, for example. Consequently, all unifications are performed
higher-order. The unifications are performed with the wavefront markers re¬
moved, since it would be difficult to guess the type of these meta-functions.
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Indeed it would be inappropriate, as they are not part of the type system. Since
they still guide the terms chosen for unification, nothing is lost.
I am currently assuming a single occurrence of the induction variable. If
there were several, there would consequently be several wave holes and wave
fronts, and it would be necessary to try all the different combinations of rule
wave fronts with conclusion wave fronts.
Postconditions, Output and Tactic
These are exactly as in the standard method, the rippled sequent is computed
and planning continues. The tactic records the lemma to be applied, in which
direction it is to be applied, and the position of the subterm to which it is to be
applied. If the meta-variable were ever to become a complex term, this would
be inadequate, I should have to store the position as partially variable too, and
instantiate it as necessary.
7.5.3 Transverse Wave Method
This is like the standard transverse wave method, with the changes to permit
meta-variables as described for the longitudinal wave method, but additionally,
accumulators (more generally known as sinks, because of their role in relation to
rippling) are unified before the whole left-hand-side is unified. This is essential
to prevent unifications occurring between terms containing variables in adjacent
positions such that flexible-flexible pairs would occur.
Given as input a sequent such as the generalisation:
h Vi £ tx\/z (E ts\/a € t3y £ t.y =t G of
the method is as follows.
Preconditions
I shall assume a transverse wave rule:
f'(f{x>z),x,z) of a
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<f>{tc(X) J,A)->j(X,Z, k'(A) )
The general form of a transverse wave rule allows for multiple wavefronts on
the left hand side and multiple sinks. I have assumed one of each, to avoid the
problem of deciding which to match with which in the meta-sequent's conclusion
and the rule, and since it is unusual for there to be more. As for the case of the
longitudinal rule, in general, all possible pairings would have to be considered.
The positions of the wavefronts before and after the use of a lemma are used
to ensure that the effect of the lemma is a transverse ripple as intended.
Sinks are determined by induction hypothesis quantification, not rule syntax.
Essentially everything proceeds as for the longitudinal wave method, except that
there is an extra unification stage 2', in which we insist that the sink selected by
the method is the accumulator added by the generalisation.
As I have already described in chapter 4, any unification which binds a uni¬
versally quantified variable into the identity of a function variable is rejected.
Postconditions, Output and Tactic
Again, these are just the same as in standard ClAM
7.5.4 Existential Method
This is very similar to the standard existential method. It has been extended
so that it automatically introduces any universally quantified variables in the
conclusion as free variables. It has been restricted so as not to apply to goals
already containing meta-variables.
This method and the tail-recursive generalisation one unfortunately apply in
almost indistinguishable circumstances. However, if this were to be applied to
the initial goal:
b Vx £ txVz € t?3y € t.y =t f[x, z)
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it would simply use reverse (x) for y, and the proof would end trivially. To avoid
these trivial completions, the tail-recursive generalisation method precedes the
existential one in the list of methods, which is appropriate, since the former is a
special case of the latter.
A further problem with this method was that it could cause useless search
in the iterative deepening planner by suggesting meta-variable solutions before
other methods such as symbolic evaluation had been applied. The only way of
stopping this was to insert artificial restrictions requiring that in an equality of
the form Y = term, say, where term was instantiated, that term be atomic.
This was another pointer to the need for a supermethod.
7.5.5 Symbolic Evaluation Method
Some of the rewritings done by the symbolic evaluation method, sym_eval,
achieve similar functions to the wave method, because they also rewrite terms
according to function definitions. These were adapted correspondingly to the
wave rule adaptations.
7.5.6 Order of Considering Methods
The following table gives the order of consideration of methods. The tail-















The new method introducing a tail-recursion generalisation is low in the list
because it only applies rarely, in quite specific circumstances. Placing the new
method higher would be inefficient, because it would be considered frequently
and fail to be applicable. It must come before induction so as to be chosen pref¬
erentially, since induction will always apply whenever the new method does. The
tail-recursive generalisation method must also precede the existential method,
since it handles a special case for which the latter method would be inappropri¬
ate.
The wave method has been moved below the fertilization methods, because
it is now expensive to try, with higher-order unification built in.
In the system with the tail-recursive generalisation supermethod, it takes
precedence over the method which just introduces a generalised formula.
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7.6 MOR on the reverse example
I shall describe the proof from the point of view of the depth-first and iterative-
deepening planning processes and explain how MOZ takes place. At each point,
I will describe the choices available, and show how the system discriminates.
At the start, the theorem is
h Vi G pnat listBy £ pnat list.y —pnat list reverse(x)
The only methods whose preconditions may be satisfied are induction and
tail-recursive generalisation. The latter precedes induction in the list of methods,
so it is chosen. The result is a new generalisation meta-sequent:
h Vi G pnat listWa £ pnat list3y £ pnat list.y =pnatiist G(reverse(x), a) (7.7)
and a further goal to show that proving this justifies the original goal. I will
return to this justification branch later.
7.6.1 Proving the Generalisation Using Induction
The only methods which might conceivably apply to 7.7 are existential, tail-
recursive generalisation and induction. The first two are barred since the meta-
sequent already contains a meta-variable. Induction is unaffected by the meta¬
variable. It finds that the only universally quantified variable is x, and that
occurs in reverse in an argument position affected by a wave rule. A straight¬
forward list induction is suggested, based on the scheme indicated by the wave
rule.
The Step Case
1. h £ pnat
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2. t £ pnat list
3. Va £ pnat listBy £ pnaf /xst.y —pnatiiat G(reverse(t),a)
h Va £ pnat list3y £ pnat h'sf.y —pnatiist G(reverse( h :: t), a)
The only applicable method for this meta-sequent is the wave method. The
existential and tail-recursive generalisation's preconditions would fail due to the
presence of the meta-variable. The longitudinal version of the wave method is
applied in preference to the transverse version, because it appears first in the
list of methods.
The wave method could select several wave rules, depending on which were
available. It is always debatable, when discussing wave rules, which ones should
be assumed to be available. There are broadly four options:
• Minimal - Only necessary definitions, anything else to be created as re¬
quired.
• Average - Definitions, along with some reasonable collection of lemmas.
Specifically not just such lemmas as will make life easy for the proof in
hand.
• So Far - Everything you happen to have proved so far.
• Maximal - everything you can think of, no matter how trivial, which is
true for the theory.
The last of these is impossible. The next-to-last is relative to which day you
run the system on, and not different enough from what I have labelled the "av¬
erage" case to be useful. The first is an interesting but not particularly realistic
case. What mathematician or automatic theorem prover would we expect to
derive everything from first principles all the time? I will present an average
problem, and say what lemmas are available. By explaining what choices they
present to the system reasoning middle-out, it should be clear that they do not
make the task artificially simple.
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The advantage of using planning is that the methods will work as best they
can with whatever information is available about the theory and its theorems.
A typical collection of wave rules would be those in tables 7-1 and 7-2,
containing the longitudinal rules and the transverse ones respectively. The order
in which the rules are found by the system depends on the order in which they
were loaded. One would expect the system either to be impervious to order, or
to select an order to suit. In fact it does a combination of the two. Since the
longitudinal version of the wave method is considered first, this filters the rules
to get the longitudinal ones, so effectively they always precede the transverse
ones. Beyond that, the system takes rules as they come. The ordering of the
rules was selected so that the "obvious" rules weren't conveniently first. In fact
there is minimal search. Usually only one induction scheme applies, and at the
worst two wave rules will apply in different ways, usually leading to different,
but valid, solutions. Problems only arise when both a longitudinal rule and a
transverse rule can apply, and due to the ordering, the system wrongly attempts
the longitudinal.
The method tries to apply a longitudinal rule, for preference. The only
possible match is the definition of reverse. This applies, producing a new sequent:
1. h E pnat
2. f£ pnat list
3. Va G pnat listSy G pnat list.y =pnatiist G of reverse{t) a
h Va G pnat list
of a3y G pnat list, y =pnat j,,t G of append(reverse(t), h :: nil)
This is submitted afresh to the planner, and exactly the same methods apply
as for its predecessor - the wave method. Again, longitudinal waves are consid¬
ered first. Since this unification results in potentially explosive flexible-flexible
unifications, at first I tried barring such matches at this point, but it was difficult
to do in a principled way. Eventually I used the iterative-deepening planning
which will allow this match but also considers the transverse rules at the same
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time, and come up with a viable answer. This problem reinforces the lesson of
other parts of this experiment in controlling MOZ, that knowledge about the
structure of the task should be used to the full, for in a supermethod, we could
describe those sorts of combinations of rippling which were acceptable.
Each transverse wave rule is considered in turn. For each, as described before,
there is progressive unification of the terms within the wavefront, the wavefront
term, and the whole left-hand-side of the rule with whatever subterm of the
conclusion it will match. At any point, one of these may fail, and the planner
will backtrack to get the next wave rule.
Here either 7.28 or 7.30 could apply, and the former is chosen purely because
it is encountered first. Consequently, G is identified as XuXv.append(u,v) and
the rule is applied.
1. h G pnat
2. t G pnat list
3. Va G pnat list
By G pnat list.y =pnatUat XuXv.append(u,v) of reverse(t) of a
f- Va G pnat listBy G pnat list.y =pnatiiit append(reverse(t), h :: a )
since the conclusion part is /3-reduced.
Lastly, in this branch, strong fertilisation applies. It still identifies the induc¬
tion hypothesis, because it applies /^-reduction to it.
The Base Case
The step case work has instantiated G, so the sequent is
h Va G pnat listBy G pnat list.y =pnatust append(reverse(nil), a)
The existential method could apply, and would introduce
append{reverse(nil), a)
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for y. This would be cumbersome, but not wrong. Symbolic evaluation occurs
early in the list precisely to avoid this kind of thing. It is the first method to
catch this. It applies twice, using the base definitions of reverse and append:
b Va G pnat list3y G pnat list.y —pnat list a
Now, the existential method is the only one which can apply, it introduces a
and a meta-variable Y for y:
1. a G pnat list
b Y —pnat list ®
Lastly, the tautology method applies, instantiating Y to a, and completing
the meta-proof branch. No other method could apply here.
7.6.2 The Justification
1. Vx G pnat list\/a G pnat listSy G pnat list.y =pnatu»t append{reverse(x), a)
b Vx G pnat list3y G pnat list.y —pnat u»t reverse(x)
By now, the variable function has been instantiated. The sequent is proved
as follows:
First, ClAM assumes that any universally quantified vaxiables in the conclu¬
sion should be identified with their counterparts in the generalisation hypothesis.
So it introduces each of these, renaming it, and echoing this for the hypothesis.
2. x : pnat list
3. Va G pnat list3y G pnat list.y =pnatUtt append(reverse(x), a)
b 3y G pnat list.y —pnatiist reverse(x)
An a must be chosen such that the y which is then yielded by the
hypothesis will indeed be a suitable value as the conclusion y, i.e.




ClAM uses a submethod which is the hypothesis equivalent of the existential
method, and, naturally, it works on universal quantifiers. A meta-variable is
inserted for a, and the symbolic evaluation method, which includes both the
base submethod and the reduction submethod, is applied to that hypothesis
alone, i.e. to the expression 3y G pnat list.y =pnatii»t append(reverse{x), A) to
arrive at an expression to eliminate a on.
7.6.3 Using a Supermethod
Combining the knowledge of the overall structure into a supermethod sorted out
the problems I have described in trying to drive and restrain methods intended
for particular situations in the absence of knowing whether their situation ob¬
tained or not.
The supermethod follows the proof structure I have described in this chapter.
The supermethod's code is in appendix A, and it is described now. In the
account that follows, applicability is used in a technical sense to mean that ClAM
attempted to use the method or submethod, and ensured that its preconditions
and postconditions would succeed.
The supermethod's preconditions are the applicability of the existing tail-
recursive generalisation method, and then the applicability of the induction
method to the result. With the supermethod, all the methods selected as appli¬
cable lead to successful solutions.
The postconditions deal with the step case(s) and base case(s) separately. A
new ripple-over submethod was written to apply at least one longitudinal wave
followed by a transverse one. It looks for a solution using a minimal number of
longitudinal waves. This was used for the step case(s), followed by a fertilization.
The base case(s) are as before, except that now the existential method can be
used without needing restrictions, because it is being used where it is needed.
The justification part identifies the initialisation value for the accumulator
by MOR, as described earlier, It then constructs a tactic virtually identical
to the one described for the free-standing tail-recursive generalisation tactic.
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The only real difference is that the initialisation value has now been supplied
automatically.
7.7 Results
This approach is also successful in synthesising a tail-recursive version from a
naive one for times, total, greatest, multhalf, summation of the values of a
function from 0 to an arbitrary value, and length. The theorems, definitions and
instantiations for G (assuming much the same collection of lemmas and therefore
wave rules as above) are listed in appendix B.
7.8 Conclusions
This chapter has given an account of extensions to the ClAM proof planning sys¬
tem to detect goals which describe the naive specification of a program, and cre¬
ate synthesis proofs completing such goals which yield tail-recursive algorithms.
The technique implemented in these extensions relies on the programs-as-proofs
philosophy to characterise proof structures which ensure that the corresponding
programs will be tail-recursive. Achieving such proof structures requires adap¬
tation of the existing specification, to specify a new tail-recursive function, and
two accompanying proofs, one being the synthesis of the new function, and the
other the justification that the new function supplies the same values as the
original. The extensions to ClAM have to deal with the problem of not knowing
initially what the new function must be. They do this by using higher-order
meta-variables to describe the new specification, and then allowing the subse¬
quent proof to instantiate the meta-variables, using MOZ. The tail-recursion
proof structure is used to ensure the proof corresponds to a tail-recursive func¬
tion.
The extensions fit well into the existing ClAM planning structure, since they
are inductive proofs. Only a few methods needed to be created or modified,
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although the use of higher-order unification required careful interfacing. HO Z
itself made special demands on the planner, because it became important to
pursue first those proof branches which would decide the identity of the meta¬
variables rapidly and conclusively. The subsidiary goal of justifying the choice of
the new function also relied on HOZ, to fix the initial value of the accumulator.
Attempts to extend ClAM's use of methods in a freestanding way were of
limited success, and were eventually superseded by a supermethod, incorporating
available knowledge of the proof structure to direct appropriate methods.
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length( X :: Y_ )
X*Y + X* Z
X*{Y + Z)
X* ( Y + Z_)
append( append(X, Y} , Z)
append{X, append(Y_, Z) )
( X*Y_ ) * Z
X* {¥_* Z)
{X+Y)+Z
X + (Y + Z)
max(X, max(Y_, Z) )
mai( mai(X,y) , Z)
*Y>w
greatest( X :: Y_ )
max( s(X) , s(ll) )
total( X :: Y_ )
+ Y
reverse( X ::Y_)
append( X ::Y_ , Z)
s(length(Y))





X * {Y * Z)
(X * Y) * Z
X + (Y + Z)








append(reverse(Y), X :: nil)




















Table 7—1: Longitudinal Rules
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append( append{X_,Y :: nil) , Z) —► append(X, Y :: Z_) (7.27)
append(X, Y :: Z_) —> append( append(X,Y::nil) ,Z)(7.28)
appendj append(X,Y) ,Z) —► append(X, append[Y,Z) ) (7.29)




X * ( Y * Z_) {X*Y) * ^
(x + y) + z - x + (y + z)
x + ( y+ z) (x + y)
x + *00 s(x) +y
»(20 + y x + 5(H)
maz(X, max(Y,Z) ) —> raai( max(X, y) ,Z)










Table 7—2: Transverse Rules
168
Chapter 8
Comparison with Related Work -
Tail Recursion Optimisation
In attempting any comparison it is important to remember that although the
underlying problems attempted by different researchers may be similar, their
overall purpose can be quite different, and this will naturally influence the em¬
phasis of their work.
One of the most significant differences between the work described in this
thesis and other work on tail-recursion optimisation is that the approach taken
in my work exploits the proofs-as-programs paradigm. This impacts on how
the equivalence of a program to its specification is verified, and how we create
programs having desired properties. The guarantees for both of these lie in the
form of the proof used. Outwith the proofs-as-programs setting, such guarantees
must be sought through proofs about the process creating the program. In
proofs-as-programs, equivalence of a specification to a program is part of the
proof relating to that particular program. Elsewhere, preservation of equivalence
is a general property that must be proved of program synthesis or transformation
system over all operations it could perform. In proofs-as-programs, properties
of programs become properties of proofs.
The proof-theoretic properties (in constructive logic) corresponding to tail-
recursion in their corresponding programs can be characterised [Wainer 89]. The
work described in this thesis is a first attempt to automate the generation of
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proofs meeting these characterisations, starting from a nailvely recursive speci¬
fication.
Constraining the synthesis proofs to using certain proof structures ensures
that the corresponding functional programs are tail-recursive. The problem be¬
comes one of producing these proof structures - a task well-suited to a proof-
planning system. Some questions arise:
• is the proof structure used here sufficient to cover all tail-recursive optimi¬
sations?
• are the chosen representation and its implementation adequate to express
all the variants of the proof form which I have described in chapter 7 as
characterising tail-recursiveness?
• how will the planner produce such proofs?
The MOR proofs-as-programs approach is goal-driven in the sense that it
starts from the intention of creating tail-recursion and works back towards the
tail-recursive form, with the aid of the original program as specification. Any
extra constraints will be proved as they are needed. The equivalence of the
specification and result is a requirement of the proof process.
Key work on generating tail-recursive programs has come from Darlington
and Burstall [Darlington 81, Burstall & Darlington 77], which will sometimes be
referred to as fold-unfold, for convenience. By categorising program transforma¬
tion operations according to their function, they were able to assemble combina¬
tions of transformations automatically. By placing demands on the combination
patterns, particular effects could be achieved. This is analogous to proof plan¬
ning. One of their combinations would take a defined program (or set of recursion
equations) and produce a tail-recursive equivalent. Each transformation opera¬
tion is guaranteed to preserve the equivalence of the original and the result of
its transformation, so verification of equivalence of the starting program and the
final result was not an issue considered at length. The significant decisions were
the definition of the original task, what information was given to the system,
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and the nature of the automatic control. I shall go into this in more detail in
section 8.1.
An alternative approach driving previous work in this area has taken pro¬
grams with known tail-recursive formulations and generalised the observed pat¬
terns linking them into schemas. This is the approach taken in Cooper's paper
[Cooper 66], which is generally cited as one of the first in this area. Each gen¬
eralised schema has then necessarily been restricted to ensure that when it is
applied to suggest an alternative version of some function, the new expression
produces the same results as the original. The constraints implied by these re¬
strictions arise from the schema-level proofs of equivalence between input and
output schemas. The restriction takes the form of theorems about the entities
named in the schema, such as that some function must be associative, or be the
inverse of another. The guarantee that the aim of the optimisation has indeed
been achieved is implicit in the structure of the output schema. Template1 -
based approaches are more data-driven, in that a number of templates could
apply, perhaps designed to achieve different kinds of optimisation. The major
contributions to the template approach come from Darlington [Darlington 72],
who automated the application of some of these transformations, and from Huet
k Lang [Huet k Lang 78], who extended the library of templates, and developed
proofs of their validity, but without any automation.
In [Huet k Lang 78] Huet k Lang provide a thorough theoretical account of
the validation of second-order schema and constraint templates. They give their
concerns as being:
• How to discover templates;
XI am deviating from Darlington's nomenclature here for the sake of consistency -
he uses the term schema for what Huet k Lang term a template. I shall adopt Huet
& Lang's terminology, and use template to encompass a set of input pattern, output
pattern plus associated constraints, reserving schema for the input or output patterns
within templates.
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• How to validate them as preserving the equivalence of programs;
• How to recognise that a template is applicable to a given program;
• How to organise a system automatically applying such templates.
The first of these is not tackled in the paper, since as they point out, "it is one
of the basic problems of communicating knowledge about programming", and
they wish to concentrate on the second and third. The fourth is not addressed
explicitly, but mentioned in passing from time to time, usually as a fruitful
direction for future research. Since they are not describing an implementation,
issues of correctness are more important to them than automation and search
control.
It is apparent, but not surprising, that the criteria relevant to the proofs-as-
programs approach are not the same as those stated for the schema approach.
I shall return to both sets of criteria at the end of this chapter, after examining
the differences between these approaches in detail. Before going on to that I
will set an agenda, in approximate order of centrality, by noting factors to be
considered:
1. Use of a proof-based criterion for tail-recursiveness. This provides us with
a way of characterising our goal very generally, something the other ap¬
proaches lack. As long as the proof satisfies the requirements of the tail-
recursive characterisation, the program will be tail-recursive. The template
approaches are driven by finding existing transformations and generalising
their patterns into templates.
2. Extent of automation versus human intervention. The .MO^/ClAM sys¬
tem is entirely automated, where other systems need a degree of human
guidance, or are not automated at all.
3. Search problems and search control. ClAM's proof-planning information
is well-suited to the task and supplies exactly the kind of information
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needed. It provides a principled framework for describing the progress of
these proofs and explaining their properties.
4. Equivalence of schemas versus equivalence of programs:
• Templates are relatively static, their only features which can be se¬
lected dynamically, in response to a given task, are the choices which
may be made for their variable entities. They are consequently con¬
strained by the need to anticipate all the possibilities in advance. This
is exacerbated by the need to prove equivalence of the schemas in ad¬
vance, too, demanding further restrictions, sufficient to cover all the
cases described by the template. However, the proof need only be
done once for each template.
When programs are built dynamically, there is the potential to select
components according to the demands of the individual case. For
proofs-as-programs, equivalence is more straightforward, as only such
equivalence as relates to the case in hand need be proved. Such a
proof must be supplied for each synthesis.
• Choice of intermediate level - second-order schemas, control of pro¬
gram transformation operations such as folding and unfolding, or con¬
trol of proof. Each possibility constrains the nature of description
possible. A schema describes an input, an output and constraints,
but nothing about how to get from input to output, short of what is
implicit in unification. Program transformations describe a pattern of
operations on program fragments, but without an overall statement
about how the end product will relate to the input - typically there
is no formal justification of the whole transformation as opposed to
each step. Proof control permits both a process and an input-output
relationship to be described.
• Nature of justification of equivalence. The proof control approach
used in this thesis requires only an auxiliary proof branch specific
to the case in hand, and although a general method must be pro-
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duced for finding such proofs, that has been found to be relatively
straightforward. The program transformation approach requires a
higher-level proof assuring the equivalence-preserving properties of
each transformation operation. Similarly, the generalised template
approach requires a higher-level proof for each template that the gen¬
eral transformation it describes is equivalence preserving provided
that the (general) constraints hold.
• Nature of assurance that optimisation is actually taking place. This is
a property implicitly designed into the output schema of each template
Huet &; Lang give, rather than being proved or designed into a (non-
existant) template producing process. Optimisation is not assured
for the fold-unfold system. Achieving the required proof structure
guarantees tail-recursiveness under proofs-as-programs.
• Different information is made explicit or kept implicit in the various
systems. In proofs-as-programs and fold-unfold, objects' roles and re¬
lationships may be implicit. Depending on the implementation, the
overall structure ensuring tail-recursive proof may be implicitly im¬
posed, or explicitly checked. Templates are necessarily explicit about
how entities are involved, but not why.
5. Type of unification and/or matching;
6. Explicit use of meta-variables to enable argument at the meta-level. The
template approaches have meta-variables, but there is no attempt to use
them for explicit guidance, it is bundled into the constraints which are
placed on them.
7. What are the functions of different templates? Do they amount to con¬
sideration of possible correspondence to different rippling patterns, where
wavefronts move up and then across into an accumulator, or up and then
down a different branch, or perhaps some different configuration?
8. Use of other known theorems;
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9. Range of accessible problems - different recursive structures and beyond
second-order;
10. Relation to known processes for linear recursion;
11. Completeness and termination;
12. Transparency of the resulting program;
13. Explainability of the process;
14. Choosing between alternative solutions;
15. Effect of using a proof development system;
16. Other types of optimisation;
17. Evaluation system - call by name/call by value
18. Closeness to any actual language or implementation;
19. Efficiency of the synthesising operation;
20. Modifiability and extensibility.
To aid my comparison, in 8.1 - 8.3, I will run through the example I used in
chapter 7 - the optimisation from naive to tail-recursive reverse - both from the
different perspectives of Darlington and from that of Huet &; Lang. Relating to
this concrete example will make it easier to describe some features, and point
up differences between the four main approaches I will contrast.
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8.1 Burstall and Darlington's Fold-Unfold
Approach
I shall work through ail example first as illustration, and give an account of the
fold-unfold method afterwards.
The specification of the reverse function, and that of <> (append) which it
relies on are given to the system:
along with the knowledge that <> is associative (h, l.t, u and x are all variables).
Other lemmas may also be provided for use as rewrite rules, but as equations.
Only those with well-known properties, and which can loop readily are classified
as laws. Although some of this terminology has now entered common usage,
definitions are still in order:
Unfold. Substitute for an expression the result of evaluating its outermost
function by using the function's definition once, e.g. 8.2 from left to right.
Fold. The opposite of unfold, substitutes the definitional version for the
expanded one, e.g. 8.2 from right to left.
Laws. Knowledge of the commutativity and associativity of functions in
the current problem.
A "eureka" step is given to start the system, a new function, reverseiT is defined
reverse[nil) == nil
reverse{h :: t) === reverse(t) <> h :: nil
nil <> I == I






reversetr(x, u) == reverse(x) <> u (8.5)
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Recursion is assumed to be defined on x. Now, the automatic part of the system
can examine the cases which would have to be defined. First the base case, is
found by instantiating the definition of reversetr (8.5), and unfolding using the
definitions of reverse and <>:
The step case's definition is unravelled similarly, but an extra step uses the
associativity of <> to bring the reversetT definition into a form which can be
folded with the original definition (8.5):
Finally, the circle is completed, and reverse can be defined in terms of reversetr,
by folding 8.2 with 8.5:
reverse{a :: x) —— reversetr(x,a :: nil)
I shall not describe the system in total, just the portion which is relevant to
my comparison here.
The instantiation stage can be given some assistance from the user to set
the system off working on the right equations. Then the automatic part takes
over. It applies the transformation operations - folds, unfolds and uses of other
lemmas and laws of the theory - according to one of a number of strategies.
Their design of strategies was guided by their observations that:
• Almost all the optimising transformations consist of a sequence of unfold-
ings and rewritings by lemmas and then foldings.
reversetr{nil,u) == reverse{nil) <> u
== nil <> u
u




== (reverse(x) <> (a :: nil)) <> u
—— reverse(x) <> ((a :: nil) <> u)
=— reversetr[x, (a :: nil) <> u)
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• Use of associativity and commutativity can usually be delayed until just
before folding.
The latter observation led them to the specialised notion of a forced fold. This
restricted use of laws (associativity or commutativity) to such applications as
made a fold possible, and so cut down on pointless use.
An exhaustive (with backtracking) but relatively inefficient strategy was:
Algorithm 1:
1. Arbitrarily do an unfold or rewriting by a lemma. Repeat this or proceed
to stage 2.
2. Do an arbitrary forced fold. Repeat until no more folding is possible.
The further observation that in most cases folding could be delayed until until
all possible unfolding had been done, provided that the equations were kept in
unfolded form lead to the following less general, but more efficient algorithm:
Algorithm 2:
0. Unfold each equation until no further unfolding is possible.
Then, for each instantiation case of the equation to be improved:
1. Unfold until no further unfolding is possible;
2. Arbitrarily either do a rewriting by a lemma and go to stage 1, or go to
stage 3;
3. Do an arbitrary forced fold. Repeat this stage until no more folding is
possible.
The overall goal was to get the new equations to such a form that folding became
possible, giving the strategy purpose. This system was able to improve a range
of examples.
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The system described in [Darlington 81] refined these strategies further, mainly
to achieve better control over the development. New areas were attempted, such
as generating other improved functions which also optimised using an accumula¬
tor. An example of this being the versions of functions which start from a base
value, and build the calculation up from the bottom, i.e. recursion is converted
into a "going up" form from a "going down" one.
8.1.1 Parallels with MO2 System
Parallels between the types of components should be immediately apparent. This
is no accident, as the proof plans work grew out of the recognition that certain
theorem proving operations, such as the use of wave rules, could be categorised
similarly to the fold and unfold operations. However, it would be misleading to
stretch this analogy too far, as divergence has taken place since.
The initial specification of the new function, (8.5), to be elaborated in tail-
recursive form, achieves the same kind of function as an induction - it suggests
the induction variable, and provides the equivalent of an induction hypothesis for
folding to aim for. The equivalent of an induction's cases is handled by using the
constructors for the type of the variable, so only recursive schemes corresponding
to those are permitted. The function which the MO2 system finds during the
proof process is given by the definition at this point.
Burstall and Darlington's unfold operations only relate to definitions, so they
correspond to ClAM's base and step submethods, and to such wave rules as apply
definitions. Their folding is not the same as rippling down into sinks. Folding
includes their equivalent to fertilisation, since it recognises that an expression
compatible with the posited new definition has been reached, and terminates
the improvement. If repeated, it also incorporates a recent ClAM technique of
reversing rippling after weak fertilisation, to improve the chance of a cancellation.
Associativity and commutativity, are treated specially, and only used to enable
folding. This contrasts with the ClAM approach, where lemmas are preprocessed
to establish their usages as wave rules or simplifications, and used according
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as they fulfill meta-level requirements. Using other lemmas in Burstall and
Darlington's system is controlled by orienting them as rewrite rules in advance.
The overall pattern of applications of categories of program transformations
is, not surprisingly, similar to those performed in proofs.
8.1.2 Conclusions
Burstall and Darlington's system needed no higher-order unification, and there
is no reason why it should have any problem with higher-order problems than
have been described in their papers. It was able to work in conjunction with
other kinds of program improvement, something that has not yet been tried for
the proofs-as-programs approach.
Less of the Burstall and Darlington system has been automated (though
that was not a goal of Darlington's transformation development system). Fewer
recursive schemes are available.
The treatment of non-definitional lemmas of whatever kind is not controlled
in such a principled way as in ClAM, and the lack of any equivalent of wavefronts
to direct and monitor progress means that their strategy is less controlled.
The point at which the associativity is used to enable the terminating fold
in the reverse proof above, (8.8) is a key step, analogous to ClAM's transverse
rippling. In ClAM, any suitable transverse wave could be used, whereas here,
only associativity (or a combination of associativity and commutativity) of the
function which had been inserted as the definition would be allowed. Indeed
later versions of ClAM would be able to assemble the effect of a transverse wave
from appropriate longitudinal ripples, and then carefully controlled backwards
ripples into a sink.
The Burstall and Darlington system doesn't have as much of a search problem
at the stage when the associativity is used (8.8), exactly because they constrain
the possibilities.
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There is no guarantee that Burstall and Darlington's application of the trans¬
formations will improve the program. The fold-unfold systems attempt a strat¬
egy of performing operations which complete the definition of a new function.
There is nothing inherent to the strategy of application or the conditions for
termination which ensure that optimisation will necessarily have taken place.
Features with the capability to optimise have probably been installed, but there
is no characterisation enforcing an optimised structure or monitoring the result.
8.2 Darlington's Template System
This is part of Darlington's thesis work, already described briefly in chapter 2. It
automates the use of tail-recursion producing template-driven transformations.
I will take a naive definition of reverse as a starting point
reverse(l) <= if null(l) then nil
else reverse(cdr(l)) <> cons(car(l),nil) (8.10)
This is equivalent to a set of recursion equations which exhaustively and mutually
exclusively define the reverse function.
8.2.1 Schema Matching
The first task is to see if any of the schemas from the templates describing
recursion optimisation translations, fit. Darlington's system would proceed au¬
tomatically, checking through schemas, using F-matching to detect a match. His
first schema template would fit. The input pattern (slightly adapted) is
/(x) <= if a(x) thenb(x) else if c(x) then h(d(x). f(e(x))) (8.11)
All of a, b, c, d, e, /, g and h are variables of the appropriate types, number, list,
function etc. Since the schema must represent a set of mutually exclusive re¬
cursion equations, a(x) and c(x) must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive, i.e.
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in this case c(x) •<=>■ ->a(x). Output is an iterative POP-2 program, which I will
present here in an ALGOL-like form:
if a(x) then ans := b(x)
else [ ans := d(x);
x e(x);





There are attached conditions, that:
1. whatever h is instantiated to does not contain as a subexpression whatever
x is instantiated to. This is a restriction on the solutions suggested by
the matcher, equivalent to the one I use to filter out unsuitable unifiers.
It ensures that the functions, which are supposed to operate on x, don't
include explicit references to x by name;
2. the function that h is instantiated to is associative.
Provided a substitution can be found which satisfies these conditions and
gives values for all the variables, the output part of the schema template uses
them to supply an iterative program. In this case, matching (8.10) to (8.11)
the following substitutions would be found, ignoring any which fail the first
condition. Their values for some variables are identical to each other:
x a be e f
I Xu.null(u) nil Xu.-<null(u) Xu.cdr(u) Xu.reverse(u)
apart from their alternative substitutions for d and h:
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d h





Note in passing that the substitution for d in the second of these is not of
the right type to fit in with the type that h would require in that substitu¬
tion. Although c is not supplied directly by the instantiation, its computation
is straightforward.
With these substitutions the second condition is:
h(u,h(v, w)) = h(h(u,v),w)
1. (w <> v) <> u — w <> (v <> u)
2. (xv <> cons(v,nil)) <> cons(u,nil)
= w <> cons[y <> cons(u, nil), nil)
3. (w <> cons(car(v),nil)) <> cons (car (u), nil)
= w <> cons (car (v <> cons (car (u), nil)), nil)
The condition arising from the first of these is satisfied, since it is recorded as
a basic property of <>. An algebraic manipulator is used to check such condi¬
tions, using a mixture of recorded properties of the theory and user interaction,
depending on circumstances, as described next. The other three substitutions'
conditions fail to be established. They are variously ill-formed or not true.
8.2.2 Using Properties of a Theory
Basic properties (such as commutativity and associativity) of functions used in
the definitions are supplied to the system and used by its algebraic manipulation
routine to test conditions. The algebraic manipulation routine is a rewriting
system, which, given a set of equivalent formulae (rules) and an expression,
produces the set of all the expressions equivalent to the first under one rewriting
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using the rules. A simple breadth first search with loop-checking was enough
to test the truth of any conditions likely to be encountered. This was further
controlled by placing resource limitations on the manipulator and taking it to
have failed if no success was forthcoming within the resources allowed. It was
not a major part of Darlington's system, but was adequate for his purposes.
In this example, the conditions can be checked automatically. As noted in
chapter 2, for other schema the user might be asked to supply an inverse for a
function, or a unique value satisfying a predicate.
8.2.3 Search Strategy
Darlington's search strategy was to use backtracking. Each template consisted of
a single input pattern which could turn into any of a number of output programs
depending on whether the associated conditions for each output were satisfied.
The system would pick a template and find a substitution. The template would
supply a number of possible output programs with associated conditions which
would have to be satisfied for the use of the template to be valid. If on testing
the conditions any failed, it would backtrack over the other output forms testing
their conditions until it found a success. If none of those succeeded, backtracking
would find another substitution and try all the outputs again. Only when all
substitutions had been attempted against all possible outputs' conditions and
failed would it give up on a particular template, and backtrack to the next.
8.2.4 Validation of Schemas
The emphasis of this system was on achieving automatic optimisations, so known
templates were supplied to this system and not derived automatically. Their
validation was assumed to have been a pre-processing step.
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8.3 Huet & Lang's Template System
Since they are not describing an automated system, Huet &; Lang simply state
that a particular template would be applicable, and give the preferred substitu¬
tion set. They discuss the efficiency and search aspects of their approach. For
them search exists amongst templates and results from the matching algorithm.
The library of templates given in [Huet & Lang 78] is collected from a variety
of sources, particularly Darlington's thesis. They have distilled some of the
schemas into more general forms. This has some drawbacks, which I shall return
to.
In this account I shall follow their frequent practice of showing the output at
the intermediate tail-recursive stage before the final conversion to an iterative
program in some ALGOL-style language. This makes the process and compar¬
isons clearer.
For example, take a template Clnput, Output, Constraints> that corre¬
sponds to the insertion and use of an accumulator, such as < SijE^Si > from
Huet & Lang:
Ei: f(x) <= if_a(x) then b(x) else h[d[x). f(e(x)))
E'x: /'(x) -<= if a(x) then b(x) else p'(e(x). dfx))
g'(x,y) •<= if_ a(x) then h(y, b(x)) elseg'(e(x),h'(y,d(x)))
Si: VxVyVz h(x,h(y,z)) = h(h'(x, y), z)
Vx h(x, ±) = ±
where _L is the base element of the domain of h's second argument.
Notice that their problem is already significantly different from Darlington's
because of the existence of the new variable h' in the output schema which will
not be identified by any matching between the input schema and the input. This
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is a direct consequence of generalising templates. They become more expressive,
but this brings a concomitant larger search space.
The result of second-order matching between the input schema and the defi¬
nition of reverse (8.10) given earlier:
reverse(l) <= if null(l) then nil else reverse(cdr(l)) <> cons(car(l) ,nil)
(they assume that / is reverse and x is /) is a number of partial substitutions.
These are identical in some of their values:
x a be f
I Xu.null(u) Xu.nil Xu.cdr[u) Xu.reverse(u)
but each partial substitution offers differing values for d and h:
d h
1. Xu.cons(car(u),nil) XuXv.v <> u
2. Xu.car[u) XuXv.v <> cons(u,nil)
3. Xu.u XuXv.v <> cons(car(u),nil)
With these substitutions, the first of the associated conditions above becomes:
h(u,h(v,w)) — h(h'(u,v),w)
1. (w <> v) <> u = w <> h'{u, v)
2. (xv <> cons(v,nil)) <> cons(u,nil) = w <> cons{h'(u,v), nil)
3. (w <> cons{car(y),nil)) <> cons{car{u),nil)
= w <> cons(car(h'(u,v)),nil)
The conditions must be shown to hold, and an identification of h' is needed.
This is a MOR problem. They suggest that one way of doing this is to use the
now partially instantiated constraints as match equations. Doing this means
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that h' may only be identified as composed from functions appearing in the con¬
straints. They cannot identify it as being composed from any other functions in
the theory. Realistically, though, any solution available via this route is probably
simpler than all the alternatives.
Unfortunately, this technique will only work for some of the templates. With
the constraints above, it is very hard to see how matching alone could work,
without using information about other theorems. In their paper they demon¬
strate how it might work on a template with more amenable constraints such as
those from < E2, S2 >
If we had chosen that template, we would have been able to use one of its
constraints (see figure 8.3):
Xu.nil <> cons(car(u),nil) = Xu.h'(nil,u)
Matching offers four solutions for h
XyXz. y <> cons(car(z),y)
XyXz. nil <> cons (car (z),y)
XyXz. y <> cons(car(z),nil)
XyXz. nil <> cons(car(z),nil)
The second of these leads to a viable solution. With it, the second condition
becomes
(nil <> cons(car(w),v)) <> cons(car(u),nil)
= nil <> cons(car(w),v <> cons(car(u),nil))
Symbolic evaluation using the definition of <> makes this:
cons(car(w), v) <> cons(car(u) ,nil)
= cons (car (w),v <> cons (car (u), nil))
which further evaluates to be true:
cons(car(w),v <> cons (car (u), nil))
= cons(car(w), v <> cons(car(u), nil))
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The third condition is immediately true since <> is strict in its second ar¬
gument.
Even with this template, there are other constraints to choose from to identify
h', and one of them has b! on both sides of the equality, so that second-order
unification, not second-order matching, would be required. In practice, each of
their templates has a constraint where the unknown function features only once,
but there is no guarantee that this will always be so.
In general, more than one of the various substitutions might lead to a suc¬
cessful solution. This is not of itself a problem, although selecting a "best" one
might be. Detecting which substitutions do not yield successful solutions is more
problematic. In cases described in their paper, more elaborate theorem proving
was required, such as proving the associativity of <>. It is not clear how this
would be handled: by recording standard results, trying out a few values, or a
little theorem proving.
8.3.1 Search
Search arises at a number of points:
• Which template to attempt? Although the initial matching to input schema
may be straightforward, all the variables must be identified and the con¬
straints shown to be satisfied before a template choice can be deemed
successful.
• Choice of initial match to follow up.
• Choice of constraint to use to suggest matches for the rest of the variables.
• Choice amongst solutions proposed by the matcher for the variables which
don't appear in the input schema.
As can be seen from the example above, the search space is not immense. Taking
the above example as a typical case suggests a size of the order of:
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Number of templates (6) *
Number of initial matches (S) *
Number of constraints (2) *
Number of matches from constraints (4)
(= Ui)
8.4 Comparison of Template Systems with
Each of Huet &: Lang's static templates captures a tail-recursion transformation
with some generality. Although, they discuss some of the problems involved in
using the templates, they do not significantly address automation. Their main
efforts are devoted to proving that template use preserves the equivalence of the
input and output programs.
Using templates requires second-order matching to select an input schema.
Matching an input schema only solves part of the problem. Except for the spe¬
cialised Fibonacci one, all the templates have function variables in their output
schema which do not appear in the input schema, and so will not be identified
by any initial match (I am not counting the name of the new function being
defined). These variables must be instantiated for the output schema to define
a function. Huet & Lang suggest instantiating the variables by using the con¬
straints on the functions appearing in the schemas. These constraints correspond
to assumptions which were made in order to prove that the template transfor¬
mation preserved the equivalence of input programs and output programs. The
constraints describe general properties similar to associativity or functions being
inverse of each other.
The process of identifying one of these variables works by finding a constraint
where the variable only appears once, and assuming that the two sides of the
equality (all constraints are equalities) can be matched. A substitution arising
from the match is taken to instantiate the variable. In all but one of their
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templates, there is a constraint where the new variable function appears on only
one side of the equality. However, as I have already shown in working through
this process by hand, it is not simple.
As I have already suggested, some problems are apparent in this stage of
the process. Firstly, there may not be a constraint where the variable to be
instantiated only appears once. Secondly, the two sides of the constraint may
be equal but not unifiable. Thirdly, the function required could exist within the
theory but not appear in the constraints, though intuitively this is unlikely, since
the whole point of the constraints is to link the input to the output. Fourthly
there may be different constraint equations to choose from, each of which may
supply different substitutions, and it is not always obvious how we would choose
between them.
Darlington's system also has constraint equations, but avoided this problem
by storing (or asking for) standard general properties about functions, such as
associativity or inverses, and checking against these known values. This seems a
more sensible way of tackling the problem.
Apart from the ones about base values, all the constraint equations corre¬
spond to wave rules and base cases of function definitions.
So as a search problem, I believe that Huet &; Lang have set themselves
a harder task in general, in terms of identifying the new function. If it were
attempted as Darlington does or as ClAM would, by searching a knowledge base
for a suitable candidate, the various systems would have equivalent tasks.
The six templates cover the following cases:
1 & 2. The kinds of tail-recursion optimisation I have implemented using MOZ
with the ClAM system.
3. The conversion available when an inverse is known, so that calculation
works from the base value, and works upwards.
4. A transformation designed to suit the fibonacci function.
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5 & 6. These are similar to the first two, but make use of existing function argu¬
ments as accumulators, instead of introducing new ones.
Effectively the static templates preprocess what the .MO£/ClAM system
does dynamically for a number of fairly general cases. In principle, therefore,
•M0£/ClAM has greater potential, as it should be able to construct any of these,
and any others which do not happen to fit one of these prepared templates. In
practice, its ability to achieve this potential is restricted by:
• The form of the new sequent which is proposed, the proof of which is
expected to identify the tail-recursive function.
The current .MO£/ClAM system only adds one new argument and expects
it to function as an accumulator. In general one might have to add others
fulfilling such roles as initial values, or values when looping must stop.
For the fibonacci style improvement extra storage arguments are needed,
which achieve the same effect as tupling. Other functions can be optimised
without any further arguments, only needing judicious use of the arguments
they already have, as in templates 5 and 6.
• The guidance At 0 R receives to lead it to an overall proof which satisfies the
requirements for tail-recursion may inhibit it from finding some solutions.
This is true at present. Currently, for example, it insists that there be a
transverse movement of the wavefront. This could theoretically be achieved
instead by a longitudinal movement up, and then another one down.
Template systems are tied to the transformations they can represent through
second-order patterns. Information about why these effect tail-recursion is fixed
in the structure of the output schemas. Any automated systems based on tem¬
plates would do no reasoning about how a transformation into a tail-recursive
function should be composed, beyond instantiating variables with suitable val¬
ues. Although the templates may span many common cases, they will always
be limited to the forms of recursion schemes inherent in their description, and
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to functions satisfying pre-selected constraints which permit a previously proved
equivalence proof.
In proofs-as-programs and fold-unfold there is potentially far more flexibility,
as it becomes possible to have automated systems which can adapt themselves
to more complex recursion schemes, in the pursuit of the end result of a tail-
recursively defined function equivalent to the original. Information about what
constitutes the overall goal can be explicitly available for reasoning.
8.5 Ensuring Equivalence of Programs
Ensuring equivalence of programs using schemas is one of Huet &: Lang's central
concerns. They prove that their input and output schemas are equivalent under
any semantics which model the constraints and the language. Their overall
operation is split into stages, first achieving tail-recursion and then relying on
standard transformations to convert this to an iterative version. The equivalence
proof covers the naive to tail-recursive part of the translation.
To ensure the validity of each template < E, E', 3 > they expect to show that
M,3 f= E = E'
where M is the set of interpretations which satisfy the axioms of the language as
described in whatever logical system is being used, e.g. LCF. M should be closed
and not refer to the free variables of the schemas which will be instantiated using
some substitution a, which will apply them to any particular program fragment.
Since the constraints in cr5 must be valid, they are some of the theorems. Indeed
if the constraints weren't provable, the schemas wouldn't be equivalent either,
as the constraints are a by-product of schema equivalence validation. So for
any valid template, M |= <t3. This information is crucial in guiding the MO 2
process too, because it means that we can expect to find the information about
our mystery meta-variables from the associated theory, just as the template-users
do.
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Huet & Lang show that
M,S f= £ = E'
for each of their templates. To illustrate this, I shall now work through the
example proof they describe, as it will be instructive to compare its structure
with the ones MO2 uses.
Take the template:
Ex: f(x) <= if_a(x) then bjx) else h(d(x), f(e(x)))
E^: /'(x) •<= if a(x) then 6(g) else o(e(x).d(x)) where
g(x, y) <= if a(x) then h(y, b(x)) else g(e{x),h(y, d(x))
5X: VxVyVz.h{x,h{y,z)) = h(h(x,y),z) 5Xa
Vx.h(x, _L) = X 3 it
To show that
E = E'
they must show that
Vx./(x) = f'(x)
i.e.
Vx.i/ a(x) then b(x) else h(d(x), /(e(x))) = if a(x) then 6(x) else g(e(x), d(x))
This is easy if we have:
VxVy.h(x, f(y)) = g(y, x) (8.12)
The generalisation involved in this last step is more natural than it might appear,
since e will normally correspond to a destructor function, and the argument
positions in which it lies are intended to be on the primary recursion paths for
the expressions they lie in. This step is necessary in order to ensure that the
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proof of equivalence has covered all possible values. (8.12) is the key stage of their
proof. They prove it by parallel computation induction. This is a very powerful
induction scheme which leaves the variables universally quantified, and inducts
over the development of the definition of the function. The essential structure of
the computation induction proof is very similar to the fold-unfold process they
use to check their templates. They use it because it is clearer and less long-
winded than the full induction proof. Examining one of these fold-unfold checks
will display the essential form and show some interesting parallels.
Starting with
if a(z) then b(x) else h(d(x), f(e(x)))
they take, as they say, a eureka step (handy for 8.12), and define
g(x,y) <= h{y,f{x))
They do not explain how they pick just this generalisation or why they design
it to include y, but there would be two problems if they chose to prove just
Vx.h(d(x),f{e(x))) = g(e(x),d(x)):
• the induction would not be guaranteed to cover all cases of h or g, it would
cover cases of d or e. so their formal correctness would be spoilt;
• it would not be possible to use the induction hypothesis in the step case
of the computation induction proof, since the more constrained instances
would not permit matching at the appropriate stage.
There is an obvious similarity between this step, (8.12) and the key stage of
the corresponding MO JZ proof, where the original goal Vy3z.z = f(y) is replaced
by a new goal of proving VyVaBz'.z' = F(f(y),a). In cases such as the reverse
optimisation, F corresponds to h, and to build the constructive witness for z'
we construct g and use it to supply z'. The motivation for introducing a as a
new variable was exactly in order to have a more powerful inductive structure,
though it is quite a different induction from the computation induction here.
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The checking then takes this definition and by some folding, unfolding and
use of lemmas produces a recursive equivalent with the desired property that the
recursive definition's step case has no functions surrounding the reference to the
recursive application of g:
unfolding (acts like an induction, I shall insert the wavefront):
g{x,y) = h{y,f{x))
= h(y, if a(x) then b(x) else h(d(x), f (e(x))) )
"rippling" the if construct outwards:
= if a(x) then h(v, b(_x)) else h(v, h(d(x), f (e(x))) )
using Sia (rippling sideways):
= if_ a(x) then h(y, b(x)) else h( h{y_, d(x)) , f(e(x)))
folding with the definition of g (the equivalent of using the induction
hypothesis) builds the accumulated part onto y:
= if a(x) then h (v. fr(x)) else q(efx). h(y,d(x)) )
The parallels with a rippling-structured proof are very close, and the purpose
of the steps is much the same. What we would term a wavefront is moved
from being around the /(e(x)) term over to the new variable, so that it can be
absorbed.
Huet & Lang are describing two processes, a formal equivalence proof, and
a less formal fold-unfold checking, which they note "might be developed to help
in discovering new templates". In effect, that is similar to what the MO R proof
does, except that MOR skips the explicit template since it is working directly
with the function to be optimised. Remember from chapter 7 that there are two
proof branches, one that identifies a tail-recursive function, and another that
justifies its equivalence to the original specification. MOR builds its information
up through the identification branch, using other information from the theory,
and the justification of equivalence is a secondary proof. Huet &; Lang's fold-
unfold checking is very close to Darlington's work on folding and unfolding proofs,
and corresponds to the identification branch of one of my proofs. It is interesting
to note that Huet & Lang use this to check their schemas because it's easier.
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They then achieve the justification of equivalence of schemas by computation
induction, the formal proof of which is complex. Of course they only have to
prove schema equivalence once for each template.
Although these key stages have such non-coincidental similarity, this is an
illusion in one respect. The operations are carried out at different levels.
Huet &; Lang are operating in advance to prove that second-order tem¬
plates have equivalent input and output schemas. They perform proofs on these
schemas, and then apply the schemas to given first-order functions.
From the point of view of automation, each of these steps is hard. Their main
proof effort takes place at what is effectively their meta-level. It involves "eureka"
steps to find suitable intermediate lemmas, and neither finding these nor proving
them is straightforward, as they say themselves. A significant amount of search
and theorem proving would also be inherent to the application stage if it were
automated. No attempt is made to automate the process of finding schemas.
All this is in some contrast with the proofs-as-programs style, where equiva¬
lence is a separate proof branch, operating on the fully instantiated object level
formula. This justification subproof is automatically built in to the proof when
the tail-recursive version is proposed. Provided that the new hypothesis de¬
scribing the new tail-recursive function is used to justify the original conclusion
(which gives the specification of the function to be optimised), equivalence is
assured. I have already described such "justification" proofs, and beyond a little
ingenuity to find suitable initial values, the proof involved is not too hard. Typi¬
cally they involve instantiating universally quantified variables in the conclusion
to match the hypothesis, initialisation, and some simplification.
The steps which Huet & Lang describe as "eureka" steps, have been auto¬
mated in the MO 2 system.
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8.6 Achieving Specification, Optimisation and
Synthesis
In order to be able to separate the components out clearly and discuss their
function, I will briefly re-iterate an account of the underlying logical operation
of my system.
If we assume a function defined2:
f(x,y) -4= tf_ b(x) then h(x,y)
else f'(f(d(x),y),x,y)
where f is recursively defined on its first argument, then / is non-tail-recursive.
The proof statement that this specification is well-defined, i.e. that it defines
a total function whose output is well-formed, is:
VxVtj3z.z = f(x,y)
which is proved by supplying a function which constructs the z given x and y.
Clearly, many function descriptions are available which would generate a suitable
z. The recursion equations hold for these functions too. There is a trivial proof
by simply using / itself, and taking z to be /(x, y), but that does not give a new
function.
We need to introduce such a new function into the proof, and do so in such
a way that it is synthesised, not just verified to be the equivalent of /. If a new
function, /< is introduced as:
VxVy./t(x, y) = f(x, y) (8.13)
21 am ignoring a more general recursive description for the sake of clarity, it does not
affect the argument
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then the proof will verify the equivalence of the two functions, but without
ensuring a specification and synthesis of ft. This can be achieved by using the
cut rule to insert a new specification proof node:
VxVy3z.z = ft(x, y)
and then this becomes an extra hypothesis in the proof of (8.13). An accompa¬
nying proof branch will retain the original proof goal, and include this as a new
hypothesis.
The verification part of the proof takes place in the second branch, where the
new hypothesis is made to generate its values; they are used as evidence for the
conclusion, and verified to be the same.
To help with proof guidance, the synthesis branch can be more suggestively
specified, as it is for the middle-out proofs. These suggestions incorporate some
of the guidance material which in other systems would be in schemas, such as
the existence of accumulators. Other guidance is built into the structure of the
methods, as has been described in an earlier chapter, and implicitly into the
extent of the theory loaded up and made known. A copious body of theorems
will not lead the system into endless search, but an inadequate one will fail to
feed it the information it needs to proceed. It would be a significant extension
to enable it to speculate and prove such lemmas as it needed on the fly.
It is important to note that the guidance from these suggestions need not
be restrictive, as schemas are. It need not correspond to any particular schema
at all except insofar as it introduces and dictates the use of new variables. The
inserted statement from which the synthesis proceeds is of the form:
VxVyV'a3z.z = F(f(x,y),a)
This "suggestion" actually corresponds to the first stage of Huet &; Lang's
general equivalence proof which they must undertake separately for each schema.
The form of this varies necessarily from schema to schema. The rippling structure
echoes the structure of their proofs.
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Consequently, the middle-out approach encompasses a number of schemas by
having a pattern for constructing an equivalence justification, and only looking
for such constraints as it needs for this actual proof from the supplied theory.
Indeed it should be more flexible as it will not be tied to any particular schema
and its validation constraints. One could either regard this as skipping the
schema stage altogether, or alternatively as dynamically constructing the essence
of a schema.
Using templates, the result achieves tail-recursiveness because this is an ob¬
served property of its output schema. Each template is constructed as a generali¬
sation of just such observations. The XO^/ClAM proofs-as-programs implemen¬
tation binds the definition of tail-recursion in and means that tail-recursiveness
is an assured property if the method succeeds.
8.7 Static and Dynamic
It is now possible to see the proofs-as-programs work possibly as custom-building
templates dynamically, or more accurately as avoiding the need for templates
at all, as Darlington's fold-unfold work does. This is as opposed to the use of
pre-defined static schemas to describe the kinds of conversions which will effect
optimisation, the approach taken by Darlington's thesis work, Huet fz Lang and
others.
By defining templates in advance, they are obliged to predict the exact course
of the equivalence proof between the original expression and the converted form
for anything using this template. This proof will require certain properties of
the new functions, such as their associativity, and these are noted as a list of
constraints to be satisfied. It is in the other proof, the identification proof, that
the real work is done. That constructs the rippling pattern of the function that
gets constructed.
Generality of schemas is a mixed blessing, as I have shown. Those templates
which are most powerful are also the hardest to use because they involve the
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most variable quantities to be established. This is a trade-off which must be
gauged for any automated system.
The dynamic systems, using MOR. or fold-unfold, can adapt to a variety of
recursion schemes, and make use of such properties as are true of the object level
formulae they are working with. They are not constrained by a need to complete
general purpose second-order proofs.
8.8 Range of Problems Covered
I have comparable examples for the first two of Huet and Lang's templates, but
not for the others, which, apart from the third do not use accumulators. They
give no examples for most of their templates.
I shall give any relevant definitions and lemmas with each example, converted
to destructor-style description, to ease comparisons, although the definitions I
use are constructor style. Appendix B shows some example synthesis plans, and
the definitions and lemmas typically available.
To summarise common definitions and lemmas - in all the rest of this section,
p and s are the predecessor and successor functions respectively on the natural
numbers, plus, times, zero and <> (append) are defined as
plus(x,y) if zero(x) then v else s(vlus(v(x).v))
times(x,y) <= if zero(x) then v else vlus(times(p(x).v).v)
zero(x) <= if x — 0 then pnat else void
(x <> y) -4= if null(x) then nil else cons(car(x).cdr(x) <> y)
The associativity of times, plus and <> are known, nil is the empty list, null




Ei: /(x) 4= if q(x) then b(x) else h(d(x). f(e(x)))
E^: /'(x) -4= »/ a(x) thenb(x) else q'(e(x). <f(x))
y'(x,y) 4= if_a(x) then h(v. 6(x)) eZse g'(e(x), A.'(y, d(x)))
Hi: VxVyVz h(x,h(y,z)) = h(h'(x,y),z)
Vx /i(x, _L) = _L
Example:
reverse(l) <= if null(l) then nil else reverse(cdrU)) <> cons (car (I), nil)
reversetr(l,a) ■<= if null (I) then a else reversetJcdr(l).cons(car(l).a))
8.8.2 Template 2
E2: /(x) 4= if a(x) then b else h(x, f(e(x)))
Z'2: f'(x) <= g'(x,b)
g'(x,y) 4= if_ a(x) thenh(y,b(x)) else a'(e(x).h'(v,d(x)))
E2' Vx h(x,b) = h'(b,x)
VxVyVz h(x,h(y,z)) = h(h'(x, y), 0)
Vx /i(x, _L) = _L
Example:
factorial(x) 4= if zero(x) then s(0) else times(factorial(p(x)),x)
factorialtr(x,a) -4= t'/ zero(x) then a else factorialtr(p(x) .times(x. a))
201
8.9 Higher-Order Problems
The At OR system can optimise the (third-order) summation functional
n pH
£/( t) ■<= if zero(n) then f(0) else plus(f(n), f(i))
«=o »=o
Although this is very close to template 1 in form, and requires no more than
second-order matching, it is parameterised over a variable function, /, which does
not become instantiated in order to optimise the definition of the functional, E.
In general, operating in a higher-order context should not affect the M.0R.
system.
8.10 Using a Proof Planning and Development
System
By operating within a proof-planning system it was possible to experiment with
these ideas fairly easily by using the method definitions. A more flexible planning
structure would have been useful, allowing heuristics to decide whether the result
of applying a method had been informative in the sense of instantiating variables
reasonably certainly, with a small search space. If that were not the case, such
a flexible planner would have postponed this proof branch while another was
attempted which cause less instantiated branching of the search space. This
notion of informative and uninformative inference attempts was pertinent in the
case of the base and step case choices, where the step case was artificially supplied
to the planner first, because it could supply the information to instantiate the
meta-variable correctly. Using the base case would have tried every function in
the library which could match because it had so few real constraints in it.
Using ClAM meant that a sizeable body of theory could be made available.
Without the definition of purpose built into the proof plan, however, that volume
of information would be impossible to negotiate automatically.
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The meta-variables are available for explicit reasoning. Proofs convert di¬
rectly into executable programs, via the Curry-Howard isomorphism.
8.11 Use of Unification
Unification is far too prolific in its solutions to be used easily without extra
control. Darlington, Huet & Lang and I all reduce the problems to matching
wherever possible because of this, using F-matching, second-order matching and
cj-order matching respectively. Apart from its inefficiency, there is no disadvan¬
tage in using a higher-order unifier, as it only produces the same solutions that
would have been proposed by the unifier appropriate for the level of problem
supplied. I.e. if the highest order of variable is only second-order, it operates as
a second-order algorithm.
Further, we all reject solutions which are valid as unifiers, but not valid within
the context of our problems, expressly those which build parameter variables
into the definition of some variable function. As I have noted earlier, this is
Dale Miller's temporal scoping. This restriction reduces the number of solutions
considerably.
The move from F-matching to full matching3 enables matches where variables
must be instantiated to a composite function, as is required for some problems,





for which MOR can generate a tail-recursive function:
multhalftr(0,y,a) <= a





What, then, are the responses to the key questions posited at the beginning of
this chapter, in the light of this new work? How do the various approaches relate
to each other?
Proofs-as-programs makes proof of equivalence of programs to each other or
to their specification an inherent feature, for example an extracted program is
guaranteed to satisfy its specification. When we introduce a new formula to
describe a tail-recursive algorithm, its equivalence to the original specification
is a subgoal. Such subgoals are generated automatically, and are usually fairly
straightforward to prove. Other systems have to prove the equivalence preserving
properties of the transformations. When this ease of equivalence is taken into
account as well as the ability to characterise and detect tail-recursion, we can see
that any completed synthesis proof can easily be checked for the tail-recursive
qualities of the resulting proof. So, for example, earlier work ofmine on synthesis
of programs involving case-splits (not involving MO R and not reported in this
thesis) such as greatest common divisor, would readily be checkable for tail-
recursiveness.
The proofs-as-programs approach makes it possible to describe the proof
forms corresponding to tail-recursion very clearly. Work is still required to find
such proofs, of course. A significant advantage of this approach can be seen
to be that it gives us a general characterisation of our goal simply by restrict¬
ing our attention to a class of object level proofs. Other approaches have to
attempt this through other means. The fold-unfold approach uses analogous
procedures to ours (Burstall and Darlington), but they lack the information
available through ClAM about progress and direction. In fold-unfold, the cri¬
terion for tail-recursiveness must be decided of the resulting defined function.
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The template-based systems specify sets of transformations, which iff applicable
achieve the desired result [Darlington 72, Huet & Lang 78, Cooper 66].
Although the analysis of the proof structure shows that it describes tail-
recursion, the implementation and representation chosen have some built-in as¬
sumptions which restrict it from achieving the full power of the proof structure.
Since it automatically builds in an accumulator it will miss certain solutions
where simply substituting functions would be adequate. Given the straightfor¬
wardness of characterisation of tail-recursiveness, it would not be difficult to
search for such direct tail recursive proofs too. In these cases, however, a similar
alternative with an accumulator can be found.
The fold-unfold approach has considerable versatility, in that it can work
with whatever information is to hand, and can combine a number of program-
optimising features. It lacks automated guidance at the level of our supermeth-
ods, and the ability to surmise the existence of, and then identify, entities needed
for intermediate stages.
An important conclusion relates to the value of explicit templates. Although
it might be suspected that their knowledge had just been slipped in somewhere
else, that is not so. What has happened is that the meta-knowledge inherent
in their validation proofs, which controls the identification of templates, has
been embedded in the tail-recursive planning component. That now operates on
actual theorems rather than on abstractions. The built in optimisation drives the
process with guidance from the theory, and a customised validation is produced.
The intermediate structure of the template becomes redundant. This would
seem to be confirmed by the success of Darlington's later, non-template based,
fold-unfold work.
My main conclusion is that a AfO^/proofs-as-programs approach contains
most of the best features of templates and fold-unfold. It has fold-unfold's flexi¬
bility over unforeseen recursive schemes, and the template approach's ability to
supply values for unknown functions. >10 R/proofs-as-programs has the added
advantage that it can use an explicit characterisation of suitable proof struc-
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tures for strategic guidance, aided by ClAM's tools for monitoring progress in
such strategies.
My long list of points to be considered ended with a miscellany of larger
issues which are important, but most of which are beyond the scope of what is
still an experimental system.
• Completeness and Termination. These are not guaranteed, any more than
for any other system addressing this kind of problem.
• Transparency of the Resulting Program. This is poor, but that is a well-
known pitfall of the optimisation process. It is exactly the reason why
optimisation is a good thing to automate, so that humans don't have to
face this ugly side.
• Explainability of the Process. This is debatable, but by using more large
scale "supermethods" can probably be improved.
• Choosing Between Alternative Solutions. I don't do this at all, I just stop
with the first one. It could be an avenue for further work.
• Other Types of Optimisation. Templates can be used to achieve other
kinds of optimisation. There is no reason why proof structures should not
do this too. The problem of preferring one optimisation to another would,
of course, still be present.
• Evaluation System. I have assumed lazy evaluation throughout. If some
other form of evaluation were required, such as call-by-value, this type
of approach should still work, but the proof structure would need some
adaptation.
• Closeness to Any Actual Language or Implementation. The output of
this system is a simple functional programming language, which can be
executed, though it's not built for efficiency. It wouldn't be too hard to
convert it into a more carefully implemented functional language.
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• Efficiency of the Synthesising Operation. This is poor. Once it hits a lot
of lemmas, it is dreadfully slow. However, it could be improved by some
optimisation of the unification system, and streamlining the preconditions
in the methods.
• Modifiability and Extensibility. Both the flexibility of arguing about proof
structures, and the powerful tool of the proof planner make this approach
highly modifiable and extensible.
As I hinted at the beginning of this chapter, different purposes emphasise dif¬
ferent aspects of work. It should now be clear that my work is strongly directed
at automation and discovery, ensuring equivalence is a necessary sideline, and
even easier when dealing with actual functions rather than templates. The con¬
centration on formal correctness of templates in Huet &; Lang's work, becomes
redundant in an approach which avoids such intermediate representations. Proof
planning has given us the tools to characterise the structure of the proofs we need,
and hence their programs. Discovery arises out of the interaction of a theory
with the demands of optimisation. Its automatic organisation can be controlled
effectively by the MO R process.
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£i: f[x) if °(x) then bfx) else h(d(x). f(e(x)))
E'x: f'[x) <= if o,(x) then b(x) else y'(e(x), d(x))
y'(x, y) •<= t/a(x) there h(y, 6(x)) else q'(e(x), h'(y, dfx)))
3X: VxVyVz h(x,h(y,z)) = h(h'(x,y),z)
Vx h(x, ±) = _L
/(x) if a(x) then b else h(x, f(e(x)))
E'2: /'(x) <= y'(x,6)
y'(x, y) •<= ij_a[x) then h[y,b[x)) else y'(e(x), h'(y, d(x)))
32: Vx h(x, b) = h'(b, x)
WxWyWz h(x,h(y,z)) — h(h'(x,y),z)
Vx h(x, _L) = _L
E3: /(x) <= if x = a then b else h[x. ffe(x)))
E3: /'(x) <= y'(a,6,x)
y'(x,y,2) •<= if_x = z then y else y'(e'(x), h(e'(x), y), 2)
53: Vx e'fe(x)) = x
Vx efe'(x)) = x
Vx h(x, _L) = _L
_L is always the base element of the relevant domain
Figure 8—1: Huet and Lang's Templates 1-3
E4: /(x) 4= if a(x) then b else h( f(d(d(x))). f(d(x))) (fibonacci)
s4: f'{x) <= g'(x,b,b)
g'(x, y, z) <= if_a(x) then v else g'(d(x),h(z,y),y)
S4: Vx (_,a(x) A a(d(x))) D a{d(d{x)))
Vx h{x, ±) = _L
£5: fix,y) <= i£a(x) then b(x,y) else h(y,f{c(x),d(y)))
Eg: f'(x,y) <= if a(x) then fe(x. v) else f'(c(x).h'(v.d(x)))
H5: VxVyVz h(x, h(y, z)) = h(/i'(x,y),z)
VxVyVz h(x,6(y,z)) = 6(y, h'(x,z))
Vx /i(x, _L) = _L
E6: /(x, y) -4= if a(x) then b(x,y) else h(x, f(e(x),y))
Eg: /'(«, y) if_a(x) thenb(x,y) else f'(e(x),h'(x,y))
56: VxVyVz h(x,h(y,z)) = h(/i(x, y), z) V VxVyVz h'(x, h'(y, z)) = h'(h'(x, y), z)
VxVyVz h(x,b(y,z)) = 6(y, h'(x, z))
Vx h(x, _L) = X
± is always the base element of the relevant domain
Figure 8—2: Huet and Lang's Templates 4-6
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Chapter 9
Middle Out Reasoning to Guide
Generalisation for Induction
I shall use the term generalisation in its mathematical sense, not in any broader
sense used in Artificial Intelligence.
The attractions of generalisation are that when applied correctly, it yields a
more powerful result, and perhaps an easier proof. Indeed many theorems are
not provable at all without generalisation.
The difficulties of generalising and automating generalisation are in deciding
the following questions
• when is it appropriate to generalise?
• what expressions should be generalised?
• what should they be generalised to? It is very easy to create a new formula,
of which the original is an instance, but which is no longer a theorem.
• how and when can we tell some generalisation is succeeding?
To answer these questions, and control proofs, it is invaluable to rely on a
general structure for a type of problem. My attempts have taken advantage of
choosing a particular class of problems (universally quantified formulae requiring
induction) and developing an understanding of properties and structures of their
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proofs. As a result, there are other classes of generalisation, outlined in sections
9.1 and section 9.2, that my techniques do not address, such as removal of
redundant hypotheses, or some kinds of proofs involving existentials.
Previous attempts to automate such generalisation have been designed for
specialised classes of generalisation problem. As described in chapter 2, for
instance, they look for multiply occurring terms, and then use heuristics to
decide whether to generalise, and if so, how to generalise the theorem. Although
generalisation is used as an aid to induction, and the heuristics are built with
an eye to future inductions, this relationship to induction is not fully exploited.
The heuristics work in advance of the subsequent induction proof, not alongside
it.
Using we can bind the generalisation choices more closely to the needs
of induction. We can use the meta-level to describe a generalisation flexibly,
but postpone making a precise choice. Subsequent proof planning selects the
particular generalisation necessary for success.
I will try to answer the questions I posed at the beginning of this chapter.
To do that, I will first give a brief account of what constitutes generalisation.
Section 9.2 will briefly review how generalisations are effected within a sequent
calculus, and assign some limits I will assume for my task. Following that, section
9.3 will describe the form my flexible description will take, and why I believe
it is adequate for its purpose. Section 9.4 describes how we can decide that an
induction is working or being ineffectual. This helps us know when to attempt a
generalisation and assess whether one is proving worthwhile. Section 9.5 analyses
the generalisation process under MOR in detail, showing what constraints are
available and discussing search control. Subsequent sections demonstrate the
technique working on a variety of theorems.
Comparison between MO R and other approaches will be addressed in chapter
10.
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9.1 What is Generalisation?
Generalisation is a proof step which allows us to postulate a new theorem as
a substitute for the one we are currently trying to prove, and then use it to
justify the original. Usually, the generalisation is inserted into the proof giv¬
ing the theorem prover two tasks, to prove the generalisation and show that it
justifies the original theorem. In a sequent calculus this insertion is commonly
effected by using the cut rule. The cut rule allows us to add a new hypothesis
to the sequent being proved, provided that we can give a (separate) proof of
the new hypothesis from the existing hypotheses. An exception might be if the
generalisation corresponds to a primitive rule of inference. Use of the cut rule is
unnecessary, for example when proving an implication by proving its consequent
without reference to the antecedent. Such examples can reasonably be neglected
here.
The existence of a cut elimination theorem for a formalised theory is an
indicator of whether or not generalisation is necessary. Cut elimination theorems
are proof theoretic results, proved inductively over the formulae of the logical
formalism and the axioms of a theory. When they exist, they show that any
theorem of the theory can be proved without resort to the cut rule of inference.
If it can be shown that the cut rule is not required, then neither is generalisation.
Cut elimination theorems are not available for most theories.
There are two main reasons why generalisation is such a valuable technique
in mathematics:
• It may take the insights from a specific proof and create a more powerful
and expressive result. This may involve anything from dropping an un¬
necessary condition to grand analogies yielding a result valid for all the
entities of some type instead of just a particular one.
• Often, within the rigours of mathematical logic, certain theorems are only




R —+ P P 9.2
r > t r > s A s > t 9.3
Vx.Q(x, x) VxVa.Q(x, a) 9.4
Vx\/2.Q(x, f(z)) VxVa.Q(x, a) 9.5
Vx.Q(x, x) VxVa.<3(x, g(x, a)) (if 3b.g(x, b) = x) 9.6
Vx.Q(x, c) VxVa.Q(x, a) 9.7
3x3y.Q(x, y) 3x.<2(x,x) 9.8
3x3y.Q(x,y) Q(0,c) 9.9
where P and R are propositions, Q is a 2 argument predicate, g
is a function, and r, s and t are free variables, and c is a constant.
Figure 9—1: Examples of Generalisations
theorem is available can be guaranteed not to need operations we would
normally describe as generalisations.
Generalisation is widely used as a concept, but exactly what it means is not
tightly defined. If the new theorem postulated bore little relation to the original
theorem to be proved, for example if it were some ancillary lemma, we would
not count it a generalisation. So we do not immediately class as a generalisation
any theorem whose addition to the current hypotheses makes the current goal
provable. In some way, we expect the new theorem to imply the original, and to
achieve that implication mainly "unassisted". This happens in some cases, such
as those for which only instantiation is required. For others, an arbitrary amount
of computation using definitions may be required to establish the justification,
e.g. (9.6) in figure 9.1. This could be viewed as some kind of instantiation by
unification using a built-in theory, but controlling such unification would be very
hard. All the examples in Figure 9.1 might be taken as generalisations.
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One of the dangers of generalisation is that of over-generalising - generalising
to a new statement which is not a theorem. This is easily done when following
syntactic generalisation rules, and hard to guard against. I shall address this
issue at various points in the course of this chapter and the next one.
9.2 Logical Basis of Generalisation
Apart from those operations which might be regarded as null generalisations,
because they are just the application of rules of inference, generalisations involve
using the cut rule. Although we typically think of generalisation as taking a
formula and somehow strengthening it, the examples in figure 9.1 show that this
can take many forms. Sometimes distinguishing multiple occurrences generalises,
sometimes it specialises, according to the polarity of the formulae concerned. All
this become clear if we look at the nature of the justification and the cut rule.
If we consider this process in relation to the sequent calculus formulation,
the only way of inserting formulae into the proof which are not subformulae of
the current sequent, is the cut rule:
T\~F T,F\~A
r b A
T and A are arbitrary lists of formulae, and F is an arbitrary formula. For
the purpose of generalisation, A will be a singleton, the formula which will be
generalised, and F will be the formula which is its generalisation. Then the
left-hand proof branch proves the generalisation, F, and the right-hand proof
branch is a justification that F is indeed a generalisation, i.e. that its addition
to the hypotheses results in a proof of the original sequent.
Starting from this point, we can look at generalisation as a use of the cut
rule where F is very similar to some other formula in the sequent, in the sense I
outlined earlier of something akin to unification with some theory built in. For
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example Boyer and Moore's generalisation (9.5) from figure 9.1 is proved like
this:
r I- VxVy.Q(z,y) T, VxVy.Q(x, y) b Vx\/z.Q(x, f{z))
r h VxVz.g(x,/(z)) 1 ' '
Aubin-style generalisation (9.4 in figure 9.1) follows the same pattern:
T h VnVm.Q(n,m) T, VnVm.Q(n,m) h Vn.Q(n,n)
r h Vn.Q(n.n)
At the same time, some restrictions are apparent, regarding the polarity of
the formula being generalised. The following inference steps are generalisations
too:
T h Vn.Q(n,n) —* P r,Vra.Q(n,n) ->Ph VmVn.Q(m,n) —> P
T h VmVn.<5(m,n) —► P
T h 3n.Q(n,n) T, 3n.Q(n, n.) h 3m3n.(5(m,n)
T h 3m3n.Q(m,n)
In each case, the requirements of the justification branch insist that only some
similar expressions are actually generalisations, those of which the originals are
logical consequences.
For most induction proofs which I will consider, this point never arises, since
we are dealing with a single expression on the right-hand side, which is universally
quantified. Therefore the first (9.1) of these generalisation inferences covers
them.
In general though, it would be necessary to consider the quantification and
polarity of an expression carefully, in order to decide what was a generalisation,
and would therefore result in a suitable justification branch.
First order predicate calculus with no theory axioms, is an example of when
it is possible to prove that the availability of the cut rule does not add to the
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body of theorems. Without it, all the same theorems can be proved. In such
cases, generalisation in this sense is unnecessary from a purely logical point of
view, though it may not be heuristically, or aesthetically.
9.3 Generalisation for Induction Proofs
Working in the context of plans for induction proofs, I am interested in the
generalisations which facilitate such proofs. This perspective is helpful in guiding
the generalisation process. My approach has been to find some way of casting
problems in a flexible form so that the requirements of a successful induction
could manifest themselves, and prescribe the generalisation required. I regard a
successful induction as one which leads to the use of the induction hypothesis,
and then (if the proof branch is not already finished) some cancellation - use
of the functional or predicate substitution axioms, which eliminates some of the
term structure present in the induction hypothesis.
Broadly, I expect to hypothesise suitable generalisations of types (9.4) to
(9.6) of figure 9.1. Although they look different, the generalisations can all be
viewed as cases of the following:
• Take terms in the expression to be generalised, and link them to a new
universally quantified variable by meta-variable functions.
• Instantiate the meta-variable functions as required to allow the proof to
go through. The instantiation may make the meta-variable functions pro¬
jections onto some argument, or create a link between the term and the
variable. The meta-variable will become this link.
So, for example, let us start with a formula e[t, ...,$], with occurrences of a
subterm t, which is a constant, free variable, universally quantified variable or
non-atomic term containing no existentially quantified variables. Then for some
variable a not occurring in e[t, ...,<], \fa.e[Fi(t, a),..., Fn(t, a)] is a flexible gen¬
eralisation. It speculates about a possible generalisation. F, are meta-variable
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functions, indexed so that each occurrence of t can be treated differently. This
assumes that a single new variable, a, will be enough to create a useful gen¬
eralisation. I will return to this assumption later. The intention is that this
construction inserts an object into the formula which can be used flexibly for
meta-reasoning. Each F, becomes identified as one of the following:
• XuXv.u
This means that F,(t, a) = t, no generalisation.
• XuXv.v
Here, F,(f,a) = a, generalisation of term t to the new variable, a.
• XuXv.f(u,v)
In this case, F,-(f, a) = f(t, a), where / is some constant function symbol, or
composition of such symbols. This permits the insertion of accumulators.
The higher order unification required to identify the Ft- is described in chap¬
ter 4. Some further restrictions are appropriate to the unifiers which will be
accepted. We are expecting unification to perform the above tasks only. We are
not expecting it to suggest other alterations to the formula, such as introducing
more occurrences of the unknown variables. Although such unifications would
eventually be rejected since they would fail to lead to generalisations which justi¬
fied the original formula, it is very expensive to consider them all. Consequently
I am filtering out such unifications at present.
By creating this common approach, a variety of generalisations can be ad¬
dressed, the exact form being directed by the needs of the proof. The new
variable can be treated as an accumulator, a new induction variable, or simply
as a variable on which no induction takes place, as required.
I will seek solutions which lead to a successful induction, rather than maximal
generalisations. An advantage of this is that the number of new variables can
be kept to a minimum. This also helps to ward off the ever present danger of
over-generalisation.
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9.4 When Induction Fails
If generalisation is to be viewed as a technique to fix failing inductions, we need
a way of deciding that induction is failing. I shall devote this section to looking
at what induction is and how it works.
9.4.1 How Does Induction Work?
The point of induction is to give us a strong hypothesis, similar to the theorem
being proved. In constructor-style induction, we suffer for this by accepting a
more complex theorem to prove. If as a result we fail to simplify the expression
to be proved in any sense, by use of an induction hypothesis, then it is likely
that our task has been complicated to no good effect and the induction attempt
was faulty.
It's helpful to look at this first from the point of view of a theorem whose
dominant functor (after quantification) does not readily admit a rewriting use
within the theory, not = or < for example. This corresponds to permitting only
strong fertilization in ClAM. The whole of the induction hypothesis must be used
to substitute for (at least part of) the induction conclusion, after any necessary
instantiation of quantified variables. This usage corresponds to functional and
predicate substitution axioms.
Admitting rewriting allows the possibility that not all of the induction hy¬
pothesis need be re-created within the conclusion for the hypothesis to be used.
In the case of =, manipulating the conclusion so that just the left-hand side of
the hypothesis appeared as a subterm of the conclusion would allow that sub-
term to be rewritten. The right-hand side of the induction hypothesis equality
would be substituted for the subterm. This is ClAM's weak fertilization. Its
usage corresponds to transitivity axioms.
I will elaborate the basic possibilities ignoring the possibility of rewriting,
and then go on to look at the effects of allowing rewriting afterwards.
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9.4.2 Using Induction Hypotheses Which Cannot Be Used
For Rewriting
Taking VxVyP[x, y] as a theorem to be proved, a step case is of the form:
Vy'P[x,y'] b VyP[ c(x) , [yj ]
where c stands for some construction inherent in the induction scheme, and y
has been renamed as y' in the induction hypothesis to avoid ambiguity. The
square bracket notation, as ever, indicates that P may be a composite function
containing multiple occurrences of the arguments in the brackets. Although in
principle there could be any number of other universally quantified variables
present, i.e. instead of just y there could be yi,y2,the essence of the explana¬
tion is clearer without them. The account extends straightforwardly, but with
notational extravagance, to any finite number of arguments. The notation [yj
reminds us that y corresponds to a universally quantified variable (y') in the
induction hypothesis; it is called a "sink" as any wavefronts which can be moved
to immediately around y, can be "soaked up" by suitable instantiation of y'.
The only way the induction hypothesis can be used is if it can be made to
unify with the induction conclusion, strong fertilisation in ClAM terms. Cur¬
rently, the wavefront prevents this. There are two ways of rectifying this,
2. transversely rippling the conclusion sideways to b VyP[x,
y can be introduced as a free variable, and y' chosen as c"(y), provided all
the term occurrences in the conclusion which match y' are the same. Then
the hypothesis matches the conclusion.
In principle some combination of the two types of rippling may be required to
achieve even one of these overall effects. For example both longitudinal and
transverse rippling may be required to move a wave front sideways onto a sink.
Indeed some combination of these two effects may occur, and one wave front
219
may move onto a sink, while another emerges from the original term. It can also
happen that c' or c" is null.
If the application of wave rules fails to achieve either of these two situations,
the conclusion is strictly more complex than the one we started with, since it
is the one we started with, with a wavefront inserted. So any subsequent proof
attempt is likely to be at a disadvantage.
The only exception to this is if the effect of subsequent inductions is to
combine with this failed attempt to create a complex induction scheme which
was not part of our repertoire, but was needed at some rippling point in the
expression. Perhaps an induction over more than one variable, or an n-step
induction that had not been anticipated by the recursion analysis. By looking
at the point at which rippling is blocked, we can often tell if that's the case,
by seeing if there are any wave rules which could be enabled. Otherwise this
induction has made the theorem more complex, and was therefore probably
unwise. Abandoning it in favour of an alternative induction or generalising the
theorem could enable a successful proof which uses the induction hypothesis.
9.4.3 Using Induction Hypotheses Which Can Be Used
For Rewriting
With induction hypothesis rewriting available, the situation becomes more com¬
plicated, as more options, weak fertilisations, become available in addition to
those in the non-rewriting case. Equality is the obvious example of this, and
arises in most of our proofs. An induction step of the form
Vy'.L[x,y'] = R[x,y'] h Vy.L[ k(x) , [y\] = R[ k(x) , [yj]
may only ripple far enough to enable the use of the induction hypothesis, (with¬
out loss of generality on the left), to permit a rewriting:
-it
\/y'.L[x,y'} = R[x,y'] b Vy. kl{L[x, [yj]) = R k(x) ,[yj]
the rewriting makes the conclusion into
bVy PjR[x, [yj]) R H*) ,Lj/J]
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If we rewrite as justified by one side alone, does this bring us closer to our
aim of simplifying the theorem to be proved?
I will return to the question of the use of the induction hypothesis in 9.4.6.
First, I shall examine how rippling can act to inform that discussion. Particularly
interesting are the instances in which cancellation becomes possible, i.e. reducing
the proof of the equality of two terms with identical dominant functor, to proofs
of the equality of corresponding arguments. This analysis is currently only partly
implemented in ClAM.
There are six possible schematic combinations1 of rippling progress on the
two sides of the equality. Each side may become longitudinally or transversely
rippled, or it may be blocked. By longitudinally rippled or transversely rippled
I mean that one side of the equality in the hypothesis can completely match
some (sub) term of the conclusion with suitable choices of universally quantified
variables:
1. Vy ^{L[x, [yj]) = k2(R[x, [yj])
Both sides are longitudinally rippled. Provided that the functor structure
in A;1 and k2 dominating L[x, y] and R[x, y\ are (or can be made) the same,
say we have:
Vy k)(L[x, [yj],*:1) = k2f(R[x, [yj],fcg)
where k^ = k2, then cancellation can be used, and one of the subgoals is
just the induction hypothesis.
The other subgoals (fc1 = A:£) are the (hopefully) simpler task of showing
the equivalence of the rest of the two wavefronts. If there are multiple
occurrences of the induction and/or sinks present, this may not be trivial.
xIt is of course possible for there to be multiple wavefronts and have some of them
ripple longitudinally, and some transversely. I am not considering such complexities for
now.
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ClAM doesn't actually do this work to make wavefronts match. It leaves
the matched terms in place and lets subsequent proof clear the discrep¬
ancies, quite possibly through further inductions, which can be confused
by the continuing presence of the rewritten term. This is a common in¬
stance requiring Boyer and Moore style generalisation, and was part of the
motivation for their technique.
It may be that this wavefront matching cannot be achieved just through
cancellation, in which case the Boyer and Moore style generalisation would
be essential.
2. VyL[x, k3(y) ] = R[x, fc4(y) ]
Both sides are transversely rippled. If k3(y) and fc4(y) are identical, then
the induction hypothesis' universally quantified y variable can be instanti¬
ated to that value, and we have a hypothesis identical to the conclusion.
Otherwise, weak fertilisation, i.e. rewriting using the hypothesis (left-to-
right, but the cases are symmetrical) makes this:
WyR[x, fc3([yj) ] = R[x, k4(y) ]
and cancellation (functional substitution) simplifies this to showing the
equivalence of the two wavefronts. The same comment applies as for the
previous case.
3. Vy ki(L[x, [yj]) = R kU) ,LyJ]
One side is longitudinally rippled and the other is blocked. On rewriting
the rippled side we get:
Vy ki{R[x, |yjl) = R kU) >LyJ]
No cancellation is enabled immediately. But by rippling the wavefront back
inwards on the left as far as possible, the outermost functor structure may
be restored, and the cancellation enabled. At least some of the original
term structure is removed, and the problem simplified.
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4. Vy.L[\k(x) , [yj] = R[x, k*(y) ]
One side is transversely rippled and the other is blocked. On rewriting the
rippled side we get:
Vy.L[ k(xj ,[y\} = L[x, k4([y\) }
Depending on how much the blocked side has rippled, some substitution
may or may not have been enabled. If not, this is exactly analogous to
the previous case, and we would expect to try to reverse the movement
of the wave front, and again ripple sideways, but backwards, to enable
cancellation.
5. Vy kx{L[x, [yj]) = R[x, k*([yJ)
One side is longitudinally rippled and the other is transversely rippled, so
we could rewrite either side:
• Rewriting the longitudinally rippled side gives:
Vy kl(R\x,[y\])=R[x, fc«([y]) ]
• Rewriting the transversely rippled side gives:
Vy k\L[x,[y\ 1) =L[x,k*([y\) }
Either way, cancellation is only going to be enabled by rippling k1 back in
and sideways towards the sink y, or by rippling kA up. If possible, these
are probably worthwhile steps and may allow us to reduce the problem by
cancellation. However, although some functions ripple both longitudinally
and transversely, many do not. It seems likely that in the first case we have
marooned a wavefront outside an essentially transverse system, and in the
second, marooned one inside an essentially longitudinal system, around an
argument position which was not part of the last induction, and so may
not be in a good position to ripple away. It is unlikely that cancellation
would be assisted in these circumstances, and they should be avoided.
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6. Vy.L[ k{z) , [yj] = R[ k(x) , [yj] Although k appears on both sides, it's
just there to indicate that rippling has failed to move the wavefront so
that either side of the conclusion can be rewritten by the corresponding
hypothesis expression. In practice both sides could have rippled partially,
but not enough to permit weak fertilisation, and then the two wavefronts
would be different. I shall show this more accurately below.
Both sides are blocked. No cancellation is possible. It might be possible,
in the case of a blocked ripple, to perform a tactic on the corresponding
side of the hypothesis to produce a formula which would justify a rewrite
of just the term which has been rippled past. This could be achieved by
successively applying to both sides of the equality a function which is the
inverse of the outermost function of a designated side. This can have the
effect of raising a subterm of one side of the equality until it becomes one
side of a new equality, thus "isolating" it.
Whether or not such isolation would aid cancellation would depend on
how deeply the blockage was nested. Take an extension of the schematic
example:
Vy'-Li[L2[x,y']\ = J2x[.R2[®,y']] h Vy.L^ kt(L2[x, [yj]) ] = i2x[ kr(R2[x, [yj])
If the hypothesis could be "isolated" to give
\/y'.L2[x,y'] = L\{Rl[R2[x,y']])
we could rewrite the conclusion to
Li\ kt(L[(JRi{R4x^]\)) ] = i?x[ kr(R2[x,y}) )
But the chances of simplifying this down seem slight.
Rippling should ideally proceed as far as possible, so that the rewrite replaces
as much of the original expression as possible. Currently weak fertilisation in
ClAM applies when a whole side of an equality can be matched.
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9.4.4 Assessing the Rippling Progress of Multiple Occur¬
rences of the Induction Variable
It should be clear from this account that the combinations of possibilities are
quite complicated, especially with multiple wavefronts. When reasoning about
them, with a view to deciding when, where and how to generalise, identifying
each occurrence of each variable separately is important so that it is possible to
track:
• the subexpressions which must be identical and should therefore be treated
alike. For example if we unfold the definition of multiplication to change
s(x) * y into [x * y) + y, we would want to know that the two y's are
necessarily the same. Then if one is later identified, the other is too.
• the wavefronts, knowing which variable they originate from. This has
two uses. If we decide that two variable instances are identical, then we
know their corresponding wavefronts must be too. Conversely, if we find
two wavefronts which are identical and have reached the same stage (e.g.
rippled out), we may infer that the variable instances from which they
originated are identical.
9.4.5 Induction Variables and Induction Schemes
Choosing an induction involves choosing a variable(s) on which induction is to
be performed and an induction scheme. Schemes describe sets of base and step
cases which must be proved to justify an overall proposition. The arrangement
of base and step cases is itself the subject of proof that the cases they cover span
the domain type of the variable they relate to. The proof will involve showing
that the order in which the step cases traverse the domain is a well-ordering, so
that the cases described do indeed step across the entire domain from the base
case starting point (s).
We are familiar with some standard induction schemes - successor induction,
list induction, course-of-values, etc. but there are infinitely many. Other schemes
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are built from these. One way this may happen is explicitly and separately.
Proofs of the validity of such composite schemes may be stored as lemmas.
An alternative way in which complex inductions can be achieved indirectly is
through multiple inductions within a single proof, producing a composite induc¬
tion across the whole proof. This has the advantages that the composite is built
on demand, out of established schemes, and it needs no special proof of itself as
a valid separate induction scheme. So when we do multiple inductions within a
proof, they serve to create the combination of cases and induction hypotheses
dynamically which could otherwise be reached through the definition of a fresh
scheme. We can see this with the scheme for the even predicate, which steps
in twos. If it is not available, two steps of successor induction achieve the same
end.
So there is a significant relationship between the combination of inductions
which take place in a proof, and the induction schemes available for proof con¬
struction. If composite induction schemes are explicitly available, a compact
proof can result, using a smaller number of more powerful composite induction
schemes. If composite induction schemes are not explicitly available, proof will
have to resort to achieving their effects by combinations of weaker inductions,
and the total number of inductions will be greater.
It is interesting to note that if a theorem as it stands is provable without
generalisation, we never need to do more than one induction, provided we use a
sufficiently powerful scheme. Clearly, we need to be able to create some subtle
induction schemes. However if our range of available schemes is very broad, it
is reasonable to use this information to suggest how many inductions should be
required.
Since ClAM can create n-step inductions on demand, but has no facility for
inductions based on more than one variable, it seems reasonable to assume as a
heuristic that for a theorem provable without generalisation:
We should not need more inductions in any proof branch before
some term cancellation is achieved, than the number of universally
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quantified variables present in the original problem. Those inductions
should each act on variables which have not previously taken part in
an induction.
Conversely, if we find that we are disobeying this heuristic, it suggests a
reason to look for an alternative induction or try to generalise.
9.4.6 Effects of Using the Induction Hypothesis
How can we assess a use of an induction? We need to tell whether it brings us
closer to completion, by ending or simplifying proof branches.
After longitudinal or transverse rippling, using the induction hypothesis, and
cancelling, if the proof branch has not been completed, we face another proof
subgoal. This may or may not still contain the induction variable or its deriva¬
tives (head, tail, predecessor etc.). We must then contemplate another induction
proof. The next induction may be on a different variable from the set of variables
present at the start of the problem. Alternatively, it may use a variable which
has already taken part in an induction in order to create compositely an induc¬
tion scheme not built into the system. In the latter case, the previous choice of
induction scheme is called into question, as earlier discussion suggested. Since
we have techniques for creating n-step inductions, the latter case should not be
necessary, or at least we should be able to tell from the nature of the blockage
that this is required.
The only inference rules which can complete the proof of an equality are the
existence of an identical hypothesis, or the use of the reflexivity equality ax¬
ioms. Functional substitution (cancellation) reduces the problem, by recursively
demanding the equality of corresponding arguments.
If cancellation actually clears away terms corresponding to the pre-induction
theorem, then, intuitively, a significant reduction of the problem has occurred.
Other inferences such as rewriting and induction can only contribute to a situa¬
tion in which one of these happens.
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Successful longitudinal and transverse rippling create term structures which
allow the induction hypothesis to be used to contribute to such simplifications.
This all suggests that an induction has proved worthwhile if it has achieved
one of:
• a conclusion which is identical to the induction hypothesis;
• a conclusion true by the reflexivity of =;
• cancellation of at least some of the original term structure;
• a situation where subsequent induction on a different variable (from the
set of variables originally present) leads to one of the above.
If this finite2 process doesn't happen, induction isn't working, and generali¬
sation should be explored to set up an induction which will work. The process
should be guided by the failures of current inductions, and judged successful if
it enables an induction which is worthwhile in the terms set out above.
9.5 Generalisation Guided by MO2
Having addressed the problem of choosing when to generalise in section 9.4, in
this section I shall investigate the questions of how to characterise a speculative
generalisation in a flexible, expressive manner, and where to generalise, i.e. what
terms to attempt to generalise.
I shall look at how induction can be patched first, and then see whether the
kinds of unifications between induction hypothesis and conclusion ensuing will
serve as justifications. Achieving unifiability will require computation in some
cases, as noted in chapter 2. The need for justifiability is a useful restriction on
speculations.
2Since there are only a finite number of variables in the original problem.
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9.5.1 Patching Inductions
If we are to use generalisation to fix faltering inductions, we wish it to somehow
clear up these errant wavefronts which are impeding matches with the hypothesis.
There are a number of ways this can be achieved; we can either dispose of the
wavefront or help it on its way.
We can describe each of these fixes speculatively in the same manner, as
outlined at the beginning of this chapter:
• XuXv.u
Fi(t,a) = t, no generalisation.
• XuXv.v
Fi(t,a) = a, generalisation of this term to the new variable. It is thus
distinguished, and may become the induction variable or a sink (or accu¬
mulator), as required.
• XuXv.f(u,v)
Fi(t, a) = /(£, a), where f is some constant function symbol, or composition
of such symbols. This permits the insertion of a sink (or accumulator) as
in (9.6) of figure 9.1.
The higher-order unification required to identify the Ft- is described in chapter 4,
restricted as indicated earlier in this chapter. The F{ are function meta-variables.
To use MOR to describe a generalisation of the existing formula, we intro¬
duce a single new variable, a, say, to act as a sink or as an induction variable as
required. Also, for each blockage point, where a wavefront has failed to ripple
either into a sink or upwards out of the term, we introduce a separate func¬
tion meta-variable F, linking the new sink/induction variable to the blockage,
i.e. a subterm, t, of the original will be replaced by F,(f, a) in the speculative
generalisation. Placement of these meta-variable functions will be guided by a
blocked proof, as I shall explain. Each inserted function meta-variable should
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come between the blockage and wherever it is headed, i.e. around an outward
bound wavefront, but inside an inward bound one, so it can create a sink.
Is this representation adequate to express any generalisation we might need to
let an induction make progress at simplifying the theorem? For the generalisation
of types 9.4-9.6 in figure 9.1 I believe so, for the following reasons. Our induction
schemes currently apply to a single variable at a time. Therefore, this scheme
should only need to create one new variable to be the induction variable. Might
we need multiple different accumulators, as opposed to multiple copies of the
same one? This is harder to say, but intuitively seems unlikely, since all the new
variables introduced are universally quantified in the new theorem. If we are
assuming single variable induction, then as the wavefronts are moved, we would
then have to split them to make this necessary. That might have to be radically
revised if we were wishing to use a tuple accumulator to amass multiple results
from a function. Be that as it may, it works for a good range of problems.
Therefore, for a generalisation to enable an induction, the form of speculation
permitted by the flexible meta-term I have described is adequate, unless the
induction scheme is defined over more than one variable, in which case, I would
need to have as many new variables as induction variables.
After inserting our speculation, we look to the proof process to guide us. The
possibilities are:
• look at where the blockage occurs, and "get rid" of the whole term at that
point, by turning it into a new, universally quantified variable. An example
of when this is needed is for generalising:
VyVz. rev(t) <> (y <> z) = (rev(t) <> y) <> z
h VyVz. (rev[t)<>h::nil) <> (y <> z)
( (rev(t) <> h::nil) <> y) <> z
This problem, which is handled by the kind of generalisation Boyer &:
Moore do, where multiplying occurring terms are generalised to new vari¬
ables. The speculation would be:
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VyVzVa. iri(reu(t),a) <> (y <> z) —
{Fi{rev{t),a) <> y) <> z
h VyVzVa. (Fx( (rev(t) <> h::nil) ),a) <> (y <> z) =
(F2( (rev(t) <> h::nil) ,a) <> y) <> z
where both F\ and F2 will become instantiated to XuXv.v. The amenable
generalised theorem is
VyVzVa. a <> (y <> z) = (a <> y) <> z
• get rid of a subterm of the blockage, by the same means. This could be just
the variable occurrence that originated the blocked ripple. Here is such a
problem just after induction:
t <> (t <> t) = (t <> t) <> t
b h :: t AV h :: t AV h ::t
= ( h :: t <> h ::t )<> h ::t
This is the kind of problem which is solved by Aubin's technique of gener¬
alising variables apart. Here is a speculation which could achieve that:
Va. t <> (Fs(t,a) <> Fi(t, a)) = (t <> Fb(t,a)) <> F6(t,a)
f,a) <>F4(h Va. t <> (F3(
(t <> F5{
h :: t h :: t
h :: t 5 a)) <> Fe{ h ::t
,*)) =
,a)
Only the occurrences which originate a blockage have been speculatively
generalised. All the i<i turn out to be XuXv.v. The generalised theorem is
VxVa. x <> (a <> a) = (x <> a) <> a
• provide a sink, and redirect the wavefront into it. This is needed for the
theorem which states that if you single step rotate a list as many times as




t~ rotate( s(len(t)) h :: t ) = h ::t
A suitable speculation is:
Va. rotate(len(t), F7(t,a)) = Fg(t, a)
s(/en(t)) .*V( h :: t £II h :: t ,a)
where F7 is AuAv.u <> v and Fg is XuXv.v <> u
The generalised theorem is
Vl\/a.rotate(len(l),l <> a) = a <> I
similarly, we might expect to be able to clear some longitudinal ripple's
upward path using the same mechanism. The effect would be to substitute
a nicer function or composition of functions, but the justification aspect
would be harder. We'd have to show that Vx3y.old(x) = new(y), a non-
trivial proof in itself. Since it is hard to see when this will be appropriate,
I am not going to attempt this possibility.
A constraint becomes apparent. There is only a single new universally quan¬
tified variable, which appears in the same position in hypothesis and conclusion.
The hypothesis copy may be instantiated to a different value from the conclusion
one (as accumulators regularly are, as in tail-recursive synthesis). The hypoth¬
esis copy of this single new variable can only be instantiated once, to a single,
common value. So once that value has been established, any speculation not con¬
sistent with it is pointless. This means that our new variable may only serve one
purpose. We cannot simultaneously accommodate, say, transverse rippling onto
an accumulator and turning a copy of a multiply-occurring variable into a sim¬
ple non-induction variable. For example, take x * x * x, and consider speculating
about it as
Va. .Fi(x, a) * F2(x, a) * Fs(x,a)




Fs as XuXv.u + v
could not succeed, as there would be no consistent instantiation of the hypothesis
copy of the new variable - one requiring it to also be a, the other requiring it to be
a term strictly containing a. I shall refer to this requirement that the induction
hypothesis be instantiable for the conclusion as the rewritability constraint.
It is important to note that these F's are meta-variables, not pure higher-
order variables. Their identification is a matter for meta-level reasoning. As was
the case for the instantiation solutions, restrictions like temporal scoping may
be needed for the logic. Additionally, we may use knowledge about the proof to
guide the instantiation process.
This technique is sufficiently expressive to cover most first-order generalisa¬
tions. It is still further restricted, as I expect each F to be identified by matching
with a single rewrite rule. Progressive matching first by one rule, leaving a par¬
tially instantiated function, and then by others until a whole match is achieved
is difficult to control, and I do not attempt it.
9.5.2 Ensuring Justifiability
When will new formulae, adjusted by the effects of meta-functions, justify the
originals? Schematically, we start with some
P[...,7i[z],...,T,[x],...]
where T,-[x] and Tj[x] are some distinguished subterms which will be considered
for generalisation. The speculated generalisation is then
Va.P[...,P,(T,[x], a),..., F^x],a),...]
The justification proof would be of
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Va.P[..., Fi(Ti[x], a),Fj-(Ty[x], a),...]
h p[...,rt-[x],...,r.,-[x],...]
Each Fi(Ti[x], a) could be:
• a projection onto its first argument. This restores the term structure,
unchanged at that point, so justifiability is not an issue in relation to it.
• a projection onto its second argument, which is used as a non-induction
variable or a new induction variable. Since the second argument is a new
variable, universally quantified in the hypothesis, that can be instantiated
to anything of the appropriate type, and justification is easy. However,
since all the instances of a must be the same, this affects its use in the
other generalisation speculations. There are two cases:
— All the relevant T,-[x] are equal. If they are not identical, computa¬
tion must take place to make them so for instantiation to take place.
Detecting and reconciling non-identical equalities is non-trivial. For
heuristic purposes, we would almost certainly have to restrict this to
use of existing lemmas.
— They are not equal. The generalisation is wrong.
• Fi could be a function such that the wavefront can be rippled onto a acting
as an accumulator. In this case we need there to be a single b such that for
all the function meta-variables in a particular generalisation Vx.P,(x, 6) =
x, and then we know that this can be used to justify the original. The
rewritability constraint can be seen to apply. This usage is incompatible
with other usages of a in other function meta-variables, e.g. to define a
new induction variable.
The order of the quantifiers is usually unproblematic since ClAM tries to re¬
order a sequence of universal quantifiers if it wants a later one at the front as
the induction variable. This is usually possible for the kinds of re-ordering we
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would want to make. It is not possible, for example, if it involves switching the
quantification of a variable and the quantification of its type, i.e. we cannot
switch the order of the following: Vr : U Vx : r ...
From considering the requirement that the generalised theorem justify the
original, we have another constraint on the generalisation. Since the new vari¬
able is used in the induction proof and will be instantiated to make an instance
of the original formula, it must stand for the same term throughout, assuming
justification will eventually take the form of instantiation. This is the justifica¬
tion constraint, another requirement relating to the new variable. Its demands
sometimes subsume those of the rewritability constraint. It means, for example,
that a commitment to generalising an unrewritten copy of a variable to a new
variable is incompatible with use of accumulators. It is also incompatible with
using the same new variable for generalising away a term which becomes blocked
after any rippling has taken place, since the justification instantiation for that
would be a strict superterm of the earlier one.
9.5.3 Controlling the Search for a Generalisation
Having selected a reason to generalise and a means of expressing a speculative
generalisation, I must still have a way of picking the terms to mark out for
potential generalisation.
There are various ways this could be done, the main choice is whether to
start from where the blockage is manifested, or its originating variable. Either
way, backtracking towards the other may be required, to consider generalising,
respectively, smaller or larger terms. A further choice is whether to include all
terms arising from copies of the induction variable in the speculation, or just the
ones leading to blockages.
One solution is to start from the origins of the blockages, and see how their
progress affects the proof. Backtracking in this case would be to progressively
larger formulae.
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Alternatively, I could look at the terms at which the blockage occurs and wrap
the speculation around them in the original theorem, backtracking if necessary
to subformulae. This could be a gross change to the formula, and runs a higher
risk of generalisation to a non-theorem, which could be difficult to detect. It is
attractive because it makes immediate use of the information about failure. It
is important to avoid any implicit assumption that the original induction choice
was correct. This may not be so, we may be trying to transfer the induction to
the new variable.
Another approach would be to view the process as proof transformation
rather than theorem transformation. Speculations would be introduced to progress
the proof and then propagated back to the theorem. On failure, backtracking
would roll the proof back and try a transformation at a previous stage. This
would tend to follow the path of patching at the point of blockage, because each
backtrack to a subterm would correspond to rolling the proof back to previous
stages. An implicit assumption with this is that any wavefront which has ap¬
parently rippled out or into a sink is uncontroversial. This may not be so. A
difficulty with this approach is that starting at the blockage can leave the new
variable a long way from the origin it will have to propagate back to. A further
problem is caused by having to decide which failed proof attempt to use for
guidance. Fortunately there is little or no search with proof plans that succeed,
so taking the first failure as initial guidance is reasonable. Inevitably there are
almost always more failure states than starting states, as branching can occur
after each step.
Since proof-patching motivates this technique for generalisation, and since
starting from the original formula with guidance as to the origin of the blockages
involves so many cases potentially, I have a system which selects terms at which
blockage occurs in the first instance.
It is notable that this concentrates the generalisation on patching a particular
proof attempt, when there may have been several proof attempts, by different
uses of available lemmas. An aspect not dealt with here is the choice of which
failed proof attempt to try and fix, if there is a choice from more than one.
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The nature of the proof so far will also determine the type of generalisation
attempted.
9.6 Implementation of MOR, Generalisation
I have adapted the ClAM.vl.5 system so that it uses MOR to generalise theo¬
rems. My current implementation is lacking in some of the grander heuristics I
described earlier to detect when induction was failing across nested inductions.
It does, however, detect when proof attempts following a single induction fail to
achieve fertilisation, and then tries to patch these by generalisation.
9.6.1 Deciding to Attempt Generalisation
The system takes failure to achieve strong fertilisation as an indication that
induction might be improved. At that point, the failed proof is used to attempt
to find a generalisation which will lead to either to strong fertilisation or to weak-
fertilisation and cancellation. If generalisation fails, the theorem prover will
continue without MO R, attempting to find a less successful weak fertilisation. If
there is still no success, another attempt at MO R will try to find a generalisation
which will lead to weak fertilisation.
This strategy of detecting failures and appealing to MOR to attempt gen¬
eralisation are implemented adapting ClAM's overall induction strategy super-
method. The standard version ripples wavefronts out as far as possible, or into
sinks, and then tries to fertilise, preferring strong fertilisation. The MO R system
splits that standard version into two attempts. The first of these tries to achieve
strong fertilisation or weak fertilisation with cancellation, as described above.
The second only tries for the less successful kinds of fertilisation. They appear
in ClAM's list of methods in that order, so that the stronger one will be tried
first.
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Immediately after each of the two versions (in ClAM's list of methods) comes
its generalisation counterpart, which aims to complete the same proof stages
as the corresponding induction strategy (induction, base cases, rippling, fertil¬
isation etc.) but applied to a generalisation of the original. The counterpart
also deals with a subproof justifying the original from the generalisation. The
generalising supermethod has no immediate access to the failed proof attempt,
but can reproduce it, by applying the same component methods to a step case
up to the fertilisation stage. This provides the guidance for a speculation rou¬
tine, which is described in the next section. The generalisation strategy, having
picked a speculation, will pursue it through the rest of the standard strategy,
using versions of the standard methods adapted for MO2.
There is some minor strategic adaptation here, so that deepest wavefronts are
attempted first. This is to enable wavefronts requiring common generalisation to
interact. Search is further controlled by having MO2 select outward longitudinal
rippling in preference to transverse rippling, and transverse rippling to inward
longitudinal rippling which in turn is preferred to projection. This will become
clearer from the description of speculation, and the example in the rotate proof,
described later.
Failure results in backtracking to attempt a different speculation selection.
Failure of all the speculations resulting from this failed proof results in back¬
tracking to attempt speculation from a version of the failed proof at an earlier
proof stage, i.e. with fewer ripples.
9.6.2 Speculating about a Generalisation
Choosing speculations is driven by a need to make the changes where they are
needed, not just a scattergun approach of changing everything in sight. The
following analysis prefers not to try to change subterms, which although they
may be blocked, may be perfectly alright in themselves, and only need something
else to be generalised, i.e. they need a sink, or the other side of an equality to
ripple successfully and enable cancellation.
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Here is the algorithm for speculation for the system I have built.
1. Identify all the blockage points in the conclusion of the given failed proof.
2. Sort them, deepest first. There is no unique solution to this, but any which
do fall below others can be considered earlier. The reason for doing this is
so that speculations inspired by different blocked wavefronts may require
a speculation to take place at a common place. This makes it easier to
co-ordinate their sharing of a single speculation. Work on outward-bound
wavefronts before inward-bound ones.
For each blockage, check the following possibilities, and store all the rele¬
vant speculations in this order of preference:
• Is the blockage adjacent to an equality? Such wavefronts may need
no speculation, they may only need the other side of the equality
to ripple accordingly. This gives us the option of not wasting effort
on speculating about something which is not actually failing. The
"speculation" is to leave the term unchanged.
• Could this blockage be removed if a sink were available in another
subterm position? I.e. is there a wave rule which would apply if a sink
were available? If so, note the speculation which would potentially
insert such a sink in the relevant position.
• The last alternative, which always applies, is to speculate at the block¬
age point. This may lead to the speculation function being a projec¬
tion onto one of its arguments, or something which enables longitu¬
dinal rippling. Strictly, this case subsumes the first one.
Select one of the suggested speculations and apply it to hypotheses and
conclusion of the blocked sequent. Backtracking may return for an alter¬
native.
The following three sections discuss and demonstrate the MOR approach's
working on some examples.
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9.7 Generalising Variables Apart Using MOJZ
Here is an example of a theorem which is easy to prove if some of the variables
are generalised apart.
Vx.x + (x + x) = (x + x) + x
I shall assume that the only available wave rule is the step case of the defini¬
tion of +:
a(u) + v s(u_+_v)
9.7.1 What Goes Wrong?
Although the theorem is "simpler" than the general version, the induction is
made difficult by the occurrences of the variable in positions which can't be
affected by wave rules:
x+ (x + x) = (x + x) + x
h s(x) + ( s(x) + s(x) ) = ( s(x) + s(x) ) + s(x)
The usual ripples apply:
x + (x + x) = (x + x) + x
h
but neither side of this matches the induction hypothesis. We also get an extra
ripple:
x + (x -I- x) = (x + x) + x
b
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but that doesn't help.
This attempt at induction can be seen to have failed because it doesn't even
get as far as fertilisation, there is no other variable to do an induction on, and
there are no rippling rules which might apply to the blockages, and thus act in
concert to create a better induction scheme.
9.7.2 A Solution
The solution is to differentiate between the x's and generalise the theorem to
Vx, Vy.x + (y + y) — (x + y) + y
then the induction goes through:
Vy.x + (y + y) = (x + y) + y)
bVy. g(x+ (y + y)) = s((x + y)+y)
The tricky bit, of course, is working out how to choose the x's and y's. It
now becomes clearer why Aubin's technique of defining primary recursion paths
was sometimes effective. It was because this identified those occurrences which
were likely to ripple outwards, since each ripple would produce a new term in the
correct argument position for a further ripple. His analysis had two deficiencies:
• The new term might be needed in a position for which no definitional
rule was available, consequently his algorithm would have no reason to
generalise it.
• Wave rules in Aubin's terms were only recursive definitions. Although
my only wave rule here is just a recursive definition, in principle I could
have some which weren't.
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Using Rippling and MOZ
By labelling each variable and each wavefront by the occurrence of the variable
it originated from, we can distinguish the individual ones and analyse their
behaviour:
xi + (x2 + x3) = (z4 + xB) + x6
h s(xi) + ( S(X2) + 5(xs) = ( 5(14) ^ ) + s(xg) J1 " v> n. r> lb
the ripples can now be distinguished, this becomes:
Xi + (x2 + 2:3) = (au + £5) + x6
h
Everything is longitudinal in this problem.
Informally, the lack of available ripples suggests that the third, fifth and sixth
occurrences of x are non-induction variables. The first, second and fourth occur¬
rences of x are possible induction candidates. The first and fourth occurrences
ripple out completely, making them strong induction candidates. In terms of the
analysis of induction hypothesis usage, longitudinal rippling can occur on both
sides. There is no reason to look to replace the first and fourth occurrences as
induction candidates. Our use of the speculation function will only be to find a
way of generalising the rest of the term structure to make the current induction
successful.
Inserting the speculative meta-functions turns this into:
Va.X! + F2((x2 + Fs(x3, a)), a) = (x4 + F5(x5,a)) + F6(x6,a)
h Va. s(xi + F2( s(x2 + Fs{ s[xs)
s((x4 + E5( s(xb) ,a)) + Fe(s(xe) ,«))
~x> —lb
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Looking at each of the outstanding wavefronts:
5 There is nothing that F& could be instantiated to, apart from XuXv.v which
will remove its blockage. We note that this will require the instantiation of
a to x in the justification branch of the proof. The rewritability constraint
means that such a generalisation is only compatible with other generalisa¬
tions of i to a.
6 The identical argument holds for F6, and its instantiation for a is consistent.
3 A similar argument holds for F3, and its instantiation for a is consistent
with those above, but it is complicated by being inside wavefront 2.
2 The term containing F'2 and F3 is nested. According to the selection of
F2, F3 may be irrelevant. There is no wave rule which could be made to
ripple wavefront 2, so an alternative is to eliminate it by choosing F2 to be
XuXv.v, too. However, the justification branch instantiation is then x + x
for a. This is incompatible with the F5 and Fe generalisations.
The left-hand side of this equation can be made rewritable by using the last of
these options, but it is then impossible to fix the right-hand side. The right-hand
side can be made rewritable by using the first two of these options in tandem.
Although this is inconsistent with the current version of adjusting the left-hand
side, we can move back to the earlier, unrippled failed proof attempt. Exploring
this latter course is preferable to soldiering on with a solution which can only be
partial. We examine:
Va.x1 -I- F2 ((x2 + ^3(^3, a)), a) = (x4 + a) + a
I- Va."
2
s(^i) + (^2 ( 5(®2) ,a) + F3( s(xs) ,a)) = (s(x4) + a) + a)
8 a
F2 denotes the version of F2 at the previous, unrewritten stage. It is immedi¬
ately apparent that the left-hand-side can be totally unblocked by making both
F2~ and F3 XuXv.v. The outermost wavefronts are identical, and cancellation is
enabled - our criteria are satisfied.
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Trying this technique on more challenging problems like Vx.x * (x + x) =
(x * x) + (x * x) shows up how difficult it is to tell when proofs are failing.
Currently, I have some heuristics for this but they need refinement.
9.8 Generalisation by Adding Accumulators
In this example, we need to generalise to insert sinks, and to make the right-
hand side work transversely, like the left. It is interesting in that a variety
of longitudinal and transverse rippling has to take place, and the speculation
functions involved take different values here, unlike in previous examples.
Vl.rotate(len(l),l) =1
The typing of / as a list is elided. This is an example of a theorem which can
be proved by adding an accumulator, and so generalised to:
b V/Vp. rotate(len(l),l <> p) = p <> I
where rotate and len are defined as
I ^ nil —> rotate(s(n),l) = rotate(n,cdr(l) <> (car(/) :: nil))
rotate(s(n),nil) = nil
rotate(0,l) = I
len(h :: t) = s(len(t))
len(nil) = 0
car and cdr are just functions returning the head and tail of a list, respec¬
tively, and <> is the append function:
nil <> I = I (9.2)
(h ::<)<>/ = h :: (t <> I) (9.3)
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9.8.1 What Goes Wrong?
List induction in the step case gives us an induction hypothesis:
rotate(len(t),t) = t
and the goal of proving:
and again the only possible transverse ripple produces:
k
b rotate(len(t) »\L <> (h :: nil) |) = \h :: t
(9.4)
(9.5)
It is worth noting that ClAM would not currently permit this ripple, in the
absence of a sink to ripple into. 9.5 is clearly not going to match the induction
hypothesis on the left of the equality. Weak fertilisation is available on the right
hand side:
b rotate(len(t), t<> (h :: nil) ) = h :: rotate[len(t),t) (9.6)
but then we're stuck, and no cancellation is possible. The rippling on the left
is blocked. The right hand side of the equality has rippled longitudinally but
only transverse rippling is available on the left hand side, so there is a mismatch
which my earlier analysis would reject. As I described in section 9.4, attempting
weak fertilisation when one side of the equality is operating transversely, but the
other is longitudinal is unlikely to lead to success in the form of a simpler goal
to prove.
9.8.2 A Solution
This can be fixed by a generalisation of the original proof. We prove
V/Vp. rotate(len(l),l Op) — p <> I (9.7)
Here's a proof of the step case:
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Vp. rotate(len[t),t <> p) = p <> t
(- Vp. rotate(len( h :: t ), ( h :: t ) <> LpJ) = LpJ <> (1^:: t\)
As a universally quantified variable in the hypothesis, p is a potential sink.
Assuming the wave rules in Table 9-1, two longitudinal ripples, Ll and L2,
make the conclusion:
b Vp. rotate{ s(len(t)) , \h :: {t <> LpJ) |) = [pj <> (\h :: t\ )
then, by T5, the definition of rotate, a transverse wave rule (the condition is
trivial),
h Vp. rotate(len[t), (t <> [pj) <> h :: nil ) = [pj <> { h :: t )
The final step needed on the left-hand side is to ripple the wavefront into the
target, using the associativity of <> as a wave rule downwards:
b Vp. rotate(len(t),t <> ( [p <> (h :: nil) ) = LpJ <> ( h :: t )
And on the right hand side, using Tl:
Now we can introduce p and fertilise with the induction hypothesis.
9.8.3 on the Generalised Theorem
I shall return to the stage of the theorem where ClAM fails. Both sides of (9.4) are
effectively blocked. The right hand side appears to ripple, but since its direction
is mismatched against the left's, we don't accept it. We could be looking for
an entirely new induction by generalising a term to a new variable or perhaps a
patching of the existing proof.
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len(\H :: T )
( H :: T)




X <> ( Y_ <> Z )
s(len{T))
H :: (T <> L)
X <> (Y <> Z)





L<> (H ::T ) (L <> LT :: nil) <> T
{X<>H::nil) <>Y -> X <> ( H :: Y_ )
([x <> y | ) <> z
x <> (i y <> zh
X <> ( Y <> Z_ )





L ± nil —>■ rotatei s(N) I ,L) —>• rotate(N, cdr(L) <> (car(L) :: nil) ) T5
Labels for longitudinal rules begin with L, and those for transverse rules with T.
Table 9—1: Wave rules used in the rotate — length theorem
Using the same strategy as before, we fit the blockages with speculation
functions. Here the blockage is a longitudinally rising wavefront stuck inside
a transverse function. We must either dispose of the wavefront or enable the
transverse ripple to proceed by providing a sink. This could not suggest an
alternative induction. Speculative insertion at earlier stages could, theoretically.
A question that arises here is the type of a. We would like the requirements
of rippling to constrain that3. Unfortunately, Huet's algorithm cannot proceed
without knowing the type in advance. Currently I guess this by choosing the
predominant type of the formula, that of the equality itself.
We are now attempting to ripple transversely on both sides of the equality.
Since the right-hand side is apparently rippled out, the first attempt would be
to try:
Va'. rotate(len(t), F(t, a1)) — t
h Va. rotate{len[t), F{t_, [aj) <> (h :: nil) ) = h :: t
3David Pym's unification algorithm or similar should be used for this, because Huet's
needs to know the types.
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No speculation can turn this into something which achieves strong fertilisation.
That could only happen if rotate were defined longitudinally.
Backtracking finds another speculation:
Va'. rotate(len(t), Fi(t, a')) = F2(t,a')
b \/a. rotate( s(len(t)) ,FX{ h :: t , [aj)) = F2(h::t , [a\)
On the right-hand side, use of any longitudinal rule to instantiate F2 will fail
to reach strong fertilisation, for the same reason that not not generalising at all
failed. However, wave rule T1 matches, instantiating F2 to XuXv.v <> u. This
will require a' to be a <> (h :: nil). No other transverse wave rule matches,
because no other transverse rule has the :: constructor as the main functor of
the wavefront.
On the left-hand side, there are two blocked wavefronts. Taking the deepest
one, in the second argument position of rotate, we seek a longitudinal wave rule.
Ll is not applicable because the result must be a list. L2 is the only other
available longitudinal rule. Fi is instantiated to XuXv.u <> v:
Va'. rotate{len[t),t <> a') = a' <> t
I- Va. rotate( s{len[t)) , h :: t <> |_aj ) = a <> h :: nil <> t
Now, the last blocked wavefront is tried, and the definition of rotate applies:
Va'. rotate[len[t),t <> a') = a' <> t
b Va. rotate(len{t), t <> [aj <> h :: nil ) = a <> h :: nil <> t
lastly longitudinal rippling in downwards using L4 backwards (there is no alter¬
native) moves the lingering wavefront down into the sink.
Va'. rotate{len[t),t <> a') = a' <> t
b Va. rotate(len{t),t <> a <> h :: nil ) = a <> h :: nil <> t
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9.9 Generalisation of Terms
The major example used in Boyer &: Moore's book [Boyer &; Moore 79] is
VxVy. rev(rev(x) <> y :: nil) = y :: rev(rev(x))
where all functions are as specified before, and rev is defined as
rev (nil) = nil
rev(h :: t) — rev(t) <> (h :: nil)
ClAM would use the definition to add to the wave rules in table 9-1, and I
shall assume also the wave rules arising from the lemma relating rev and <>:
Recursion analysis would suggest induction on x, and the step case of the
induction would look like this:
Vy. rev(rev(t) <> y :: nil) = y :: rev(rev(t))
b Vy. rev(rev( h :: t ) <> [yj " nil) = [yj " rev(rev(\h :: t ))
unfolding the definition of reverse makes this
Vy. rev(rev(t) <> y :: nil) = y :: rev(rev(t))
|yj :: nil) =
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A transverse ripple is available on the left hand side to get the wavefront
towards the y :: nil term. Generalisation might provide both sides with a new
target.
Vy. rev(rev(t) <> y :: nil) = y :: rev(rev(t))
The proof is stuck. Boyer & Moore's solution would generalise both reu(x)'s
in the original theorem to a new variable, which would clear the blockage.
9.9.1 MOR on the Generalised Theorem
Attempt 1
Speculatively generalising produces:
VyVa. rev(rev(t) <> Fi(y :: nil,a)) = y :: rev[F2(rev[t),a))
On the left, we might think that Fi projecting onto its second argument could
provide a list accumulator as opposed to a number accumulator, and requiring
i<2 to provide a transverse ripple on the right. But the justification constraint
demands an a* such that
Vz.Fi(z,a*) = z = F2(z,a*)
So this kind of projection is impossible. Rippling is not available on the left. We
must revert to an earlier proof stage.
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Attempt 2a
We undo the last rewrite, (in the sense of keeping the number of rewrites on any
term shortest) and try again:
VyVa. rev(F{~(rev(t), (aj) <> |_yj - nil) = [yj :: rev(F2(rev(t), [aj))
No longitudinal rippling is available on the left.
Both Fi could be XuXv.u <> v, and we ripple the wavefronts sideways onto
a new accumulator using T2. The instantiated, rippled proof would be:
VyVa. rev((rev(t) <> a) <> y :: nil) = y :: rev(rev(t) <> a)
There is now no trouble in strong fertilising and cancelling this. Interestingly, it
is not the solution Boyer & Moore find.
Attempt 2b
Looking again at the meta-level version of the sequent that started Attempt
2a:
VyVa. rev{Fi(rev(t), (aj) <> [yj :: nil) = [yj :: rev(F2(rev(t), (aj))
The generalisation Boyer & Moore reach would be produced if both Ft project
onto their second arguments, as new induction variables, and we propose a new
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theorem. The justification constraint is satisfied, since a stands for the same
term in each case. The generalisation proposed is:
VyVa.rev(a <> y :: nil) = y :: rev(a)
9.10 Conclusion
By taking failure of fertilisation (to either apply or to lead to cancellation of
some of the original term structure) as a signal that an induction on the cur¬
rent theorem is inappropriate, we can choose to apply generalisation techniques
precisely to address induction's problem. In order to detect this, we must work
with supermethods, as freestanding components would be unable to monitor the
history of the proof so far.
Using the existing induction strategy as guidance, a theorem can be coerced
into a generalisation which effects some useful reduction on the theorem.
The following points form the basis of the algorithm:
1. Attempt generalisation when there is no available sequence of inductions
which will lead to cancellation.
2. Analyse the combination of longitudinal and transverse rippling. This must
include the progress in the proof so far, the dominant functors on either
side of an equality, and the wave rules which might apply immediately
beyond a blockage.
3. Interpose speculation meta-functions as described around the blocked terms,
in such a way as to enable either the blocked ripple, or remove the block¬
age. Maintain a list of their justification constraints, and note whether
alternatives might be available at an earlier proof stage.
4. If a new variable is inserted which is not fulfilling the role of a sink, re¬
submit the problem to recursion analysis, in case the new variable should
take over as induction variable.
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5. For each possible generalisation, according to the list of constraints, exam¬
ine whether it will lead to a fertilisation and cancellation.
6. For each possible generalisation, examine whether it will justify the original
theorem.
7. On backtracking to earlier proof states, undo first those rewrites which
occurred on the longest rewrite path, since that should maximise the chance
of keeping parallel terms in synchrony.
The analysis makes explicit constraints which are implicit in other generali¬
sation systems, and uses them for meta-level reasoning. They are
• the number of new variables required to achieve a proof
• the requirements of the justification proof
• the requirements for enabling a sufficient match with the hypothesis to
enable a rewriting.
In this chapter, I have explained how generalisation works and why it is often
closely linked with induction proofs. This analysis of the connections between
generalisation and induction is the basis for the technique I describe of using
failed induction proofs to guide generalisation attempts. The technique relies
heavily on existing accounts of "successful" induction proofs. MOR is used to
guide choices of speculations in order to find such a successful solution. This
approach takes in a number of different "types" of generalisation, some of which
can be handled by existing techniques, but deals with them all within a single
framework. It is effective for problems such as the rotate-length one described
above, which other systems cannot manage, and where quite complex generali¬
sations are required, based on a detailed analysis of the proof process.
Further types of generalisation, such as the generalisation of constants to
variables should fit into an extension of this analysis.
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Chapter 10
Comparison with Related Work -
Generalisation
Some comparisons of MOZ with related work on generalisation have been noted
in passing in the previous chapter. Comparison will be drawn together and
considered more systematically in this short chapter.
10.1 Generalising Terms to Variables
Boyer &; Moore's type of generalisation takes selected repeated terms and gener¬
alises them to new variables. It is noteworthy that the motivation they give for
performing this generalisation is close to that driving the MOZ generalisation,
it is an aid to making future induction work.
Boyer & Moore regard generalisation as tidying up after a previous induction
to clear the way for subsequent inductions. Their view is that an induction may
leave extraneous term structure around which has fulfilled its function. This
may seem odd, but it arises quite naturally after weak fertilisation. Recalling my
analysis in section 9.4, consider an example of an equality proof where one side
ripples completely, permitting weak fertilisation, but the other side is blocked.
Schematically, it will be something like this:
L1(L2(x))=R(X)
254
I- Li(|ki(L2{x)) ) = kr(R(x))
After weak fertilisation the conclusion is:
Lx{kt{U{x)) ) = kriL^Ltix)))
We now have two identical L2(x) terms. L2(x) is just the portion of the term
structure that the wavefront got through before it became blocked. As the
expression stands, further induction on x would have to repeat that rippling,
and would become blocked on the left-hand side, just as before. To avoid this,
Boyer &; Moore wish to generalise such terms to a new variable.
Achieving exactly such generalisation as I have just described is not straight¬
forward in a system without wavefront annotation. It is also hard in Boyer &;
Moore's system because the theorem-proving components (equivalent to CIAM's
methods) operate without communication or knowing quite how they are fitting
in with the effects of other components contributing to the current proof. Their
current "proof plan" information is embedded in the current state of the formula
and the knowledge of which "method" is currently being applied.
Accordingly, Boyer &; Moore have to take a roundabout route to find these
terms. Before trying to apply any induction, they have a generalisation compo¬
nent which looks for repeated terms which occur on either side of an equality or
in separate literals. This will find cases like the one I have described above, and
tidy up the theorem for the induction to follow. However, it is not triggered by
strong fertilisation failing.
The disadvantages of this are that their technique is not as closely tied to
its purpose as one would like, so it can easily be confused by multiply occurring
terms which have not arisen from a previous fertilisation, such as:
V/. I <> (/ <> /) = (/ <> /) <> I (10.1)
The dangers of false generalisations like this are considerable.
To avoid these unwise generalisations, their essential technique is hedged
about by special purpose generalisation lemmas and extra conditions. The lat-
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ter, listed in chapter 2, are to stop Boyer & Moore's system from generalising
constants, and to make restrictions on the type of the generalised expression.
The analysis above suggests that ClAM should attempt generalisation of the
terms corresponding to L2(x) after weak fertilisation, as part of the overall in¬
duction strategy. However, it is not enough to only consider such generalisation
after weak fertilisation, because such a subgoal may be proposed as a theorem
in its own right, and we need heuristics to be able to cope with it.
MOR generalisation returns to the original motivation for generalisation, of
enabling successful induction, and uses ClAM's tools to construct just such a
generalisation as will achieve a successful induction. It has both the wavefront
annotation and the control of linking methods into plans to help it do this.
In cases like the one described above, MOR generalisation will discover that
L2(x) is the term that needs to be generalised because rippling will be blocked
there. So it will propose generalisation of the term that lead to weak rather than
strong fertilisation taking place. So it ties in closely with the method which has
just preceded it, even if they are not explicitly linked in a supermethod. Given
any repeated terms which are obstructing the rippling of an induction step case,
the MOR technique will be able to propose generalising them. It will fail to find
some generalisations Boyer and Moore would find, if the term to be generalised
is not obstructing rippling, as in this case:
V/VmVn. / <> (m <> reverse(n)) = (/ <> m) <> reverse(n)
However, this theorem can be proved without generalisation by both ClAM and
Boyer &: Moore's system.
MOR generalisation will not propose all the generalisations that Boyer &
Moore's heuristic would, because it is more conservative in the sense that it will
not propose repeated terms unless they are obstructing rippling. So given 10.1
it will not propose a generalisation to the non-theorem:
V/Va. I <> a = a <> I
Instead it will find a solution in which the first occurrence of / on each side is
distinguished.
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10.1.1 Generalising Variables Apart
Generalising variables apart is a type of problem addressed by Raymond Aubin.
Again, his system looks at the current formula to be proved, rather than the
whole proof process. His system operated along the same lines as the Boyer &;
Moore theorem prover. In his case, however, there is a more explicit attempt to
anticipate the subsequent proof.
Recognising that fertilisation was the key to success in induction, Aubin noted
that the means of achieving it lay in having sequences of rewrites which would
take the extra term structure introduced by induction (the wavefront in ClAM
terminology, although Aubin had no wavefront notation), and move it upwards
in the term, leaving a copy of the original for fertilisation. In ClAM's terms,
this is rippling out. His system had only recursive function definitions to act as
rewrite rules, not ClAM's more general notion of wave rules. Therefore, it was
possible to analyse the formula from the top, and see the routes through it where
there was the potential to move a wavefront all the way from the bottom up.
For example, in:
Vx. /[l](/[l,l](x),/[1,2](x)) = /[2](/[2,1](x),/[2,2](z))
if we assume that all /,• are defined on their first argument position, then there are
only rewrite rules to move wavefronts occurring in the positions [1,1,1] and [2,1,1].
These were called primary recursion paths. The rewriting of any wavefronts
occurring in non-primary recursive positions would become blocked.
This recursion path analysis was used to suggest generalising occurrences of
the induction variable which were not on primary recursion paths, to some new
non-induction variable which would not get in the way. The above would become
VxVy. /[l](/[l,l](x),/[lf2](y)) = /[2](/[8,l](®),/[2.2](y))
In practice, this characterisation was too rigid. In the case of the distribu-
tivity of multiplication over addition, a purely primary recursion path analysis
would suggest generalising:
Vx. X * (x + x) = (x * x) + (x * x)
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to the non-theorem
VxVy. x * (y + y) = (x * y) + (y * y)
assuming * and + are recursively defined on their first arguments.
Consequently, Aubin extended his algorithm in two ways. Firstly, he added
a module to try out some real values in the proposed generalisation, so that
non-theorems could be rejected. Secondly, he allowed other permutations of
the partitioning of the occurrences of the induction variable into induction and
non-induction occurrences. Preference was given, not only to the occurrences on
primary recursion paths, but if necessary to occurrences in a recursion argument,
but not on a primary recursion path.
Aubin's technique amounts to a kind of speculation which tries out the values
most likely to succeed. His analysis looks forward to the subsequent proof stages
more than Boyer and Moore's.
In ClAM's terms, Aubin's approach finds the positions amenable to wave
rules, casts them all as candidates for induction. Failure results in broadening
the net, guided by some of trial and error. The notion of a primary recursion
path was effectively an attempt at a heuristic which would stand a good chance
of producing successful ripples.
Here again, making induction succeed is the motivation and the guide for gen¬
eralisation. In this case analysis of the subsequent proof is used more directly
to suggest suitable generalisations. Again, however, generalisation is a prepro¬
cessing step applied in order to make an induction succeed, not one applied in
response to a failure to achieve fertilisation.
MO 2 generalisation is similarly motivated to Aubin's technique. It wishes
to make a subsequent induction work, and takes advantage of an analysis of
recursion to do so. The differences are:
• MO2 generalisation is initiated in response to induction failing to lead to
fertilisation. Aubin's like Boyer Si Moore's, is a preprocessing step. It tries
to generalise whether it needs to or not.
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• The M0 R approach is guided by a failed proof attempt, it does not analyse
all the route ahead, as Aubin does.
• The analyses which lead to the proposals as to which terms should be gen¬
eralised have similar origins, but different results, as I have described, since
the .MO £/ClAM system must handle a wider notion of rippling. MO R will
try to generalise whatever obstructs rippling, not just repeated terms, as
Aubin does. The result of MOR generalisation may insert sinks, since the
analytical tools are available to do this, not just distinguishing induction
and non-induction variables.
• Rather than explicitly computing the course of a future proof, as Aubin
tries to do, MOR can embark on a proof and make a generalisation to fit
in with proof requirements. In this respect, MOR is dynamically guided
by being embedded in a proof plan supermethod. This gives the proof
attempt an overall structure, but adapts to each stage of the proof.
• The MOR approach can take failure information from other sources -
namely failure of a base case and continued failure to achieve fertilisa¬
tion. The latter may be used to reject speculated generalisations until a
generalisation is found which enables fertilisation.
10.2 Generalising Constants to Variables
Aubin had a further generalisation technique intended to generalise constants to
variables, as described in 2.3.3. He used this in cases dealing with transversely
defined functions, like the tail-recursive reverse in chapter 7. Suppose we have
such a tail-recursive reverse, reverse(r, and a naive reverse, reverse, and we wish
to prove
I- V/. reversetr(l,nil) = reverse(l)
After induction, the step case is
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reversetr{t,nil) — reverse(t)
,nil) = reverse(b reversetr( h :: t h :: t )
Ignoring ClAM's insistence on the existence of sinks before transverse rippling,
This evaluates to
reversetr(t,nil) — reverse(t)
b reversetr(t, h :: nil ) = append(reverse(t), h :: nil)
The left-hand side is blocked. Weak fertilisation on the right makes this
reversetr(t, nil) = reverse(t)
b reversetr(t, h :: nil ) = append(reversetr(t,nil), h :: nil)
This is badly stuck. The theorem can be proved by generalising it to
b V/Va. reversetr(l, a) = append[reverse[l), a)
Here, the nil on the left has been replaced by an accumulator, which has also
been added on the right.
In theorems stated with a constant in that accumulator position, the proof
may be hard to achieve unless that the constant is generalised to a variable,
otherwise fertilisation is obstructed. The MOZ approach should be able to do
this kind of generalisation too, but I haven't yet tried such an example. I believe
it would find the generalisation proposed above.
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10.3 Conclusion
Aubin's and Boyer & Moore's approaches always took multiple occurrences of
the same term, and generalised them to a new variable. This meant that they
had no possibility of generating a proposal which was not a generalisation of the
original. In the MO R system, the generalisations proposed may be more subtle,
and justification becomes an explicit issue. However, since it is also an explicit
proof branch, unlike in the Boyer &; Moore system, failure to achieve justification
will cause backtracking to attempt an alternative generalisation.
The danger of the MOR approach leading to non-theorems is less than that
in the Boyer &; Moore case, but perhaps a little more than in Aubin's case.
The extra protection of trying out some values cannot be denied. However,
my analysis of successful induction in chapter 9 shows that there are numerous
mechanisms for detecting failure, and therefore rejecting generalisations. I have
demonstrated the effectiveness of this in my examples.
The MOR approach to generalisation can be seen to be well-motivated and
subsume existing approaches to generalisation in the context of induction proofs.
As I have shown in chapter 9, it covers examples these existing approaches cannot
attempt, such as the rotate-length theorem. In summary, the reasons for this
are:
• It is explicitly guided by a failed proof,
• It has the ClAM tools enabling characterisation of wavefronts, sinks and
transverse movement, and
• Instead of being restricted to replacing repeated terms by a new variable,
it can add sinks linked to the existing term structure by different functions.
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Chapter 11
Conclusions and Further Work
11.1 Conclusions
This thesis examines and demonstrates the technique of MOZ in the context of
two classes of problem. In each of them it successfully expresses and develops
the speculation one might expect of a human. This speculation is inspired by
knowledge about proof structures, and afterwards constrained by other such
knowledge, until a solution is reached. These two stages, of speculating and
resolving the speculation require careful co-ordination.
The work on tail-recursive optimisation successfully exploits the proofs-as-
programs paradigm to gain and harness new insights into tail-recursion. System¬
atically viewing generalisation as an aid to inductive theorem proving enables a
number of forms of generalisation to be dealt with uniformly.
There is a valuable interplay between the automation and proof structure
design. In order to use MOZ at all, one must be very specific about exactly
what role it is to play. Using a sensitive tool for exploring proofs, requiring fine
control, has enabled us to make our planning more precise, so this work has
contributed to our growing understanding of how proof works.
In this chapter I shall draw conclusions about
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• the value and role of MOZ,
• contributions to tail-recursive optimisation,
• contributions to generalisation,
• psychological validity.
Lastly, I will describe further work which could be undertaken.
11.1.1 MOR and Meta-Level Reasoning
MOZ is used here specifically as an adjunct to meta-level reasoning, and can be
seen to be effective precisely because the object/meta-level separation permits
reasoning about the object level, and the postponement of object level constraints.
It seems similar to Prolog-style backwards reasoning with variables becoming
instantiated as required. Superficially, that was almost certainly the technique's
inspiration. It would be wrong to view MOZ as a sequent calculus equivalent of
Prolog. There is a significant qualitative difference in having an explicit meta-
level. Prolog-style backwards reasoning alone could only offer limited MOZ, not
just because it is first-order, but because it is only object level. The additional
use of meta-level control is a key factor in the success of MOZ.
It is not surprising that this powerful technique requires considerable control.
The key has been seen to be detailed analysis of proof structures, and the ability
to describe components in such a way as to permit their flexible, goal-directed
assembly, guided by knowledge of the theory. It has enabled a clear step in the
direction of making plans and proof structure take over from logical syntax as
the driver of proof production.




It is clear that the meta-variables used for MO R. are subject to more constraints
than ordinary variables of the relevant type would be. They are different from
simply using higher-order object-variables. These constraints are:
• Temporal scoping - knowledge about which variables only came into ex¬
istence after whatever the value of the meta-variable is, and could not,
therefore, be part of its definition,
• The purpose for which the variables were created. By insisting that they
fulfill certain roles in strategies, we restrict the unifications we attempt to
suit.
Unification alone is not enough to identify their values. Either the unifications
chosen must be very carefully structured so as not to allow evasion of these
constraints, or filtering must be performed to enforce them.
Inhibiting Multiple MO R.
Once MOR is being attempted, and meta-variables have been introduced, all
other methods must take account of that.
From the meta-level control point of view, rampant speculation is a hard
thing to tame. Humans usually restrain themselves unless they're very confident
of what they're doing. Looking at "The Big Picture" takes considerable depth
and breadth of understanding. Our level of control of proofs is not yet up to
managing extensive simultaneous speculation involving meta-variables.
Further, at the level of intricacy which would be involved, our higher-order
unification tools can't cope. Higher-order unification will not retrieve us from
a large-scale lack of precision involving many variables. Applied to terms con¬
taining multiple meta-variables in contiguous positions, it produces numerous
flexible answers, which offer us little information. Indeed they can lead to an ex¬
plosion of variables and unwanted speculation. That is why I make such efforts in
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both ofmy problem areas to pin down the use of speculation and meta-variables
very closely.
These problems are really two sides of the same coin.
The straightforward solution, which I have taken, is to insist that any method
which would introduce meta-variables instigated by a new speculation should be
inhibited from doing so if any meta-variables are already present. This kind
of self-consciousness may seem rigid, but it amounts to insisting on only one
speculation at a time. In 11.2.2 I sketch out a problem which would require
multiple speculation.
Method and Supermethod
Methods designed to deal with a particular situation have the advantage of in¬
dependent self-contained operation, mediated by their pre- and post-conditions.
This works well for problems where the various stages are reasonably self-
contained, or order of application is unimportant. In practice, even for its sepa¬
rate methods, ClAM conveys meta-level information from one method to another
by embedding control information (wavefronts) in the object-level expression.
The same free-standingness may also be a disadvantage. Methods may be
isolated and too general purpose to play a role required in a proof strategy. It is
only within the context of a particular speculation that one knows what to expect
or reject according to its needs. One may need to carry meta-knowledge about
purpose across individual methods. A "supermethod" embodying an strategy
constructed from ordinary methods and perhaps employing some specially writ¬
ten ones may be necessary. This is especially true of MOZ, where we expect to
know what kind of operations will provide the identity of the meta-variable.
The danger is that a method will apply to a meta-variable inappropriately,
and apparent success will take the system down a blind alley. The errors here are
of commission more than omission, although both are search problems. This is a
problem wherever the existential method might apply, particularly. As it simply
inserts a meta-variable for an existentially quantified variable, many symbolic
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evaluation and tautology results supply possible values immediately, without
giving a general strategy a chance to apply.
If, on the other hand, all the general purpose methods intended to function
free-standing on a wide range of problems are adapted for particular ones, they
will be made too specific and then not apply when they should more generally.
Propagation of Reasoning
One of the design decisions made in this implementation of MOR was to im¬
plement meta-variables as Prolog variables, for the purpose of propagating their
values, and to give us easy access to first-order unification when that was appro¬
priate. Mostly, Prolog's unification was intercepted and replaced by higher-order
unification under the control of .M0£. The choice of Prolog variables was nat¬
ural in a Prolog setting. It ensured that any discoveries relating to the identity
of the variable object were automatically propagated by Prolog's instantiation.
There was no need to exchange new information for tokens throughout in all
copies of the representation actively. The linguistic consequences of this decision
are addressed below.
This confirms our intention that the speculative phase of MOZ be a combi¬
nation of instantiation and the creation of subgoals for any object-level require¬
ments as they became manifest. The discovery phase was then achieved through
proof, and its findings propagated consistently throughout, as they were found.
No mechanism was established for storing other requirements of the meta¬
variable's value. As anticipated this was not required, being handled by the
means already described and embedded in the meta-level proof structure knowl¬
edge.
Representation and Language
The object-level language available for describing the problem will affect any
use of MGR. It is necessary to reach an accommodation between the object
language, the meta-level language and the implementation language.
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To reason middle-out, we start with the object level language, and extend
it by allowing meta-variables. This will inevitably break the grammar rules of
that language, which enforce constructs that may well be the ones we wish to
reason about. Exactly how they do this will influence the ease of adaptation
of the representation. Meta-level languages are commonly more loosely defined
and extensible, but assumptions may be built into them implicitly, in choices
of representation. The underlying implementation language may have its own
requirements as well.
An example is the Oyster system's notation for the application of a function,
/, to an argument, a, is / of a. For those of us used to other styles, there is syn¬
tactic sugar to permit the / (a) formulation. As Oyster is a higher-order system,
/ may legitimately be a variable, provided that it is appropriately typed and
quantified. In either of these formulations, although illegal under the grammar
of Martin-Lof Type Theory, it is perfectly possible to replace / by an untyped
unquantified meta-variable, F, at the meta-level. However, as the system is built
on Prolog, which is first-order, using the Prolog term structure to represent the
term F(a) would produce syntax errors, if Prolog variables were used to repre¬
sent meta-variables. The basic Oyster f of a representation was easy to adapt,
and had no inadvertent interaction with the Prolog's term structure.
One of the original motivations for building ClAM was not just as a planning
system, but as a way of avoiding some of the details of the object level until they
proved necessary for a proof whose major components had been established. It
was a tool for meta-level reasoning. Consequently, it was expressly designed to
omit certain linguistic requirements of any underlying logic. Unfortunately some
first-order assumptions were implicitly built in by using Prolog's term structure.
So here, we have relatively little difficulty in extending the underlying object
level language, but are somewhat impeded by the meta-level language's assump¬
tions.
267
Implementation Issues and Interface with Higher-Order Unification
Subsystem
In spite of using Prolog variables for meta-variables in C1AM, the higher-order
unification subsystem uses ground objects to represent higher-order variables,
and assumed terms which were /?— and r/—normal formed, and for which the
type of all symbols was known. An interface was built to effect all this, and
then instantiate the Prolog meta-variables when appropriate. This meant that
the higher-order system could be kept localised, and the advantages of Prolog's
backtracking and instantiation propagation could be used.
This could deviate from ClAM's choice of search strategy, in that the unifica¬
tion subsystem presented a list of alternative solutions from which choices were
made one at a time, and backtracked over, essentially depth-first. To observe
the search strategy would have meant drawing on this list of possibilities in the
same manner as the current strategy, a desirable, but not particularly easy thing
to do. As it would have made little difference to the information resulting from
the experiment, no effort was made to implement this.
Normalisation
Types of normalisation arose from two sources. Huet's algorithm assumes ex¬
pressions in /?— and r\— normal form. Oyster permits a syntactic sugar for
application of a function to arguments which actually corresponds to an un¬
derlying representation of curried expressions or compound products. Both of
these entail pre-processing steps for the interface into the unification subsystem.
There is no great difficulty in achieving this.
The use of rewrite rules may result in the "output" of MOR. being normalised.
When this is put in a conclusion, for example, problems can appear if other ex¬
pressions, such as a corresponding induction hypothesis, have not been similarly
normalised. It may become difficult to see matches which were implicitly kept in
step before. So these normalisations must be applied to all expressions involved
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in matching. If other expressions, such as a corresponding induction hypothesis
have not been similarly normalised, ordinary first-order unification may now fail.
This means that the use of the higher-order unifiability algorithm is neces¬
sarily pervasive through the system. Once its use has been initiated in relation
to any particular data structure, it must be used from then onwards.
Types
The implementation of Huet's unifiability algorithm is now available as the basis
for future work. It would be useful to extend it to deal with types more flexibly,
for example as David Pym describes in his thesis [Pym 90]. He shows how
one can start with variables whose types are also variable, and unification can
instantiate the types as necessary. My implementation is currently very reliant
on being able to guess the types of all the entities in a formula in advance of
any unification, a hard task. Operation with variable types would be a helpful
enhancement, allowing some of the guessing to happen at easier times. It would
be a more natural way of reasoning middle-out, and would actually be essential
to allow fuller MOR, as described below.
Failing that, an improved type-guessing algorithm should be produced. Mine
is already far more adventurous than ClAM's, variously exploring terms top down
and bottom up until it pieces together all the information without leaving any
variable holes.
Search Control and Meta-Level Reasoning
Although conventional search control techniques were used, they were not al¬
ways adequate to the purpose and the fit was sometimes contrived. In order
to ensure that ClM/l was always working on the next goal which was likely to
prove informative, it became necessary to switch the order in which some of its
methods produced subgoals, to place the informative ones first. This was an
easy substitute for a more subtle and elaborate search control mechanism which
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could have selected a subgoal according to some heuristic criterion. This is a
complex problem to which I shall return in section 11.2, on further work.
11.1.2 Contribution to Tail-Recursive Optimisation
Central to this part of the research was the description of the necessary proof
structure for tail-recursion to obtain in the functional extract term. Stan Wainer
is to be thanked for his account of this. This characterisation of tail-recursive
optimisation by the way the induction hypothesis was used provided a struc¬
ture within which speculation could take place and be resolved. Importantly,
it defined a purpose, a general goal to which efforts could be directed, unlike
the static templates used elsewhere, or emulated indirectly procedurally. Tail-
recursiveness was inherent to this proof structure, not an ancillary fact to be
proved. Likewise, justification of the equivalence of the new program to its spec¬
ification was a companion proof branch which only needed to be proved for the
choices made in the individual example, not for a whole template. Depending on
which lemmas were made available to the system, different proofs and therefore
different programs could ensue.
The original theorem acted purely as a specification of the program. It was
not used as an object to be transformed.
The middle-out system was able to synthesise tail-recursive versions of several
standard naively defined functions: reverse, length, times, greatest and total.
Additionally, it worked on two examples, each of which could elude some existing
technique:
• Summation. The functional sigmaO was defined as the summation of a




Since this involves a functional, it would not be admissible in Huet and
Lang's second-order system. Although summation from 0 seems restricted,
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it allows the functional to be total, and defined using one of Oyster's basic
types.
• Integer Half. This was defined using recursion stepping two-at-a-time, as




This function would evade Darlington's F-matching because the step case
requires matching a single template variable to a composite function
An.s(s(n))
11.1.3 Contribution to Generalisation
By using the production of an inductive proof as motivation and guide for gen¬
eralisation it has been possible to develop a single unified approach to deal with
various generalisation problems previously treated separately or not at all.
The resulting generalisations are minimal, but this is an advantage when
safeguarding against over-generalisation. The generalisation from
Vx.x + (x + x) — (x + x) + x
will be found as
VxVy.x + (y + y) = (x + y) + y
not
VxVyVz.x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z
but I know of no theorem prover that can find this last generalisation in a
principled way, i.e. other than with just trial and error.
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Analysis of successful proof structures again provided the key to this task.
It suggested that tracking individual sources of failure could suggest locations
for potential generalisation, to eliminate or fix these obstacles. The precise
generalisation needed would be discovered by the requirements of proof. Failed
proof attempts provided initial information for the process. At 0 2 was then used
to insert meta-variables permitting speculation at the points of previous failure.
Further MO 2 in the context of a subsequent proof attempt instantiated them
to identify the actual generalisation needed for success.
As for the tail-recursive optimisation problems, this necessitated a detailed
analysis of what constitutes "success" in inductive theorem proving, what forms
impediments take, and how known generalisations remedy them.
It was surprising to find that the additions needed for the generalisation and
its discovery could be restricted so compactly, normally to a single new variable
and a functional meta-variable for each errant wavefront.
11.1.4 Psychological Modelling
One of the claims I made in my introduction for this technique was that of
some psychological validity. In the light of the descriptions in this thesis, that
should now be assessed. Psychological studies of the acquisition and practice of
mathematical skills in humans propose that key abilities are those of classification
and abstraction of structure. Using MO2 for mathematics uses the same kinds
of underlying mechanism - classes and structures - for the same sorts of purpose,
in the same way that reports of mathematicians suggest they do - hypothesising
guided by structures.
Using Classes
Piaget argues that one of the early abstract abilities children acquire is that of
being able to recognise a class of entities [Piaget 52]. They learn to distinguish
kinds of things - cups, balls, spoons, cuddles etc. This is first manifested by ob¬
servation and manipulation of physical objects. It is further evinced by creation
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of such objects, literally or in drawings. Children may use their classifications
to request an object of the class, and accept what they are given according as
whether it fits the purpose.
Class is a fundamental logical-mathematical concept and leads to the refine¬
ment of types of comparison:
Is this a member of a class C, or is it not?
Is this set of members of class C here bigger than that one there?
Is this set of members of class C here bigger than that one of class V
there?
The notion of class precedes those of quantity and number. This account is taken
from Howard Gardner's book on theories of multiple intelligences [Gardner 84].
Gardner argues that hypothesising is an advanced activity, and symbolic reason¬
ing comes much later, if at all.
As mathematicians, and creators of artificial mathematicians, we recognise
classes of proofs, and identify classes of inference pattern which go into the
making of proofs. We categorise the classes of objects involved. We build precise
and powerful descriptions of these classes.
Having described mathematical classes, mathematicians can reason in terms
of them, hypothesise about their members, determine whether given objects fall
into certain classes, and sometimes even generate objects of a particular class.
The technique of MO2 corresponds closely to these abilities. It hypothesises
new variables to fulfill the roles such as that of an accumulator, or a function
which will enable an accumulator to be used. In doing so, it uses knowledge
about the existence of such classes of object.
Mathematicians also study all these classes' relationships to each other. The
relationships between classes form structures, which are the subject of the next
part of my argument.
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Using Structures
The other essential component of MOR is its use of recognised structures for
guidance. On this, Gardner cites the thoughts of Henri Poincare, a famous
mathematician from the 19th century, on the importance of structure, won¬
dering: " why, if mathematics only involves the rules of logic, ... anyone should
have difficulty in understanding mathematics?". Poincare distinguished between
prodigious memory and reasoning, believing that structured reasoning was the
core mathematician's ability. He wrote (my emphasis):
"A mathematical demonstration is not simply a single juxtaposition
of syllogisms, it is syllogisms placed in a certain order, and the order
in which these elements are placed is much more important than the
elements themselves. If I have the feeling, the intuition, so to speak,
of this order, so as to perceive at a glance the reasoning as a whole, I
need no longer fear lest I forget one of the elements, for each of them
will take its allotted place in the array, and that without any effort
of memory on my part."
This approaches a description of MOR. A later quotation about mathematicians
is evocative, they "are guided by intuition and, at the first stroke, make quick,
but sometimes precarious conquests, like bold cavalry men of the advance guard".
The value of structures is respected in other psychological literature, too.
In "The Psychology of Learning Mathematics" [Skemp 71], Skemp places great
emphasis on the schema - "the general psychological term for a mental struc¬
ture". A schema "integrates existing knowledge, and it is a mental tool for the
acquisition of new knowledge". He describes striking results from experiments
to compare rote learning and schematic learning, in which students were able
to recall twice as much schematically learnt material as rote learnt. Four weeks
later, the ratio had changed to 8:1. This evidence from learning confirms the
importance of structures, although clearly the reasons for their power in learning
are not the same as for use.
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When it comes to using structures, Gardner relates studies of mathemati¬
cians' introspections about finding successful solutions to problems (my empha¬
sis):
"Sometimes the intuition comes through first, and then one must
actually make efforts to work through the details of the solution; at
other times, the careful execution of the steps actually suggests the
solution; less frequently, intuition and discipline arrive at the same
time or work in concert."
These processes and styles of activity correspond very strongly to those which
compose MOZ.
MOZ is an interplay of structure, speculation and discovery. Structural
knowledge guides our decision to speculate and our choice of speculation to at¬
tempt. Further structural knowledge guides us in discovery, as when we use
wavefront markers to align the portions of expressions to be matched, and select
specific methods to effect proof. Discovery of values which confirm the appropri-
acy of a speculation affirms our selection of a suitable structure for a problem.
The nature of the co-operation of human and machine is still heavily human-
controlled in the systems described in this research. The human recognises struc¬
ture and gives it to the machine. Eventually more of the recognition and its
representation may be automated too.
Role of Heuristics
Schoenfeld sets heuristics in a larger context which explains more about useful
roles for them, and hence suggests different uses of MOZ [Schoenfeld 85]. An
admirer of Polya's work, he warns that attempts to teach his heuristic approach
have not succeeded in the wider sense. Although Polya's descriptions strike
a chord with many successful mathematicians, teaching them to students only
seems to improve their performance on problems similar to the ones they learnt
on, and couched in language which is suggestive of an appropriate technique.
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He attributes this to the broadness of Polya's heuristics and difficulties in
controlling their use. A typical failing is that people often set out along the wrong
track altogether, attempting the wrong technique for the problem. They stumble
in the initial stage of translating from the problem to mathematical model. By
constructing an ill-chosen model, they are led to unsuitable techniques.
Schoenfeld's analysis of the knowledge and behaviour necessary for charac¬
terising mathematical problem-solving performance has four components:
• Resources. Mathematical knowledge possessed by the individual.
• Heuristics. Strategies and techniques for making progress on unfamiliar
or nonstandard problem.
• Control. Global decisions regarding the selection and implementation of
resources and strategies.
• Belief Systems. One's "mathematical world view" about self, the envi¬
ronment, the topic and mathematics.
In terms of this analysis, the Edinburgh mathematical reasoning group's
work has concentrated on the heuristic level. MOR relies on working within
a particular heuristic, using its structure and supplying detailed information on
the use of resources. Although we would like to use it to select between heuristics,
by indicating whether or not they apply, that is difficult when a reason for failure
may be just lack of information at that point.
Given the great need for structure in directing MOR, I believe it will be
a long time before major progress is made on using MOR at what Schoenfeld




I view my implementation as a pilot study, an experiment with MOR. Sim¬
plifying assumptions made to explore the overall idea need to be revised and
consolidated into robust long-term versions. With this in mind, there are a
number of implementation and interface details which I would improve if MOR
were to become a regular feature. Some of these have already been noted in
section 11.1, especially improved handling of types.
Tail-Recursive Optimisation
The wave method I built to incorporate meta-variables assumes that there is
a single wavefront in the conclusion. This avoids the problem of working out
which wavefront in the target expression corresponds to which one in the rule.
In all the problems attempted so far, this assumption is valid. Accommodating
more wavefronts should be a minor task, especially now that ClAM has more
machinery for handling complex wavefront patterns.
My supermethod for tail-recursive optimisation uses a submethod called
ripple-over to perform a longitudinal ripple followed by a transverse one. The
former provides evidence the latter uses to identify the meta-variable. This is
purely an economy measure. For all the problems in my repertoire, it is exactly
what I need. Straightforward variations on this pattern will extend it to cover
most of the other transformation covered by Huet& Lang's templates (chapter
8). It will also suffice until using meta-variables is extended to permit their
identification through progressive unifications (described at the end of 11.2.2),
or control of rippling is made more subtle, as described next. In fact, the system
is capable of finding the informative step case part of all these proofs by the
iterative deepening planner, just using freestanding methods.
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In the justification branch of these proofs, where the generalised formula
is used to deduce the original and assure their equivalence, the accumulator
inserted must be given a base value. The situation I have in mind is the proof
branch starting as:
Vx'Vz'VaBy'.y' = g(f(x',z'),a)
H VxVzBy.y = f(x,z)
The proof proceeds by instantiating x' to x, and z' to z, but is then faced with
a decision for the value of a, the accumulator:
VaBy'.y' = g(f(x,z),a)
H By.y = f(x, z)
A value A must be chosen for a in such a way that the resulting value for y', can
be used for y. For this, we will need
g{f{x,z),A) = f(x,z)
and since this must be true for any values of x and z, we really need A such that
more generally:
Vv.y(v, A) — v
Currently, MO2 uses knowledge of available lemmas to select a suitable value
for A, as described in chapter 7. A reduction rule or base case is sought which
suggests a value immediately. In general some computation and proof might be
required to find a suitable value, requiring more extensive MO 2.
Enhanced Proof Structure Information
Newer versions of C1AM record more detailed information about the direction
of wavefronts and the positions of potential accumulators or sinks. They have
better routines for joining and splitting multiple wavefronts. Indeed since I froze
a version of ClAM to work on, the entire characterisation of wave rules has been
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refined and extended considerably. An obvious improvement on what I have
done would be to make use of this, and deal with conditional wave rules and the
presence of more than one wave (as in fibonacci, for example).
This would have implications for the choice of accumulator. Currently a
universally quantified variable is inserted deliberately to fulfill the function of
being an accumulator, and identified by name. In general, there might be other
universally quantified variables present which could perform that function. The
associated problems would be detecting that this might be possible and the se¬
lection of which universal variable to use. This does not mean that tail-recursive
optimisation is only ever needed for univariate functions. The other arguments
could be of the wrong type, they could be too bound up in the current defini¬
tion to admit another usage, or the available wave rules might not permit their
argument positions to be used.
Matching Abstracted Terms
As described in Chapter 4, in order to constrain the unification process and
ensure that the control information available from wavefronts is used, I apply
the unification algorithm on progressively larger terms, so that only matching is
used in the successful solution branch. Each of these larger terms includes the
previous ones.
This kind of idea is certainly needed, but could also have been achieved by
A-abstracting the entities to be unified and then unifying those abstractions. It
could be awkward to do in any non-trivial case, as I shall now show. Given a
conclusion which has already rippled longitudinally:
b VzVaBy.y = F( c'(f(x,z), x, z) , a)
and a wave rule:
9(\c'{U,V,W)Ia) -> g(u\c"{v,w,a)\)
Instead of matching progressively:
1. /(x, z) and U
2. c'(f(x,z),x,z) and c'(/(x, z), V, W) (U having been instantiated)
3. a and A
4. F(c'(f(x,z),x, z),a) and g(c'(f(x,z),V,W),a)
we would match
1. /(x, z) and U
2. At.c'(t,x,z) and At.c'(t,V,W) - abstracting over the hole;
3. a and A
4. Av.F(v,a) and Av.g[v,a) - abstracting over the wavefront.
This would be a partial improvement, but we would still need the filtering, to
stop a from being built into the identity of F. More advanced wave rule analysis
would be needed to see the possibility of A-abstraction over a as well, as a is
universally quantified. Then there would be no need for solution-filtering to
impose temporal scoping restrictions. In general, identifying the form of the
abstracted function is a non-trivial task in its own right.
Control of Unification
As I wrote in chapter 2, Miller's algorithm has some desirable properties, and
it would be interesting to see whether it could be used for all the tail-recursive
synthesis work, or whether some adaptation would be necessary. Miller notes
[Miller 90] that Huet's algorithm would also serve for his task " if ... [it] ... is
modified to handle a mixed quantifier prefix and to solve those flexible-flexible
equations". So it may well be that this problem is better approached from
the other direction, of modifying Huet's algorithm to achieve those desirable
properties, without making all the restrictions that Miller does.
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Other Recursive Types
The current system only works on lists and natural numbers. Extending it to
handle integers should be straightforward, and less similar types such as trees,
not very much harder. Much of the difficulty in proofs about other structural
types is in enhancing the type-guessing routines.
11.2.2 Next Steps for MO R
Tail-Recursive Optimisation
As I noted in subsection 11.1.2, the system can produce alternative programs
depending on the lemmas available to the system. Currently, it just picks the
first one that works. It would be entirely feasible to select amongst these and
choose "the best" of them, perhaps satisfying some other desirable property,
provided that we had a means of making such decisions.
What I have in mind is that at the moment, the system accepts any transverse
ripple which permits the induction hypothesis to be used without surrounding
it by function applications, i.e. without creating a stack. This does not discrim¬
inate between different uses of the accumulator. Poor choices here may mean
that the stacking has just been moved onto the accumulator. Take the following
versions of associativity of append (<>), which are transverse rules, but the
second is more specialised:
(11.1)
(11.2)
Each of these rules might apply to the conclusion:
b Va3y. y = (rev(t) <> (h :: nil)) <> [aj
Both would result in a program fragment which was officially tail-recursive. How¬
ever, the application of (11.2) would not build up a stack of functions to be
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executed, since :: is a constructor symbol. This is preferable, although either
version would be tail-recursive.
Ideally, using (11.1), we would look for another wave rule to ripple the wave-
front further in and produce the constructor function, so that after reaching
h Va3t/. y = rev(t) <>
the accumulating term would be simplified. The current version of ClAM now
does this automatically. Such simplification would be necessary even if the dom¬
inant functor were a constructor, since subterms might not be, and they might
yield to an appropriate sequence of ripples and simplifications. As there could
be alternative simplifications, what is "maximal" would have to be established.
Space would be saved, since each subsequent function call's description would
be compacted.
Chapter 7 has described structural relationships between transformation tem¬
plates and a rippling/fold-unfold approach to synthesising tail-recursive pro¬
grams. The MO Z system should be extended to cover the other patterns which
it does not presently address. This would necessitate extending the supermethod
which controls the proof structure.
More radically, we could try to get MOZ to find any proof which eventually
satisfied the proof-theoretic criterion for tail-recursiveness. This could require
control of more complex conditionals not built into induction schemes, more
elaborate rippling patterns, and perhaps use of properties such as commutativity,
which we have avoided.
A different tack would be to take the computation induction proofs used to
ensure equivalence in Huet and Lang's paper would admit MOZ themselves.
It might be interesting to explore the characterisation of those computation
induction proofs within ClAM as a general template finding system. This would
experiment with higher-order transformation templates in general.
(L(h :: nil) <> aj)
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Extending Structural Guidance for Tail Recursion
Peter's classic study of recursive functions [Peter 67] may provide further ideas
for proof structures. She shows how certain classes of recursively defined function
admit translations into equivalent primitive recursive forms. Some of her proofs
construct the transformed function from the original to a new function with the
desired form. Others, however, only use proof by contradiction to prove that
there must be such a form, using majorisation, so they will not readily lead to
the construction of a structure.
Other Program Optimisation Techniques
Other techniques exist which produce various kinds of economies in programs,
such as tupling [Feather 79]. Tupling has been described within the rippling
paradigm, and characterised through proof structures. It would be interesting
to take other such techniques and do likewise.
If this only led to their emulation, then we would still have extended our
system. If it led to a deeper understanding of these heuristics and perhaps their
extension, a significant gain would have been made. Some such techniques might
admit elements of MOR.
A result of characterising different types of optimisation within the same
framework would be that we would have to work out how to select or combine
when more than one was available. A goal of description within a common
framework would be the ability to analyse interactions. The proofs-as-programs
paradigm should provide a good basis for studying this problem, simultaneously
encompassing functional and proof-theoretic properties.
Other Current Work on Existentially Quantified Variables, Choosing
Inductions and Synthesis
The work reported here should be integrated with work on identifying existen¬
tially quantified variables and choosing inductions, currently underway in the
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mathematical reasoning group in the Department of Artificial Intelligence, Uni¬
versity of Edinburgh. In this, existentially quantified variables are viewed as
having potential wave structures within them since they may be dependent on
the induction variable. Here then, there is ample scope for MOR to identify
such variables progressively, as the proof demands. This may well happen at the
same time as trying to work out which induction to perform, as will be seen in
the example below.
Often these existentially quantified variables are used for specifications de¬
scribed in other ways than the style used in this work. A common approach
puts conditions on the existentially quantified variable, in the form of surround¬
ing predicates. By working through a sample proof, we can see how MO R could
contribute, and what the problems would be. I shall use capital letters to denote
meta-variables, as usual.
An example is the prime factorisation theorem, where we prove that any
positive integer x can be expressed as the product of a list of prime numbers, y:
MOR ties down the value of y to make the proof work, and finds a suitable
induction.
First, an induction, since there's nothing else. We leave variable the exact
induction scheme. Most guidance should be found in its step case or cases of the
form:
C is representing some arbitrary step case. We hope to select an induction by
MOR identifying a possible value. Note that for an induction with multiple step
cases, a more elaborate analysis would be needed, either of all the ways this
could be satisfied, or by accepting an induction scheme if only one of its step
cases was suggested.
Now we speculate about y. Note that although the meta-variable used for y
looks as if it will be a skolem function of x, that is misleading. Thinking about
Vx3y.product(y) = x (11.3)




the ensuing induction proof, we expect y to be a function of y', and dependence
on x to be introduced that way, through y"s dependence on x. So further MO2
would suggest that y should be regarded as F(y'), and that assumed for the
existential witness:
product(Y (y') )= C(x) (11.5)
This also ties the wavefronts together in an intuitively satisfying way.
In accordance with our knowledge of induction proofs, we expect to ripple
now. Let us assume the following wave rules:
In principle we would require a heuristic to decide which wavefront to work
on, left or right. We could try to decide which was most likely to be informative,
either by virtue of being most instantiated, or providing most information on
being attempted. ClAM is lacking in such heuristics at the moment. We could
probably decide that the left hand side of (11.5) is most instantiated.
In this case only the first of the two wave rules above could be applied. Using
the definition of product, and instantiating T(y') as Fi(y') :: F2(y'), this can be
rippled:
Yi(y') x product(Y2(y')) (11.6)
Now a simple MO2 would identify C by seeing that the wavefronts can be
rippled past the equality, the second wave rule above, if C(x) is Yx(y') x C2(x).
We get:
product(Yi(y')) = C2(x) (11.7)
and since we would now expect strong fertilisation to apply, it can instantiate
Y2 and C2 to the identity function. It should not be too difficult to work out
that Y1(y') is just the new free variable introduced for the induction, and has
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no actual dependence on y'. This should be enough to identify the induction
scheme.
We would have to do some work to identify Y more generally, combining it
with a base case value.
This example is artificially simple because so few wave rules are present, and
there are no case-splits, but it shows the approach has potential.
Conjecturing Lemmas
Within strong proof structures, it could happen that we would have a proof
which almost succeeded, but lacked some crucial lemma. If a general form were
known for such a lemma, because of the role it was expected to perform, it might
be possible to conjecture an appropriate lemma, and allow MO R proof to fill in
the details.
For example, we might use this for dynamic ripple formation - the ability to
combine the use of a collection of lemmas so that their totality constituted a
ripple. This would allow us to build ripples using commutativity, for example,
which are not available to us now, unless we work out all the possible permuta¬
tions.
Progressive Instantiation of Meta-Variables
Currently, instantiation of meta-variables is a top-down operation. We unify a
variable X and a constant c, and the result is c. This is inherent in the algorithm.
Of course it is up to us how and to what we apply it. In fact there are
occasions when we would wish to be more flexible. Choosing to unify the whole
of X with c denies the possibility that X could be composite, X'(X"), say. In
which case we might have reason to explore the possibility that just X" unifies
with c. This would leave X' to be identified subsequently.
Of course there could be an ascending chain of X'(X"(...Xwe could
always postulate the existence of a composite variable like this and rely on the
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possibility of outer functional meta-variables being projections to reproduce the
straightforward case which has been sufficient in all my examples so far.
This could be useful in the newer versions of ClAM if we were trying to use
a sequence of ripples to achieve the transfer of the wavefront as required, and
the functional meta-variable corresponded to a just such a composite function.
However there is an obstacle to implementing this now, in that we would need
to know the types of all the meta-variables X,X' and X" at the outset for the
unification algorithm. We may be able to deduce X's type, but that would be
all we would know about X' and X", i.e. there would be a "type gap" between
them. David Pym's algorithm should make it possible to find these unknown
types.
11.2.3 Extending Proof Structure for Conditionals
In the constructive logic framework, tail-recursion is determined by the way we
use the induction hypothesis. The witness for this hypothesis is the construction
corresponding to the recursive call in the function definition. If we are able to use
it (or one of its subterms) alone as the justification of the goal, then no further
work is required after the recursive call, and the function is tail-recursive. If
instead we have to embed it in some function, that function application enters
into the construction, which is no longer tail-recursive. In my definition of tail-
recursion, I mentioned the possibility of conditionals. The function surrounding
the recursive call could just be a condition. That is a complication I do not
address in these proof structures, and it is an avenue for further work.
Generalisation
Signs of success or failure in a particular proof are still only partially understood,
and would benefit from more research. To be able to control the proof of the
distributivity of x over + when all variables are x, this would be needed.
Advanced reasoning about the nature of equality is an essential element of
this. The analysis I provided in chapter 9 on failure and success in induction is
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only a rough guide to far more elaborate proof-theory. Such theory should be
adaptable to provide us with more precise heuristics. Problems with it are that
it is usually directed at number theory only, and that the induction schemes it
assumes are far stronger than any we have access to.
The proof theoretic notion of "if this were provable, it would be by steps
Si/would have been by steps S2" is something we make little use of in our work,
yet there are such results [Sieg 90]. With adaptation to the theories we use,
they might help us build heuristics suggesting how many inductions should be
required for a successful proof attempt, or how many sinks.
11.2.4 Other Applications of MO Jl
Other Types of Generalisation
Within the category of generalising to assist induction, it is possible to generalise
in other ways than I have done so far. I described these in chapter 9.
I have made attempts to generalise constants to act as induction variables.
This is a standard technique mathematicians use, and is an obvious next step,
using techniques similar to those I have already described for variables. Van der
Waerden's proof of Baudet's conjecture [der Waerden 71] does this, starting with
a conjecture about splitting the positive integers into two classes, and eventually
proving its equivalent for any number of classes.
These kinds of generalisation are simple cases of the overarching result that
proving any proposition over all the members of a set covers all its subsets or
indeed any member. Many generalisations are in this category. Some of these
should be quite accessible to MOZ.
Complementary to these generalisations is the technique of weakening hy¬
potheses. Van der Waerden's proof uses this too, by proving a result assuming
only a finite subset instead of the infinite set of positive integers.
Clearly there are many more forms of generalisation, at least some of which
should be accessible to MO2. In all of them, as with the examples I have studied
288
so far, an analysis of what generalisation achieves should drive this, if one is
available. Otherwise it is very hard to know when to initiate the generalisation.
A theoretical source of information may be found from cut elimination results.
These show whether or not the cut rule of inference is needed for a given theory
expressed in a given logic. This is relevant because the cut rule of inference is used
to insert the generalised version of the theorem into the proof. If the cut rule is
not necessary, generalisation is not necessary either. If the cut rule is necessary,
then the point at which the proof of the cut elimination theorem breaks down
may be a pointer to the types of generalisation which may be needed.
Cut elimination theorems are constructive, working through all the circum¬
stances in which a cut might be used, and showing how in each case it could be
replaced by some other cut-free proof fragment. Hence the nature of a failure
indicates certain key features about the theory, which are liable to need cuts, and
hence generalisation. These might indicate some kinds of generalisation which
might be needed, and indicate enough about their form to suggest how MOR
could be used.
Even if they are not necessary for proof, certain kinds of generalisation could
still be necessary to achieve special effects on the extract term as with the tail-
recursion proofs.
Learning from Failure
Learning from failure forms part of the guidance in instigating a MOR attempt,
and in suggesting a speculation. Boyer & Moore also use such techniques to
recognise the need to use induction in their theorem prover.
More widely, though, information about how failure has occurred is rarely
used to suggest likely next steps. This should be a promising avenue for MO R,
because often failures can be quite localised, and therefore amenable to patching.
MOR is an obvious tool to assist with such patching.
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/ 7 * x2dx
7 * / x2dx
fRi* x^^dx
OP1: / R * F(x)dx =>• R * / F(x)dx f|-
F\(x) * / xR^ldx
OP2: f x^-idx => ££ ft
Fi[x) f F2[x)dx
Figure 11—1: Example of LEX2's Constraint Back-Propagation
Learning
A candidate for the use of higher-order meta-variables, but not particularly
MOR, is the construction of patterns for problem solving. In this thesis the
patterns have been supplied, and the system has used them to find solutions.
An alternative way of using meta-variables is for discovering patterns.
LEX2 [Mitchell et al 83] uses constraint back-propagation to learn kinds of
tactics which are sequences of operators, and preconditions for the tactics which
are the combined preconditions of the operators. A small example is in figure
11.2.4 The solution to the integration problem (left-hand column) along with
the operators used to create it (centre) are givens. Their tactic is progressively
found in the right-hand column.
The letters used have special significance, denoting the types of objects they
may represent in the system's elaborate generalisation hierarchy in which
F may denote any first-order function
R may denote any rational number
In [Mitchell et al 83], the authors permit multiple uses of the same type-recording
letter to stand for different instances in the right-hand column, but not in the
rules. I have differentiated different instances for clarity, and convenience.
The task is to establish the properties of the initial expression which made
the chain of rewritings successful. This is worked out backwards, looking at each
operator, and seeing what the expression must have been like at the stage when
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the operator applied, in order for it to be applicable. We know from the form of
the final expression in the actual solution that the end point is the product of
two terms.
The preconditions of OP2 are embodied in its left-hand side - an expression
of the form / xRdx where R is not —1. Fi[x) must be xR2.
Continuing to work backwards, this has to be all or part of the expression
resulting from applying OP 1, so the right-hand side of OP 1 must fit it. This
forces F\(x) to be a rational number, Ri, say.
The preconditions of the tactic are now a (sub)term of the form
LEX2 avoids using higher-order meta-variables by using its generalisation
hierarchy of types of function. Instead of more information restricting identity
by unifying, it moves down the hierarchy to a more specific type.
An alternative would be to
• skip the separate type hierarchy,
• use meta-variables for the functions and expressions, and
• use unification to accumulate the preconditions.
Robin Boswell, an earlier student in the Mathematical Reasoning Group,
started to explore this topic, but did not pursue it far [Boswell 89].
Tutoring
If we believe that the MOR approach has improved our ability to emulate human
thought processes this brings closer the possibility of using MOR, and specifically
the ClAM system, as part of a tutoring system, in which the computer could track
the process the human was/should be attempting.
Tuition could concentrate on planning, heuristics or proof.
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Improving Interactive/Co-operative Proof Planning
In an interactive system it should be possible to let the human insert meta¬
variables standing for object-level entities as they wish. The computer system
could suggest instantiations or directions for proof. The human could accept or
override these, proceeding with the proof while computer noticed any constraints
and acted accordingly.
Conceivably, the human could indicate a desired goal state using meta¬
variables and leave it to computer to reach it.
Search Control
The tail-recursive .M0£ system I described only ever used one meta-variable
at once, within an overall proof structure. For the work on generalisation with
multiple meta-variables and wavefronts, choosing what to work on first became
more problematic. I described some simple heuristics in chapter 9.
In more general cases, with multiple subgoals to decide amongst as well, an
extended search control heuristic might be needed, paying attention to a number
of other measures.
We might choose to develop the most instantiated subgoals or wavefronts.
With plenty of information, there should be least search available and fastest
rejection of failure branches. In the case of choosing subgoals, this might be
refined if we expected to apply a particular method. In that case, we might only
be interested in the degree of instantiation of the subterm on which the method
would act.
Alternatively, we might look for cases involving meta-variables where the
options were fewest, so the search space branched least, and we could hope to
find a successful branch easiest from a small number.
Another possibility is to try to make choices which are "most informative"
in reducing the number of meta-variables.
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Selecting a heuristic to achieve this is a research topic in itself. It is a task
equivalent to that faced by a meta-interpreter. For some of these options there
is a considerable overhead even in discovering the information in order to make
a decision.
Middle-Out Planning
The MOZ in this work is purely at the object level. For greater flexibility
and better human emulation, we should also attempt middle-out planning. The
need for this becomes obvious just from considering the induction method. This
method produces a variable number of base and step cases, depending on the
induction scheme chosen. That is not a problem when we have chosen the
induction scheme, since that determines the number and type of subgoals. If
the induction scheme is what we want MOZ to suggest, the planner must be
able to accept for its list of output sequents a variable list of indeterminate
length, with at most the assumption of one step case, whose structure remains
to be fixed.
A harder example of middle-out planning is the use of a case-split. The
need for one is usually only discovered at a deeper branch of the proof. This
necessitates going back up the proof tree, choosing the best point for the insertion
of the case-split, and then re-doing the resulting branches, possibly using the
previous proof attempt.
Meta-Variable Types
As I noted in section 11.1 recent work by David Pym [Pym 90] extends Huet's
algorithm to permit variables of dependent types to have the dependent parts
of those types variable and then unify the objects' types as well as the objects.
Implementing this would be a useful extension for two reasons. Firstly, we would
be using a unification system better suited to the underlying logic. Secondly, our
reasoning would be more thoroughly middle-out, we would not always need to
commit ourselves in advance to the type of a meta-variable object, if it could be
293
inferred as the identity of the object was inferred, from the proof requirements.
As yet, Pym's algorithm could not infer the types of all the kinds of meta¬
variables used in MOZ. In practice, this change would not affect the tasks I
have used here, but would make the whole technique's implementation more
principled.
11.3 General Conclusions
MOZ at the meta-level incorporating higher-order unification has been studied
as a tool for guiding inductive theorem proving. It has been shown to be useful
in two areas
• Tail-recursive synthesis. By using the proofs-as-programs principle to char¬
acterise proof structures which correspond to tail-recursive programs, we
can synthesise programs from specifications. MO Z deduces the identity of
functions required for the new definition using the proof-planning method¬
ology for control.
• Generalisation. MO Z offers a principled and unified approach to a number
of classes of generalisation previously treated separately.
Although higher-order unification can be hard to control, it is manageable. More
control can be gained over it by knowledge about the type of unification required
for a particular problem. Reduction to matching can be achieved through an
understanding of proof structure.
In both of the areas for which MOZ has been explored, the key to success
has been the existence of a detailed analysis of the structure of successful proofs.
Such structural knowledge will inevitably be needed in general, as there is no way
that meta-variables can be controlled if they are not introduced for a purpose.
Structural analyses of proofs yield information which can be used to
• guide the decision to attempt MOZ,
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• indicate how meta-variables should be introduced,
• control the proof steps which suggest the values of the meta-variables,
• restrict the unification and instantiation process.
The MO2 technique is a considerable enhancement to our ability to describe
plans for theorem-proving. This kind of flexible planning seems to correspond
well with the behaviour of human mathematicians.
More broadly, MO 2 can be seen to be a valuable tool with great potential
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'/, identification branch - induction
scheme(Scheme,Var:T,H==>Generalised.BSeqs,SSeqs),
1, identification branch - step case
i
maplist (SSeqs ,SSeq:=> '/,SSeq2-
(Waves then Fert),











% identification branch - base case




































% Higher order unification routine is interfaced by
% making a copy with hou-style ground variable for
'/, Prolog variables, and working on the copy. This















1, find full hole paths
maplist(SWIs,SWI:=>WI.append(SWI,WO,WI),WIs).




'/. Experimental fast rejection of irrelevant rules -





Use of prolog variables for meta-variables means that
we must do a lot of working typing things. The unifier
works on ground, labelled variables. For the sake of both
efficiency, and having all the information there when you
need it, I do all the type checking and instantiation
here, rather than each time I want to do a bit of
unification. I then work with the copies until the tactic
has succeeded, when I instantiate the real thing.
% grounds vbles with
% atoms, beta-reduces,










*L ho unify all holes
maplist(LWavelnnerFronts,
HI:=>Subst_for_Hole,
'/, hole in rule
(exp_at(PureL,HI,LH),











% and subst in L:=>R
hou_apply_subst_set(Gr_L:=>Gr_R, HolesSubsts,
Gr_Ll:=>Gr_Rl),
% and in H==>G
hou_apply_subst_set(Gr_H==>Gr_G, HolesSubsts,
Gr_Hl==>Gr_Gl).








'/, k subst in L:=>R
hou_apply_subst_set(Gr_Ll:=>Gr_Rl, FrontSubst,
Gr_L2:=>Gr_R2).








'/, must be strictly more
append( [_ I _] ,Pos , WO) , */, than the wavefront
exp_at(PureMatrix2,Pos,Wave),
hou_sub(Pure_Gr_L2,Wave,FrontSubst.FnSubst.WaveSubst,_)
'/, need to trap any
% substs which embed
% a universal variable










% having operated on a















Examples of Tail-Recursive Synthesis
Plans
For the first example, the whole run is shown, including loading all the rules etc.
In subsequent examples, all the same information is loaded, and that part of the
run has been omitted.
The MOR goal, the substitution, the generalised goal, and the plan produced
at the end has been formatted to be more readable, and annotated.
B.l Reverse
Script started on Wed Sep 25 10:20:16 1991
achtriochtan:iter_methods> testclam4.qui
Quintus Prolog Release 2.5.1 (Sun-4, SunOS 4.1)
Copyright (C) 1990, Quintus Computer Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
1310 Villa Street, Mountain View, California (415) 965-7700
CLaM Proof Planner Version 1.4 (libraries only) (28/7/91 19:05)
CLaM Proof Planner (with HOU) Version 1.4 (9/9/91 15:28)
ix
I ?- [ [ 'revload'].
[consulting /home/sinl/jane/oyster/thmlib/hou/iter_methods/revload.pi...]
[consulting /home/sinl/jane/oyster/thmlib/hou/iter_methods/defs_and_waves,
loading def(app)...done /* append of
loading eqn(appl)...done /* two lists
loading eqn(app2)...done
adding wave-record for app2...done
adding recursive-record for app...done
loading def(rev)... done /* reverse of
loading eqn(revl)...done /* a list
loading eqn(rev2)...done
adding wave-record for rev2...done
adding recursive-record for rev...done
loading def(plus)... done /* plus of
loading eqn(plusl)...done /* 2 numbers
loading eqn(plus2)...done
adding wave-record for plus2...done
adding recursive-record for plus...done
loading def(total)... done /* total of a
loading eqn(totall)...done /* list of numbers
loading eqn(total2)...done
adding wave-record for total2...done
adding recursive-record for total...done
loading def(length)... done /* length of
loading eqn(lengthl)...done /* a list
loading eqn(length2)...done
adding wave-record for length2...done
adding recursive-record for length...done
loading scheme(twos)... done /* 2-step induction






adding wave-record for half3...done
adding recursive-record for half...done
loading def(max)...done /* max of 2
loading eqn(maxl)...done /* numbers
loading eqn(max2)...done
loading eqn(max3)...done
adding wave-record for max3...done
adding recursive-record for max...done
loading def(greatest)...done /* greatest of a
loading eqn(greatestl)...done /* list of numbers
loading eqn(greatest2)...done
adding wave-record for greatest2...done
adding recursive-record for greatest... done
loading def(times)...done /* multiplication
loading eqn(times1)...done /* of two numbers
loading eqn(times2)...done
adding wave-record for times2...done
adding recursive-record for times...done
loading def(sigmaO)...done /* summation of
loading eqn(sigmaOl)...done /* the values of
loading eqn(sigma02)...done /* a function
adding wave-record for sigma02...done /* from 0 to n
adding recursive-record for sigmaO...done
loading thm(assmax)...done /* associativity
adding wave-record for assmax...done /* of max
adding wave-record for assmax...done
adding wave-record for assmax...done
adding wave-record for assmax...done
loading thm(transsplus)...done /* s(x)+y = x+s(y)
xi
adding wave-record for transsplus...done
adding wave-record for transsplus...done
loading thm(assp).. . done /* associativity
adding wave-record for assp...done /* of plus
adding wave-record for assp...done
adding wave-record for assp...done
adding wave-record for assp...done
loading thm(assm).. . . done /* associativity
adding wave-record for assm...done /* of times
adding wave-record for assm...done
adding wave-record for assm...done
adding wave-record for assm...done
loading thm(assapp),...done /* associativity
adding wave-record for assapp...done /* of append
adding wave-record for assapp...done
adding wave-record for assapp...done
adding wave-record for assapp...done
loading thm(dist)..,. done /* distributivity
adding wave-record for dist...done /* of times over
adding wave-record for dist...done /* plus
adding wave-record for dist...done
adding wave-record for dist...done
loading thm(length),...done /* length step
adding wave-record for length...done /* case as theorem
loading thm(half)..,. done /* half step case
adding wave-record for half...done /* as theorem
adding wave-record for half...done
loading thm(appsingle)...done /* app(x,y::z)
adding wave-record for appsingle ... done/* =app(app(x,
adding wave-record for appsingle ... done/* y::nil),z)
loading thm(plus2right)...done /* x+s(y)=s(x+y)
adding wave-record for plus2right... done
adding wave-record for plus2right...done
loading thm(times2right)...done /* times(x,s(y))
adding wave-record for times2right...done/*=x+times(x,y)
loading thm(applright)...done /* app(x,nil)=x
adding reduction-record for applright...done
loading thm(plusIright)... done /* x+0=x
adding reduction-record for plusIright...done
loading thm(timeslright)...done /* times(x,0)=0
adding reduction-record for timesIright... done
[defs_and_waves_load.pl consulted 11.783 sec 109,932 bytes]
loading thm(trrev)...done
[revload.pl consulted 11.850 sec 111,404 bytes]
yes
I ?- display.
trrev: [] incomplete autotactic(idtac)

















of acc in pnat list
Function Substitution:
hou_subst(lambda(q454.lambda(q453,app(q454,q453))),q452)
















































































of acc in pnat
Function Substitution:
hou_subst(lambda(q289,lambda(q288.times(q289,q288))),q287)





























































trlength: [] incomplete autotactic(idtac)













of acc in pnat
Function Substitution:
hou_subst(lambdaCq256,lambda(q255.plus(q255,q256))),q254)

















































































of acc in pnat
Function Substitution:
hou_subst(lambda(q763,lambda(q762.plus(q763,q762))),q761)


















Terminating method at depth 0:
tr_gen_strat(seq(x:pnat=>
g:(pnat=>pnat)=>
acc:pnat=>
y:pnat#y=sigmaO(g,x)+acc in pnat,
new[gen])
then [ induction(s(vO),x:pnat)
then[ apply(sym_eval([.]))
then repeat intro
then intro(acc)
then apply(tautology(...))
•
wave([2,1,2,1,2,2].
[m:pnat=>
xxiv
f:(pnat=>pnat)=>
sigmaOCf,s(m))=
f(s(m))+sigmaO(f,m)
in pnat,
left
]
)
then wave([2,1,2,2],
[x:pnat=>
y:pnat=>
z:pnat=>
x+(y+z)=x+y+z
in pnat,
right
]
)
then strong_fertilize(vl)
].
beta_reduce(gen)
then repeat_intro_and_copy(gen,NewHyp)
then elim(NewHyp,on(0),new[je] )
then [ wfftacs
•
elimCje,new[jv,jw,jl])
then intro(jv)
then[wfftacs,
rewrite(jw),
wfftacs
]
3
xxv
